The Tanker Drama Back To Square One

Northrop has decided not to bid for the tanker RFP, and EADS will not go it alone. So Boeing is now the de facto winner of the KC-X competition, as was the case nearly 10 years ago. France and Germany are crying foul and may punish the US for a narrow RFP, we'll see how that turns out. Some of the observers seem to have forgotten that this is merely the first stage of the USAF tanker replacement program. There are the KC-Y and KC-Z to come.

So France and Germany need to pace themselves on that protesting part. The KC-330 has never been a good replacement for the KC-135s; its performance more approximates the KC-10(KC-Y/Z?). The USAF is clearly interested in a wide-body tanker, they just screwed up their own acquisition program in pursuing the KC-330.

Still, I'm glad that we will start saving on the O&M money of maintaining the outdated KC-135s.

ETA: Formatting and links

Take Back Your Kilometer!

MAJ Ehrhart's paper, "Taking Back the Last Half Kilometer", has been making the rounds these past few days. It is an interesting paper on the tactical and technical deficiencies of the American and allied infantry in Afghanistan, using a 5.56mm carbine against enemy mortar attacks up to 2km away.

However, this is not a new problem. Mountain warfare experiences from WW2 and Indo-Pakistan wars have shown the necessity to engage enemy infantry beyond 500m. Some writers had warned, for example, that the US Marines reinforcing the Scandinavian flank during a Soviet invasion should bring the 7.62mm M-14 rifles with them to handle the mountainous terrain of Norway. For infantry warfare, there are two extremes: the close range (within 100m) of most infantry combat, and the long range (500m-1000m) requirements of mountain warfare.

To meet this combat requirement, the 6.8mm booster club would like to push the 6.8mm intermediate-intermediate cartridge onto the military. [Intermediate-intermediate because 5.56mm was originally sold as the intermediate cartridge.] They've been looking to get rid of the 5.56mm since its inception, and this is about as good a chance as they're going to get. The 6.5mm club is getting some airtime, too, but they're really too small compared to the 6.8mm club. However, due to the Army's historical foot-dragging on topics like this, this is not likely to happen. [Iraq was too close-quartered for their arguments to be effective, whereas our long war in Afghanistan will bring them many more instances of 5.56mm ineffectivenss.]

On the other hand, there are a couple of fixes we can implement fairly quickly, to meet this combat requirement of engaging enemies 500m to 1000m, with infantry squad weapons. The answers are the 40mm grenade and, surprise, the 5.56mm M-4 carbine.

Currently the 40x46mm unguided, low velocity grenade has a maximum range of 400m with an elevated trajectory. By putting a pair of pop-out fins and a laser seeker on the grenade, we can easily double the range of the grenade out to 800m. It's good timing, too, because the US Army just transitioned from the sliding breech M203 launcher to the swiveling breech M320 launcher. The M320 launcher can accommodate the increased length of the guidance package. Due to the low muzzle velocity of the grenade (76m/s), which is well-below that of common missiles, guidance integration should not be an issue. This development effort would take some time, but will be relatively fast due to the low technical risks involved. A smart grenade would be a "leap-ahead" technology the brass will love, so there will be few bureaucratic obstacles to its adoption. Long-term this grenade is the ideal solution to the mortar ambush scenario. The area effect of the grenade will easily suppress the insurgent mortar crews.

While we are waiting on the smart grenade, the infantry in the field can use their 5.56mm M-4 carbine to suppress the far-away enemy. But wait, you say, isn't the whole problem we're facing that 5.56x45mm cannot reach beyond 500m? Actually, the 5.56mm can go all the way out to 2,000m. The only problem is that you cannot aim it accurately beyond 500m, because the bullet is too light and will drift off course. Back in World War I, the bolt-action rifles all had sights that ranged out to 1,000m, even though few people can aim that far without scopes. [Even today, AK-47 sights can adjust out to 1,000m.] Back then, infantry often had to provide its own fire support, sometimes without help from artillery. The whole regiment would line up, adjust the sights out to 1km, then fire at that target together. The massed rifle fire would blanket that far away target with a rain of lead bullets. The mass fire compensates for the inaccuracy of the individual rifle and man at that distance. Similarly, the machine guns of the era had long range sight markings for indirect-fire, area suppressions. Machine guns were organized in batteries then, and they would mass arcing fire on targets kilometers away.

We can do the same thing today. A squad or two can mass their fire against the suspected insurgent position. A squad of M-4s can generate the fire volume of a WW1 battalion by aiming together. With a bit of range experimentation, you can easily figure out how to shoot out to 1km. I did a bit of calculation and I found that you probably need to elevate your muzzle by 0.28 degrees to shoot 1km. According to online ballistic calculators, you will need about a 1 degree elevation. So work with that and try it out. A bit of Kentucky windage in the field will get you close enough to the target to suppress them. A rain of steel and lead will make the insurgents think twice of mortaring you.

Of course, you still need to close with and assault the enemy. A squad can suppress the position while other squads maneuver to close the distance. You will need at least a squad to generate the fire volume to suppress out to 1km.

Some people will say that the 5.56mm cartridge does not have enough energy to kill a man at 1km. However, try standing out there, without a helmet, while bullets rain down around you. The 5.56mm still has enough energy to lodge inside your braincase at that distance.

So, write your Congresscritters to start this smart grenade program. In the meantime, start experimenting with the sights of your M-4 carbine. Your squad can still suppress that insurgent mortar team, despite what your training told you.

ETA: links and paragraph breaks

Afghanistan: Hearts & Minds vs Security

Today's bombing in Kabul illustrates both India's investment in the Afghanistan Enterprise(tm) and the tradeoffs of waging a proxy war. I have previously commented on the neighbors' involvement in Afghanistan, so I will focus on this low-intensity side war for this article.



As I said before, Afghanistan is a war on multiple levels. Like Shakespeare, warfare theorists of all stripes can draw a favored conclusion from the Afghan war. China and India are waging a low-intensity war of influence in Afghanistan, and today we see the limitations of that approach.



All of the neighboring states have a strategic interest in a stable Afghanistan. India in particular needs a moderate and prosperous government in Kabul to both contain Pakistan and contest Central Asian states [against China]. However, due to its "Third World, Non-Interventionist" ideology, India is afraid of a direct intervention in Afghanistan. (A phobia China shares.) Therefore, India wages a war of proxy means, with money, tribes, and merchants. To date, India appears to have a moderate success in buying allies, though it has no better luck (than NATO) at fostering governance in Kabul. Therefore, we can charitably grade the Indian Campaign a C- at meeting their strategic goals. [The Americans, on the other hand, get a D+ for its Afghan governance goals, and a C for its counter-terrorism goals.]



In waging this proxy war, India accepts certain vulnerabilities. India cannot guarantee security of its embassy staff, let alone that of its citizens in-country. Without its own military boots on the ground, India has to rely on its allies and mercenary proxies to provide mediocre security. [India's own ridiculous gun laws also mean that Indian mercenary/security firms have difficulty training in India, instead must go to, say, Afghanistan, to get firearm training.] [ITBP's deployment is too small to meet all security needs.]



Therefore, India is literally paying the price for the American failure to stabilize Afghanistan, in terms of both the security "tax" its development projects and business pay, and its casualties thus far.



This isn't to say that India will stop losing people only if it deploys the Regulars. Or that allies and mercenaries cannot provide effective security. [See Xe] To meet its strategic goals, India must get close to the Afghan people. Which means that Indians must get off secure zones and into villages and bazaars to do business. Which means that they face risks of ambushes and kidnapping. India's security problem is its secured zones, or what Americans would call Forward Operating Bases.



A secured zone is where your people live and sleep, such as the hotel attacked today. The biggest reason India lost people today is because their security posture is too open. India's desire to be a "non-intervention, self-determination" soft power in Afghanistan dictates a low-profile, open, passive security posture. India's effort at pioneering "Third Way" diplomacy and differentiating themselves from the hardened American FOBs made them vulnerable to an attack like this.



[Of course, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, the competence of Indian security services is an open question.]



The point of my analysis is that an open, passive security posture is foolish and does not contribute toward your "Hearts and Minds" political goals at all. It just helps your enemies to kill you faster. Letting your guards slouch at their post and waving people through the checkpoint does not win you any points. An alert guards who pats people down with respect and a smile, however, does.



"Hearts & Minds" politicians and consultants often fail to realize that it is not the macro-level initiatives, such as blast barriers, check points, gun-toting security, etc, that turn the natives against you. It is the micro-level, man-to-man details that gets you, like yelling at people, manhandling through a pat down, etc. Soft power is all well and good, but security is the enabler for your soft power capabilities. Being aggressive in your security posture allows you to complete your projects and help people.



As Bryan McGrath has pointed out, "Hearts & Minds" are nice, but it easily degenerates into slogans and feel-good seminars. You are not going to make people like you, if they hate you to begin with. However, you can build trust and respect, even with enemies. Pussyfooting around security will not change anybody's minds.

Annual China-Taiwan-US Rituals

Sorry for the few updates recently. Have been busy at work with assignment changes.

I saw this protest from China over the proposed Taiwan foreign military sales currently pending in Congress. This happens everytime that it is practically a ritual of form.

Perhaps, to keep face, China needs to make some noise. And perhaps it is a slow news day for the news media, who have to report this kind of stuff. However, it struck me that China should be happy about all sales to Taiwan. In fact, it is in China's strategic interest to encourage Taiwan to buy as much stuff from the US as possible.

To understand this logic, you need to accept the premise that re-unification is the inevitable conclusion. 70 years is a blink in the eye of the Chinese culture. The people across the strait shares too much to keep up the separation. The independence movement has support from some parts of Taiwan, but Taiwan is too enmeshed in the Chinese economic system to make that a political reality. It may be in the strategic interests of some countries to keep Taiwan separate, but do not confuse strategic interest with reality.

Anyway, if Taiwan will eventually re-unify with China, [and a peaceful reunification looks more hopeful everyday], then any Taiwanese technology will eventually become Chinese technology. If Taiwan buys or builds submarines, they will become Chinese subs down the road. If Taiwan gets some F-16 technology from the US, that will end up in Chinese hands anyway. So whatever Taiwan can get from the US, is a net-plus to China.

The US needs to consider this possibility in its FMS process. But it does not materially change the FMS calculus. The US is officially for a peaceful reunification, and the FMS package supports that end. The US and China are not adversaries yet, just competitors and symbiots. Some parts of the US national security apparatus are arguing for an adversarial interpretation of the Sino-American relationship, but that remains a non-official view. Above all, the US strives for stability in the global economic system to foster economic growth. An ascendant China, in itself, is agnostic to that strategic goal.

So here is another way to interpret the on-going China-Taiwan-US soap opera.

Haiti and Gangs

I've been looking into Haiti's security problems (which will soon make it into the news). Poverty is an issue, but mostly as it increases the payoff for violence. Before the quake, Haiti was experiencing food riots due to price increases, starting in 2008. The food riots have empowered the gangs in enforcing security and sourcing food, and the corruption opportunity from the inflowing aid will only intensify gang competition and warfare. Port-au-Prince may well descend into Mogadishu-style misery as gangs and tribes compete for the foreign aid teat.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiti

At the same time, we have few pleasant choices to uplift Port-au-Prince from violent anarchy. With the high stakes of starvation and death, the gangs have plenty of motivation to "fight to the death". We cannot hold the gangs back from armed competition through negotiations, because of the high incentives from going violent.

At the same time, there were few police in Haiti to begin with, plus the 9,000 UN peacekeepers. Without a massive infusion of police and military into Haiti, we cannot guarantee a completely fair distribution of food and water. The abject poverty of Haiti encourages the gangs to hoard as much supplies as possible, for the day when yankees leave. Wherever out of sight of the soldiers, they will be fighting over that one bag of flour.

If we will not send in the military (American or Brazilian), the fastest way to restore order in Haiti will be to ally ourselves with the strongest gang in every district. They are the biggest boots on the ground, the ones best able to secure their own families. At the same time, it will mean the near-death of their local rivals.

On balance, though, the near tyranny of the lord of the town is better than a fought-over street corner, for the civilians. At least they don't have to worry about the stray bullets. Not picking a side in the gang warfare only prolongs the violence on civilian supporters.

Long-term, Haitian agriculture cannot support the population density on the island. Therefore, Haiti has to industrialize and develop its tourism industry. Economic development, however, cannot take place in anarchy. There has to be order before business can flower.

Haiti Relief and Security Challenge

Galrahn at Information Dissemination raised many interesting observations and questions about Haiti. For the US military, Haiti certainly looks to be THE OTHER Contingency Operation of this new decade, and whose committment may dwarf the Balkan operations in scope. At least in the Balkans, the Europeans were doing the heavy-lifting in funding and boots on the ground. The Bosnians were also better off economically than Haitians.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/all-things-maritime-and-haiti.html

For a comparison, Kosovo has 1.8 million people, comparable to metro Port-au-Prince's 1.7 million. KFOR at its height had 4 brigades and 50,000 soldiers, of which only 7,000 were from the US. Where will we find 50,000 soldiers (roughly 2 divisions) in the US without disrupting dwell time?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_Force

Security may not seem a concern right now because of the human suffering. However, as we have seen in Iraq, people get angry real fast, especially when comparing the perceived omnipotence of the US military with the reality. When the survivors start dying due to inadequate aid and gang disruptions, their relatives will be very upset. It will be sad if we see a repeat of Blackhawk Down, this time with another group of "skinnies".

G also brought up the potential immigration challenge. We almost definitely will have to dust off the camps at Gitmo. For some Haitians, it could be a return to familiar ground.

Some people in Galrahn's comments have suggested deployment of cell towers and other communication infrastructure stuff. Sadly, the US military has no money to spend on this kind of "side missions". Perhaps some state emergency management agencies have this asset available for deployment. If the USAID or State Department can organize this kind of deployment of American emergency management assets, that will be a big help to the Haitians, good practice for the states, and good precedence and practice for soft power deployment in the State Department.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/earthquake-in-haiti.html

Perhaps I need to get ready for a mobilization into Haiti myself...

China Raising Reserve Requirements

China certainly responds fast with monetary policy measures. It has raised bank reserve requirements and debt interest rates.

http://business.theatlantic.com/2010/01/china_tightens_monetary_policy.php

However, as I said earlier, the shadow finance sector is less sensitive to central bank's dicta. Let's hope China succeeds at a soft-landing.