Prof. Stephen Walt said something I've talked about here before: The AARP is a bigger existential threat to America's national security than China. After all, China, despite its holding of Treasury bills, is not going to zero out the DoD's budget by 2075, whereas AARP's Medicare will.
To my international readers: This is why you need to look at your own healthcare system carefully. It will limit your ability to afford the good stuff like an aircraft carrier.
Lauren found her dream laptop. Find the PC that's right for you.
Thursday, July 16, 2009
Grooming and Personality More Important Than Looks
It's nice to know that grooming (being clean-looking) is more important than general attractiveness, at least for men. It's a trait firmly under our control.
Lauren found her dream laptop. Find the PC that's right for you.
Lauren found her dream laptop. Find the PC that's right for you.
China and Nigeria
This piece of news is a reflection of the growing ties between China and Nigeria. It will be interesting to observe how the various economically-dominant minorities in Africa maneuver against each other, Lebanese vs Indians vs now Chinese.
Another point is the MEND insurgency in Nigeria, one of the more successful Global Guerrillas in the world. With China getting increasingly involved in the extraction industries in Africa, including Nigeria, how will these insurgencies react? Will China deploy public and private advisors to these governments to improve their security? Will MEND cells in China take root?
Windows Live™: Keep your life in sync. Check it out.
Another point is the MEND insurgency in Nigeria, one of the more successful Global Guerrillas in the world. With China getting increasingly involved in the extraction industries in Africa, including Nigeria, how will these insurgencies react? Will China deploy public and private advisors to these governments to improve their security? Will MEND cells in China take root?
Windows Live™: Keep your life in sync. Check it out.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
TTP for Anti-Ship Missile Launcher Sites
Galrahn at Information Dissemination is talking about a possible Iranian missile base in Eritrea, and the Israeli (possibly related) naval activity in the Red Sea. If Iran is building an anti-ship missile base in Eritrea to close down the Suez Canal, that will certainly give Iran a lot of leverage over Europe.
So naturally, there is a military need to shut down this missile base. Incidentally, I have an anecdote that is relevant to this situation. Hopefully, if you are planning for a similar scenario, you will find this useful.
About 10 or 11 years ago, I was in a seminar. The conclusion of the seminar was a military planning exercise. The scenario was, surprise, an Iranian missile launch site on one of its Strait of Hormuz islands.
The conditions of the scenario were:
1.) The missiles [Silkworm?] and their launchers were housed in a concrete blast-resistant bunker. The bunker has clamshell doors on opposing ends, allowing the Iranians to launch missiles after they open the doors. The bunker construction precludes a Tomahawk strike.
2.) The post had SHORAD weapons, and nearby air bases limit air strike options.
3.) The post had a small garrison, squad to platoon size, including the missile technicians.
4.) Ground reinforcements were 4 to 8 hours away.
5.) A Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operation Capable) and its Amphibious Ready Group were within flight range.
6.) Iran had just declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, and we have observed activity at the post to make the missiles operational within 24 hours.
The mission was, To absolutely, positively disable the facility. Because of the bunker construction, an air strike might leave the missiles operational. So a ground presence is necessary regardless to ensure the facility's destruction.
Obviously, they structured the parameters to force a platoon/company raid on the planners. Which is basically what we all came up with. I used the mortars to take out the radio tower/antennae before starting the assault, while others went after the garrison right away.
The challenge here, though, is the bunker. One guy suggested using Dragon missiles to blow the doors, but the Marine Colonel, who facilitated the exercise, said that had a high likelihood of failing. The Colonel said that he would have used C-4 explosives to breach the bunker. Just had to make everyone schlep a bag of C-4 onto the objective.
My idea, though, was to bring some quick-setting cement along the raid. A few engineers will mix the cement on the objective, and fill in the seams around the blast doors. By the time the reinforcements arrive, the cement would have cured. They thus cannot open up the bunker doors, rendering the bunker, and the missiles inside, useless. With a sealed bunker, the Iranians would have to either build a new bunker, which takes time, or site new missile launchers in the open, which is ripe for a Tomahawk strike.
The Colonel thought it was a neat idea. Hopefully we never have to try this idea for real.
[You might think of a SEAL raid in the beginning, but a SEAL platoon (14 people) possibly cannot schlep enough stuff to take on the bunker.]
Windows Live™: Keep your life in sync. Check it out.
So naturally, there is a military need to shut down this missile base. Incidentally, I have an anecdote that is relevant to this situation. Hopefully, if you are planning for a similar scenario, you will find this useful.
About 10 or 11 years ago, I was in a seminar. The conclusion of the seminar was a military planning exercise. The scenario was, surprise, an Iranian missile launch site on one of its Strait of Hormuz islands.
The conditions of the scenario were:
1.) The missiles [Silkworm?] and their launchers were housed in a concrete blast-resistant bunker. The bunker has clamshell doors on opposing ends, allowing the Iranians to launch missiles after they open the doors. The bunker construction precludes a Tomahawk strike.
2.) The post had SHORAD weapons, and nearby air bases limit air strike options.
3.) The post had a small garrison, squad to platoon size, including the missile technicians.
4.) Ground reinforcements were 4 to 8 hours away.
5.) A Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operation Capable) and its Amphibious Ready Group were within flight range.
6.) Iran had just declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, and we have observed activity at the post to make the missiles operational within 24 hours.
The mission was, To absolutely, positively disable the facility. Because of the bunker construction, an air strike might leave the missiles operational. So a ground presence is necessary regardless to ensure the facility's destruction.
Obviously, they structured the parameters to force a platoon/company raid on the planners. Which is basically what we all came up with. I used the mortars to take out the radio tower/antennae before starting the assault, while others went after the garrison right away.
The challenge here, though, is the bunker. One guy suggested using Dragon missiles to blow the doors, but the Marine Colonel, who facilitated the exercise, said that had a high likelihood of failing. The Colonel said that he would have used C-4 explosives to breach the bunker. Just had to make everyone schlep a bag of C-4 onto the objective.
My idea, though, was to bring some quick-setting cement along the raid. A few engineers will mix the cement on the objective, and fill in the seams around the blast doors. By the time the reinforcements arrive, the cement would have cured. They thus cannot open up the bunker doors, rendering the bunker, and the missiles inside, useless. With a sealed bunker, the Iranians would have to either build a new bunker, which takes time, or site new missile launchers in the open, which is ripe for a Tomahawk strike.
The Colonel thought it was a neat idea. Hopefully we never have to try this idea for real.
[You might think of a SEAL raid in the beginning, but a SEAL platoon (14 people) possibly cannot schlep enough stuff to take on the bunker.]
Windows Live™: Keep your life in sync. Check it out.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Chinese PLA Officer Corps Promotion Cycle, and Some Notes on India
Here is an observation thread about China today. Most of the observations are valid, coming from different perspectives. The observation about their selective enforcement of laws can be jarring to a Westerner, but not news to anyone else. The Rule of Law is definitely one of the larger issues the international aid community is struggling with now.
One commenter there noted the rapid promotion cycle of PLA officers, compared to the US Army. American officers generally have made Lieutenant Colonels (O5) by their 20th year in commissioned service. [We're not talking about the guys who are retiring.] However, the People's Liberation Army expects its officers to make "Division-Commander-Equivalent" (O8-equivalent) by their 20th year. That is fast indeed.
The speed of promotion in PLA has several effects. One is that the pressure for promotion is correspondingly high. You are not only preparing for the promotion coming up, you're also preparing for every subsequent promotions. With the intense competition, every little mistake or blemish has huge consequences (Think Zero-Defect Mentality in the post-Cold War US Military.) So the officers are always afraid of stepping away from the group norm.
Another effect is that the sycophancy gets magnified. China has a gift-giving culture that Americans might call bribery, but similar to every other non-Western nation. In the PLA the officers obviously cannot afford much given their salary, but they're still expected to give something. Coupled that with the sycophancy natural in a political organization, even someone who wants to stay clean cannot do so.
On the other hand, their generals do become very good at reading people. To survive the promotion system, they have to be good at reading body language and socializing. That may give them an edge in certain military and political situations.
With so short a promotion cycle, the officers hardly spend any time at any position. In the US Army, battalion command is supposed to be a three year job, giving the lieutenant colonels some time to make their mark on the team. The staff also have time to learn and anticipate the commander's intent. In the PLA, commanders hardly spend any time on their post (probably a year at most). Just when the commander and his staff have gelled as a team, it's time for the commander to move on to his next position. He also does not have much time for schooling, definitely not the year-long CGSC and War Colleges American officers are accustomed to. He has to depend a lot on On the Job Training.
Another effect of the fast promotion system is that the PLA has to kick out a lot of young officers along the way. If you do not make that first promotion list, you probably will not be on the next one, either. With many government-owned companies in the defense sector and elsewhere, this provides a steady stream of employees.
Another effect is that the PLA has a small staff system. The US military let many not-likely-to-promote officers stick around to make their 20 years and qualify for retirement, in part to fill the many staff jobs. The PLA does not have that pool of bodies to draw on.
However, sycophancy does not imply mindless sucking up. The PLA does think about the future and values scholarly activity (a carryover from Confuscianism), as opposed to the anti-intellectual US Army. Combine that with the obedient officer corps. If the political leadership or the PLA brass needs to change their doctrine or organizational direction (eg, from centralized corps formations to decentralized battlegroups), the officer corps will quickly adapt and adopt their orders. That organizational flexibility cannot be discounted.
Some people in that observation thread mentions nepotism. It does exist, but its effect on the PLA is limited these days. With the economic growth of the past thirty years, there is a lot of money in the non-military sector. Generals are more likely to place their children in the government enterprise or private companies, to make money, than to groom them to follow the family tradition.
Compare and contrast the PLA system with that of India. Bharat-Rakshak recently had an interesting thread that touches on Indian Army's promotion system. [Another one talks about officer commissioning sources and touches on promotion, too.] The Indian promotion cycle is definitely slower than the PLA's, maybe slightly longer than America's. So the battalion commanders have more time to gell with their staffs.
Two features of the Indian system are worth noting though: Its top-heavy chain of command, and its emphasis on a full career.
The Indian Army is remarkably brass heavy, when compared to NATO formations. On the line units, they have majors (O4) commanding companies, colonels (O6) battalions, and brigadiers (O7) brigades. Coupled with the 5 to 6 years you typically spend in each rank, that makes for a long time between command billets. While the line commanders definitely get more maturity and "wisdom" for being so senior in their military career, they may also be more set in their ways.
Another part of the Indian system is their emphasis on career. Most of the Short Service Commission officers get out of the Indian Army at the five year mark. However, the permanent commissioned officers (like the Regular Army officers of yore) usually stay on until retirement. So the Indian Army has a big population of the field grade, permanent commissioned, officers on the payroll. This is as opposed to the American system where most officers separate from service between the fifth year mark and the twelfth year mark, with the rest holding out for the 20th year retirement. The "iron rice bowl" mentality associated with government career service makes the Indian Army more rigid, less mentally flexible, than the US military. Indian Army's military operations around the country keep its line units on their toes, but the institutional and support side of the army are slow and inflexible. The slower tail of the Indian Army may hold the line units back in an extended campaign.
Edited to add labels and remove signature.
One commenter there noted the rapid promotion cycle of PLA officers, compared to the US Army. American officers generally have made Lieutenant Colonels (O5) by their 20th year in commissioned service. [We're not talking about the guys who are retiring.] However, the People's Liberation Army expects its officers to make "Division-Commander-Equivalent" (O8-equivalent) by their 20th year. That is fast indeed.
The speed of promotion in PLA has several effects. One is that the pressure for promotion is correspondingly high. You are not only preparing for the promotion coming up, you're also preparing for every subsequent promotions. With the intense competition, every little mistake or blemish has huge consequences (Think Zero-Defect Mentality in the post-Cold War US Military.) So the officers are always afraid of stepping away from the group norm.
Another effect is that the sycophancy gets magnified. China has a gift-giving culture that Americans might call bribery, but similar to every other non-Western nation. In the PLA the officers obviously cannot afford much given their salary, but they're still expected to give something. Coupled that with the sycophancy natural in a political organization, even someone who wants to stay clean cannot do so.
On the other hand, their generals do become very good at reading people. To survive the promotion system, they have to be good at reading body language and socializing. That may give them an edge in certain military and political situations.
With so short a promotion cycle, the officers hardly spend any time at any position. In the US Army, battalion command is supposed to be a three year job, giving the lieutenant colonels some time to make their mark on the team. The staff also have time to learn and anticipate the commander's intent. In the PLA, commanders hardly spend any time on their post (probably a year at most). Just when the commander and his staff have gelled as a team, it's time for the commander to move on to his next position. He also does not have much time for schooling, definitely not the year-long CGSC and War Colleges American officers are accustomed to. He has to depend a lot on On the Job Training.
Another effect of the fast promotion system is that the PLA has to kick out a lot of young officers along the way. If you do not make that first promotion list, you probably will not be on the next one, either. With many government-owned companies in the defense sector and elsewhere, this provides a steady stream of employees.
Another effect is that the PLA has a small staff system. The US military let many not-likely-to-promote officers stick around to make their 20 years and qualify for retirement, in part to fill the many staff jobs. The PLA does not have that pool of bodies to draw on.
However, sycophancy does not imply mindless sucking up. The PLA does think about the future and values scholarly activity (a carryover from Confuscianism), as opposed to the anti-intellectual US Army. Combine that with the obedient officer corps. If the political leadership or the PLA brass needs to change their doctrine or organizational direction (eg, from centralized corps formations to decentralized battlegroups), the officer corps will quickly adapt and adopt their orders. That organizational flexibility cannot be discounted.
Some people in that observation thread mentions nepotism. It does exist, but its effect on the PLA is limited these days. With the economic growth of the past thirty years, there is a lot of money in the non-military sector. Generals are more likely to place their children in the government enterprise or private companies, to make money, than to groom them to follow the family tradition.
Compare and contrast the PLA system with that of India. Bharat-Rakshak recently had an interesting thread that touches on Indian Army's promotion system. [Another one talks about officer commissioning sources and touches on promotion, too.] The Indian promotion cycle is definitely slower than the PLA's, maybe slightly longer than America's. So the battalion commanders have more time to gell with their staffs.
Two features of the Indian system are worth noting though: Its top-heavy chain of command, and its emphasis on a full career.
The Indian Army is remarkably brass heavy, when compared to NATO formations. On the line units, they have majors (O4) commanding companies, colonels (O6) battalions, and brigadiers (O7) brigades. Coupled with the 5 to 6 years you typically spend in each rank, that makes for a long time between command billets. While the line commanders definitely get more maturity and "wisdom" for being so senior in their military career, they may also be more set in their ways.
Another part of the Indian system is their emphasis on career. Most of the Short Service Commission officers get out of the Indian Army at the five year mark. However, the permanent commissioned officers (like the Regular Army officers of yore) usually stay on until retirement. So the Indian Army has a big population of the field grade, permanent commissioned, officers on the payroll. This is as opposed to the American system where most officers separate from service between the fifth year mark and the twelfth year mark, with the rest holding out for the 20th year retirement. The "iron rice bowl" mentality associated with government career service makes the Indian Army more rigid, less mentally flexible, than the US military. Indian Army's military operations around the country keep its line units on their toes, but the institutional and support side of the army are slow and inflexible. The slower tail of the Indian Army may hold the line units back in an extended campaign.
Edited to add labels and remove signature.
Thursday, July 9, 2009
Prevention of Chronic Conditions Key to Healthcare Reform
Today's Fortune has an article saying that preventative care will not necessarily fix our health care budget problem. Much of the preventative care (health maintenance) today consists of minimizing complications of chronic diseases, such as eye exams for diabetics and statins for heart disease patients. These practices merely improve quality of life of patients and delay the inevitable, and increases our healthcare expenses.
Miller says, the key is to prevent these chronic diseases in the first place. I agree, and want to clarify my earlier healthcare article: When I said Prevention, I meant prevention of chronic diseases, not of complications.
Another point Miller brought up is that, as we live longer, cancer and organ failure becomes problems, which are costly and inevitable. Prevention won't fix that. That's another issue to ponder, and my earlier article did not adequately resolve this issue. Can we afford to keep alive all people who grow old enough to deal with geriatric cancer and organ failures? (As opposed to other patients who have remaining economic potentials.) Or, is this question a moral/ethical one, ie, We have to spend the money because it is inhumane to make the judgement?
Edited for tags and removal of signature
Miller says, the key is to prevent these chronic diseases in the first place. I agree, and want to clarify my earlier healthcare article: When I said Prevention, I meant prevention of chronic diseases, not of complications.
Another point Miller brought up is that, as we live longer, cancer and organ failure becomes problems, which are costly and inevitable. Prevention won't fix that. That's another issue to ponder, and my earlier article did not adequately resolve this issue. Can we afford to keep alive all people who grow old enough to deal with geriatric cancer and organ failures? (As opposed to other patients who have remaining economic potentials.) Or, is this question a moral/ethical one, ie, We have to spend the money because it is inhumane to make the judgement?
Edited for tags and removal of signature
New MRAP-like Capability Gaps
Paul McLeary of Aviation Week asked a question: What is our next MRAP-like capability gap? In other words, a capability gap that the US military has been underfunding, but which would be catastrophic in our next war?
I came up with 3 gaps, one for each of the departments, 'cuz I'm joint in my heart :)
1.) AAM seeker diversity: AIM-120 desperately needs an infrared seeker alternative. Or a hyperspectral sensor.
2.) Corvettes/Frigates/PCs for Navy: they need more smaller ships. that one will come up when we intervene in a coastal situation again. Galrahn is talking about this one right now.
2.) An airborne-capable tank would be nice.
One of the commenters said cyber, but that's kind of getting enough attention as it is. An MRAP like capability gap is usually very conventional and un-sexy. That's why we get "surprised" when it happens.
Anyone else have any thoughts?
Edited for tags and removal of signature
I came up with 3 gaps, one for each of the departments, 'cuz I'm joint in my heart :)
1.) AAM seeker diversity: AIM-120 desperately needs an infrared seeker alternative. Or a hyperspectral sensor.
2.) Corvettes/Frigates/PCs for Navy: they need more smaller ships. that one will come up when we intervene in a coastal situation again. Galrahn is talking about this one right now.
2.) An airborne-capable tank would be nice.
One of the commenters said cyber, but that's kind of getting enough attention as it is. An MRAP like capability gap is usually very conventional and un-sexy. That's why we get "surprised" when it happens.
Anyone else have any thoughts?
Edited for tags and removal of signature
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