Galrahn has been discussing AirSea Battle for quite awhile, specifically focusing on the absence of any Army contribution to the overall public discussion. It is quite sad that the Army has not publicly engaged on the AirSea discussion. Only this month has the AUSA come out with a rebuttal to the Navy and Air Force's public discussions.
One big reason Big Army is not contributing to this AirSea concept is because of internal Army politics. Specifically the decline of Air Defense Artillery. It is quite paradoxical that, while Ballistic Missile Defense has taken on greater strategic significance, Army itself is institutionally moving away from ADA in general.
ADA is composed of two components, HIMAD and SHORAD. For much of the 90s, the active officer corps was split 50/50: 10 Battalion of HIMAD and 10 Battalion of SHORAD. Right after OIF1, though, Big Army saw that there was no low-altitude threat at all, so it moved decisively to eliminate the SHORAD formation. I think right now there's only 10 Stinger/Avenger batteries providing a residual capability, which is a 75% cut.
You'd probably say it's long overdue, but the key is that the loss of 30%+ of total ADA corps means that many fewer O4s and O5s writing papers to Parameters and other professional journals. Sure, we have several ADA generals at the Pentagon, including the current G-8, but where do you think the generals' talking points come from? It's those O4s and O5s.
The BMD mission has slightly increased the HIMAD side of the house, but it did not make a dent against the SHORAD loss. The unit manning the GMD missile field is a Guard unit (Colorado/Alaska Guard), whose officers do not worry about professional journals. Ambitious officers transfer to other hot fields to make their stars.
ADA probably will never attain the reverence of the Soviet PVO branch, but its preoccupation with self-preservation means that Big Army has little brainpower thinking about AirSea. Horror upon horrors, but sometimes I wonder if we should have folded ADA into the USAF like the Europeans have...
Showing posts with label US Navy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Navy. Show all posts
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Monday, October 11, 2010
Naval Strategy and South China Sea
This article in Asia Times adds to our understanding of nationalist elements in Japan politics. The writer's pro-China bias is so thick that even I could pick it up, but he makes clear the current [and maybe emergent] Japanese strategy: Aggressively patrols the Senkaku Islands as territorial waters, but not crossing the bright line of settling the islands. Japan's strategic concern is in not antagonizing Taiwan on the Diaoyutai issue, which can strengthen the pro-unification camp in Taiwan. [The independence movement in Taiwan is pro-Japan for historical and geo-strategic reasons.] If Taiwan ever reunifies, Japan will settle the Senkakus in a heartbeat.
More broadly, Japan's overtures to Vietnam, and Phillipine's ASEAN rebuke to Sec. Clinton's South Sea remakrs, underscores an interesting anti-colonial dynamic [for lack of a better word] at play in South East Asia. [The Hate Triangle that is North East Asia is well-documented.]
In all ASEAN states [except Singapore and maybe Brunei], there are strong sentiments and biases against both China and America. [A bit of Japan, too, but that's faint compared to the other two.] The Chinese outposts in the South Sea are sore spots to the surrounding countries, but their people don't like the Americans, either. For example, Vietnam would really prefer Russia over the US in balancing China, but Russia cannot do more than sell weapons at present. In fact, Russia wants to refurbish Cam Ranh Bay, but we'll see if it actually happens. Up Country portrays well both the strategic inevitability of a US-Vietnam security alliance, and Vietnamese reluctance to do so.
Phillippines has been pissed off about the American evacuation of Clark Air Base in 1991. Its intelligentsia are suspicious of America over its support of Marcos regime. Indonesia has regional aspirations, colonial baggage, past military dictatorships, and an Islamic identity, all of which build the above bias as well.
All this is to say that the US may have no "entry point" into a Battle of the South Sea. While the US has a freedom of navigation concern, the combatants (China + one more) will not want its help in resolving the battle. The most likely scenario is where the US Navy escorts neutral convoys together with Singapore and Japan, a la the Tanker War'84-88. The escort scenario will require several squadrons of FFGs, which the US Navy is retiring soon.
Most of the popular South Sea scenarios envision the US taking a combatant role against China's southern fleet, which in turn feeds into the general support for more destroyers and aircraft carriers. However, the political emphasis on the higher end of the Navy is unbalancing it for meeting the full spectrum of requirements. The combatant scenario is but one of the possible futures of the South Sea. Another equally likely future is the above escort scenario. Convoy escort is generally the duty of frigates, but we are coming up against a frigate gap. The current difficulties of the Littoral Combat Ships program means it may be cut short. It will take time to start up a replacement frigate program. So there may be a long gap between the retirement of the last Perry and the introduction of the next frigate, in the near future. If the South Sea Battle falls during this gap, the US Navy will have to commit our Aegis destroyer squadrons [which are national strategic assets for missile defense] for convoy duty, which is a much lower strategic priority. So the USN is on the trajectory toward a disastrous South Sea.
[The LCS as currently configured is completely incapable of convoy air defense, and only possibly capable of the convoy ASW, pending its ASW module.]
Another question we need to answer is the strategic priority of the South Sea itself. With the opening of the Northwest Passage, the South Sea is no longer the petrol lifeline of Japan. Australia, another ally, does not depend on the South Sea for petroleum. Other than the possibility of oil, and the general global commerce, why should the US care about the South Sea?
The popular South Sea combatant scenarios may be the manifestations of a US Navy in search of a strategic purpose. The continuing focus on a "near peer competitor", aka China, is unbalancing the US Navy from its other strategic priorities, as I outlined above. We need some sanity over this piece of ocean, at least in the US. That the ASEAN states go crazy over the submerged atolls there does not mean it will start World War III. The most important role for the US is to contain the conflict, and compartmentalize its effects from the rest of the world. With a robust convoy escort capability, we can minimize the harm of a shooting war on global commerce, and avoid foreign entanglements. The Senkaku flare up reminds us all that there are no easy territorial disputes left in the world. All of the remaining territorial disputes have no clear title holders; every claimant has a legitimate claim to the title. The rest of the world should not suffer from these petty title fights.
More broadly, Japan's overtures to Vietnam, and Phillipine's ASEAN rebuke to Sec. Clinton's South Sea remakrs, underscores an interesting anti-colonial dynamic [for lack of a better word] at play in South East Asia. [The Hate Triangle that is North East Asia is well-documented.]
In all ASEAN states [except Singapore and maybe Brunei], there are strong sentiments and biases against both China and America. [A bit of Japan, too, but that's faint compared to the other two.] The Chinese outposts in the South Sea are sore spots to the surrounding countries, but their people don't like the Americans, either. For example, Vietnam would really prefer Russia over the US in balancing China, but Russia cannot do more than sell weapons at present. In fact, Russia wants to refurbish Cam Ranh Bay, but we'll see if it actually happens. Up Country portrays well both the strategic inevitability of a US-Vietnam security alliance, and Vietnamese reluctance to do so.
Phillippines has been pissed off about the American evacuation of Clark Air Base in 1991. Its intelligentsia are suspicious of America over its support of Marcos regime. Indonesia has regional aspirations, colonial baggage, past military dictatorships, and an Islamic identity, all of which build the above bias as well.
All this is to say that the US may have no "entry point" into a Battle of the South Sea. While the US has a freedom of navigation concern, the combatants (China + one more) will not want its help in resolving the battle. The most likely scenario is where the US Navy escorts neutral convoys together with Singapore and Japan, a la the Tanker War'84-88. The escort scenario will require several squadrons of FFGs, which the US Navy is retiring soon.
Most of the popular South Sea scenarios envision the US taking a combatant role against China's southern fleet, which in turn feeds into the general support for more destroyers and aircraft carriers. However, the political emphasis on the higher end of the Navy is unbalancing it for meeting the full spectrum of requirements. The combatant scenario is but one of the possible futures of the South Sea. Another equally likely future is the above escort scenario. Convoy escort is generally the duty of frigates, but we are coming up against a frigate gap. The current difficulties of the Littoral Combat Ships program means it may be cut short. It will take time to start up a replacement frigate program. So there may be a long gap between the retirement of the last Perry and the introduction of the next frigate, in the near future. If the South Sea Battle falls during this gap, the US Navy will have to commit our Aegis destroyer squadrons [which are national strategic assets for missile defense] for convoy duty, which is a much lower strategic priority. So the USN is on the trajectory toward a disastrous South Sea.
[The LCS as currently configured is completely incapable of convoy air defense, and only possibly capable of the convoy ASW, pending its ASW module.]
Another question we need to answer is the strategic priority of the South Sea itself. With the opening of the Northwest Passage, the South Sea is no longer the petrol lifeline of Japan. Australia, another ally, does not depend on the South Sea for petroleum. Other than the possibility of oil, and the general global commerce, why should the US care about the South Sea?
The popular South Sea combatant scenarios may be the manifestations of a US Navy in search of a strategic purpose. The continuing focus on a "near peer competitor", aka China, is unbalancing the US Navy from its other strategic priorities, as I outlined above. We need some sanity over this piece of ocean, at least in the US. That the ASEAN states go crazy over the submerged atolls there does not mean it will start World War III. The most important role for the US is to contain the conflict, and compartmentalize its effects from the rest of the world. With a robust convoy escort capability, we can minimize the harm of a shooting war on global commerce, and avoid foreign entanglements. The Senkaku flare up reminds us all that there are no easy territorial disputes left in the world. All of the remaining territorial disputes have no clear title holders; every claimant has a legitimate claim to the title. The rest of the world should not suffer from these petty title fights.
Friday, October 1, 2010
Senkaku/Diaoyutai, and Reflections on Maritime Low-Intensity Warfare
Watching the Senkaku dispute, one is reminded of the passion people feel toward land, especially a piece of land that most people have never seen and almost uninhabitable. That people can feel so passionate of land speaks ill toward conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian struggle.
What is the next step? In the Hobbesian world of international relations, possession is 90% of the game. Japan had erected markers and a lighthouse on Diaoyutai, but has no permanent presence on the islands. Therefore, the first actor to "settle" the islands will resolve the dispute in his favor.
Indeed, as NightWatch reports, Japan is considering stationing troops.
I thought China might deploy the PLA to garrison the islands much like it did in the south china sea, but this article suggests that China may not have the will to escalate.
A unilateral occupation of any island [of the 4 "habitable" ones] will trigger a military race to settle the other 3 islands. The second mover will also embargo the opposing garrisons to "freeze" the situation, pending diplomatic resolution. Both sides will try to re-supply their marines on shore. A naval confrontation is inevitable in this scenario. Due to the distance, neither side is capable of enforcing an aerial embargo for long, so aerial resupply will keep the garrisons at survival level.
[If Japan moves first, Taiwan will face political pressure to deploy as well. Such a three-way race risks driving Taiwan away from Japan, which may be one of the few current constraints holding Japan back.]
In this scenario of unilateral settlements, a military confrontation at sea will quickly reach a new local equilibrium, absent political wills for war. If domestic pressures increase, the political leadership may seek points through this escalation.
One further point on this military confrontation: To enforce the naval embargo against resupply, ramming will be the predominant tactic. As I mentioned previously, ocean-going tugboats are incredibly relevant on the maritime low-intensity battlefield. If a combatant is too fragile for ramming, its only resort will be warning shots, which is a very risky escalation on the force continuum, depending on gunnery skills and sea state. Whereas the physical force of a tugship enables safe resolution against non-cooperative vessels. While Galrahn has expounded on the necessity of including and elevating VBSS teams and naval infantry in the planning/doctrine & force structure of naval strategy, tugs and ramming represent the other leg of the low-intensity naval dyad. Indeed, a ramming touched off the current crisis, and the Japan Coast Guard cutters frequently resorted to ramming to enforce its claims over the Senkaku Islands. Both tugs & VBSS teams will depend on a mothership that is sorely lacking in the US Navy.
Given the prominence of nationalist groups in both Japan and China, a non-government actor may try to settle the islands. Japanese and Taiwanese civilian groups had attempted to resolve the sovereignty dispute through settlement. Japan Coast Guard were able to arrest and deport Taiwanese settlers in the past. Japanese settlers did not have the logistic support to stay long term. There is no fresh water on the islands nor much wildlife, making the logistic requirements unaffordable to most NGOs. The current diplomatic crisis may raise sufficient funds for such an expedition, though.
If a Taiwanese group undertakes a deployment, its primary obstacle will be Japanese eviction. The settlers will have to employ non-lethal measures to successfully resist eviction. For example, net launchers can trap RHIBs and swimmers in the surf zone, preventing Coast Guard officers from landing. Once on land, sticky foam and nets can immobilize the officers. Thus secured, the settlers can send the officers back out to sea on their RHIBs, for an intercept and recovery by their own cutters. The settlers may deploy an ADS-like device without contending with human-safety concerns, but fuel for power generation will be the primary constraint on its operation. Same goes for other direct energy systems.
[We focus on a Taiwanese group because of logistics, and because Chinese billionaires are unlikely to fund this endeavor without government clearance.]
A Japanese civilian group faces eviction risks from the Coast Guard as well. In the current environment, PRC will respond to a civilian escalation with a proxy civilian deployment [ie, a state-sponsored NGO.] To maintain the status quo, where Japn enjoys de facto sovereignty over Diaoyu with its cutter patrols, the Japanese government has an incentive to head off a low-intensity escalation by evicting Japanese settlers. In addition, a Japanese civilian escalation risks a Taiwanese response as well, which is against Japanese interests as stated above. Therefore, a Japanese NGO needs to invest in non-lethal measures to oppose landings.
An NGO can survive on the islands with reverse osmosis water purifiers and mussel/shellfish harvests. It is not impossible, but requires significant preparation and training.
At the moment, neither Japan nor PRC wishes to escalate the dispute. However, ignored domestic pressures can become rogue NGO actions. A successful NGO operation/settlement can force the governments into escalation, reaching the new local equilibrium of a naval embargo. A Solomonic resolution could divide each island into two, half to Japan and the other half China, with a Green Line going down the middle of each island. However, a settlement operation can preclude that division. We could end up with an Ying-Yang-esque division, with a Japanese Diaoyu Dao and a Chinese Taisho Jima. That would be an amusing ending to this 130 year old dispute.
PS (3OCT10): Edited title and added links and tags.
What is the next step? In the Hobbesian world of international relations, possession is 90% of the game. Japan had erected markers and a lighthouse on Diaoyutai, but has no permanent presence on the islands. Therefore, the first actor to "settle" the islands will resolve the dispute in his favor.
Indeed, as NightWatch reports, Japan is considering stationing troops.
I thought China might deploy the PLA to garrison the islands much like it did in the south china sea, but this article suggests that China may not have the will to escalate.
A unilateral occupation of any island [of the 4 "habitable" ones] will trigger a military race to settle the other 3 islands. The second mover will also embargo the opposing garrisons to "freeze" the situation, pending diplomatic resolution. Both sides will try to re-supply their marines on shore. A naval confrontation is inevitable in this scenario. Due to the distance, neither side is capable of enforcing an aerial embargo for long, so aerial resupply will keep the garrisons at survival level.
[If Japan moves first, Taiwan will face political pressure to deploy as well. Such a three-way race risks driving Taiwan away from Japan, which may be one of the few current constraints holding Japan back.]
In this scenario of unilateral settlements, a military confrontation at sea will quickly reach a new local equilibrium, absent political wills for war. If domestic pressures increase, the political leadership may seek points through this escalation.
One further point on this military confrontation: To enforce the naval embargo against resupply, ramming will be the predominant tactic. As I mentioned previously, ocean-going tugboats are incredibly relevant on the maritime low-intensity battlefield. If a combatant is too fragile for ramming, its only resort will be warning shots, which is a very risky escalation on the force continuum, depending on gunnery skills and sea state. Whereas the physical force of a tugship enables safe resolution against non-cooperative vessels. While Galrahn has expounded on the necessity of including and elevating VBSS teams and naval infantry in the planning/doctrine & force structure of naval strategy, tugs and ramming represent the other leg of the low-intensity naval dyad. Indeed, a ramming touched off the current crisis, and the Japan Coast Guard cutters frequently resorted to ramming to enforce its claims over the Senkaku Islands. Both tugs & VBSS teams will depend on a mothership that is sorely lacking in the US Navy.
Given the prominence of nationalist groups in both Japan and China, a non-government actor may try to settle the islands. Japanese and Taiwanese civilian groups had attempted to resolve the sovereignty dispute through settlement. Japan Coast Guard were able to arrest and deport Taiwanese settlers in the past. Japanese settlers did not have the logistic support to stay long term. There is no fresh water on the islands nor much wildlife, making the logistic requirements unaffordable to most NGOs. The current diplomatic crisis may raise sufficient funds for such an expedition, though.
If a Taiwanese group undertakes a deployment, its primary obstacle will be Japanese eviction. The settlers will have to employ non-lethal measures to successfully resist eviction. For example, net launchers can trap RHIBs and swimmers in the surf zone, preventing Coast Guard officers from landing. Once on land, sticky foam and nets can immobilize the officers. Thus secured, the settlers can send the officers back out to sea on their RHIBs, for an intercept and recovery by their own cutters. The settlers may deploy an ADS-like device without contending with human-safety concerns, but fuel for power generation will be the primary constraint on its operation. Same goes for other direct energy systems.
[We focus on a Taiwanese group because of logistics, and because Chinese billionaires are unlikely to fund this endeavor without government clearance.]
A Japanese civilian group faces eviction risks from the Coast Guard as well. In the current environment, PRC will respond to a civilian escalation with a proxy civilian deployment [ie, a state-sponsored NGO.] To maintain the status quo, where Japn enjoys de facto sovereignty over Diaoyu with its cutter patrols, the Japanese government has an incentive to head off a low-intensity escalation by evicting Japanese settlers. In addition, a Japanese civilian escalation risks a Taiwanese response as well, which is against Japanese interests as stated above. Therefore, a Japanese NGO needs to invest in non-lethal measures to oppose landings.
An NGO can survive on the islands with reverse osmosis water purifiers and mussel/shellfish harvests. It is not impossible, but requires significant preparation and training.
At the moment, neither Japan nor PRC wishes to escalate the dispute. However, ignored domestic pressures can become rogue NGO actions. A successful NGO operation/settlement can force the governments into escalation, reaching the new local equilibrium of a naval embargo. A Solomonic resolution could divide each island into two, half to Japan and the other half China, with a Green Line going down the middle of each island. However, a settlement operation can preclude that division. We could end up with an Ying-Yang-esque division, with a Japanese Diaoyu Dao and a Chinese Taisho Jima. That would be an amusing ending to this 130 year old dispute.
PS (3OCT10): Edited title and added links and tags.
Friday, November 20, 2009
Fort Hood and the Second Amendment
I've been reflecting upon the Fort Hood massacre and the Second Amendment. As many of you know by now, military bases, like all federal facilities, are gun-free zones. They strictly regulate personal weapons, and concealed carry is prohibited. Doubtlessly, a soldier with a weapon would have disrupted MAJ Hasan's killings. In general, soldiers allowed to carry personal weapons will make terrorist attacks more difficult [against the military].
At the same time, the military regulation of personal weapons came from past experiences. There are many young, immature, and passionate men in the armed forces, who are very likely to shoot each other in a moment of passion, if they have a gun at hand. The challenge here is to reconcile the needs of force protection against good order and discipline.
It is eminently sensible, then, to allow a limited conceal-carry scheme in our military. Specifically, commanders (O-5 and above) can give their officers and non-commissioned officers license to carry their own weapons in garrison, and perhaps on liberty. Officers and NCOs are [hopefully] more mature than the rank and file. Traditionally, officers have sidearms to enforce discipline, so this policy is a natural continuation. Moreover, officers are to look out for the welfare of their subordinates, making concealed carry a logical extension of that duty. Being at the commander's discretion, this licensing scheme allows commanders to apply their judgement. If a licensed individual is at psychological risk, his commander has the right to revoke the license and place him under observation.
In the field and on deployment, soldiers are issued weapons, so they do not need to carry personal weapons. Personal weapons at war may also complicate the Laws of Warfare.
Of course, today's military, as John T Reed reminds us, is a micro-managing institution that fears the concept of accountability. Even if the generals were willing to delegate such a responsibility, their JAG lawyers will probably talk them out of it. I cannot see us implementing this policy any time soon.
Friday, September 18, 2009
NCADE = A-AAM?
USAF's Chief of Staff, Gen Schwartz, has signalled his support for the air-launched missile defense concepts. This is good for missile defense. Additionally, the USAF will have an option to improve its air-to-air capability.
As I have talked about before, the USAF needs new air-to-air missiles to make up for F-35's inferior capabilities. Raytheon's NCADE and Lockheed's ALHTK will nicely address the shortfalls.
NCADE will give the AIM-120 an infrared seeker option. This will address the seeker diversity problem USAF and USN faces. NCADE's booster stage will also extend the range or improve AIM-120's kinematics. Even if NCADE does not pan out, Raytheon can quickly leverage its results into AIM-120 improvements.
ALHTK will introduce new missiles into USAF inventory, if NCADE doesn't pan out. PAC-3's radar seeker operates on a different band from AIM-120, so that will complicate threat jamming efforts. THAAD's IR seeker will address seeker diversity.
If air-launched missile defense progresses beyond the study stage, hopefully BAE will bring on its Meteor in the competition.
May the best missile win!
As I have talked about before, the USAF needs new air-to-air missiles to make up for F-35's inferior capabilities. Raytheon's NCADE and Lockheed's ALHTK will nicely address the shortfalls.
NCADE will give the AIM-120 an infrared seeker option. This will address the seeker diversity problem USAF and USN faces. NCADE's booster stage will also extend the range or improve AIM-120's kinematics. Even if NCADE does not pan out, Raytheon can quickly leverage its results into AIM-120 improvements.
ALHTK will introduce new missiles into USAF inventory, if NCADE doesn't pan out. PAC-3's radar seeker operates on a different band from AIM-120, so that will complicate threat jamming efforts. THAAD's IR seeker will address seeker diversity.
If air-launched missile defense progresses beyond the study stage, hopefully BAE will bring on its Meteor in the competition.
May the best missile win!
Sunday, August 2, 2009
Capt Speicher: Closure for the Family
DoD confirmed that they found Capt Speicher's remains. At least his family now know what happened to him.
Thursday, July 9, 2009
New MRAP-like Capability Gaps
Paul McLeary of Aviation Week asked a question: What is our next MRAP-like capability gap? In other words, a capability gap that the US military has been underfunding, but which would be catastrophic in our next war?
I came up with 3 gaps, one for each of the departments, 'cuz I'm joint in my heart :)
1.) AAM seeker diversity: AIM-120 desperately needs an infrared seeker alternative. Or a hyperspectral sensor.
2.) Corvettes/Frigates/PCs for Navy: they need more smaller ships. that one will come up when we intervene in a coastal situation again. Galrahn is talking about this one right now.
2.) An airborne-capable tank would be nice.
One of the commenters said cyber, but that's kind of getting enough attention as it is. An MRAP like capability gap is usually very conventional and un-sexy. That's why we get "surprised" when it happens.
Anyone else have any thoughts?
Edited for tags and removal of signature
I came up with 3 gaps, one for each of the departments, 'cuz I'm joint in my heart :)
1.) AAM seeker diversity: AIM-120 desperately needs an infrared seeker alternative. Or a hyperspectral sensor.
2.) Corvettes/Frigates/PCs for Navy: they need more smaller ships. that one will come up when we intervene in a coastal situation again. Galrahn is talking about this one right now.
2.) An airborne-capable tank would be nice.
One of the commenters said cyber, but that's kind of getting enough attention as it is. An MRAP like capability gap is usually very conventional and un-sexy. That's why we get "surprised" when it happens.
Anyone else have any thoughts?
Edited for tags and removal of signature
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Shipbuilding Plan B: In Case USNavy Screws Up
Galrahn of Information Dissemination has a great Strategy-and-Concept-of-Operations proposal to meet our policy objectives in the littoral zone (0 to 25 nm away from the coastline). In it, he built upon CDR Hendrix's Influence Squadron idea to engage the human terrain of the littoral zone. The littoral zone is full of fishing boats, pirates, and shipping. Galrahn's litoral strike squadrons deliver sailors and Marines to interact with the population at sea, whereas the current Navy policy is to stay away from all boat traffic.
To carry the human payload into contact with the population, Galrahn depends on the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and a notional class of patrol boats. An LCS will act as the command element for its subordinate patrol boats, as well as providing aviation support of helicopters and UAVs. The patrol boats will board and inspect suspect vessels, render assistance as necessary, and gather human intelligence.
The proposal is well thought out and implementable, but the LCS is its weak point. Many people want to kill the LCS to build more DDG-51s or a better armed frigate. What if Congress cut off the LCS project in a few years? What is our shipbuilding Plan B to keep up presence and numbers? As G pointed out in his USNI piece, the US Navy will hit a Warship Gap by the year of 2025 if the US Navy does not come up with a plan to fix shipbuilding.
There are several options for our Shipbuilding Plan B. One possibility is build our 21st Century Spruance Class Destroyer. The Spruance Class was a highly successful ship type because the Navy built it in enough numbers to meet its presence needs. It also had plenty of room inside for future upgrades and technology experiments. By sticking with a minimal weapon system suite, the Navy kept the price tag affordable. Later on, the Navy used the Spruance hull to build the world-famous AEGIS Cruisers.
It turns out that we have a reverse-Spruance class in service right now: the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (DDG-51). At $1.5 billion per ship, the Burke is one of the most expensive warship in the world. Maybe we should start planning for a reverse-Spruance. More than 40% of the Burke price tag comes from the electronics and weapons. If we strip off the radars and don't install the Mk 41, we can buy a DD-51 for about $700 million.
Such a Spruanced-Burke will keep the shipyards in business. Its manufacturing cost and process is well known, so we minimize budget and production surprises. After we take out the weapons, we regain all that upgrade room we've lost over the past 20 years. We will have room to park those LCS modules and launch/recover UxVs. Or more helicopters.
We can also update the hull with new technology. For example, we can incorporate LCS's crew automation technology to drive down DD-51's crew requirement. We can incorporate some electric drive systems to increase the power reserve available for later upgrades. (Without the SPY-1, there will be plenty of power). If in the future, we face a higher end threat, we can always upgrade our DD-51 with more missiles and combat systems.
The specific configuration of DD-51 (hangar, sonar tail, boat ramp, etc) will depend on a more detailed requirement analysis and cost-tradeoff. We can even have multiple variants of DD-51. But this will work well as a Plan B. In effect, an Frigate in a Destroyer's body.
To carry the human payload into contact with the population, Galrahn depends on the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and a notional class of patrol boats. An LCS will act as the command element for its subordinate patrol boats, as well as providing aviation support of helicopters and UAVs. The patrol boats will board and inspect suspect vessels, render assistance as necessary, and gather human intelligence.
The proposal is well thought out and implementable, but the LCS is its weak point. Many people want to kill the LCS to build more DDG-51s or a better armed frigate. What if Congress cut off the LCS project in a few years? What is our shipbuilding Plan B to keep up presence and numbers? As G pointed out in his USNI piece, the US Navy will hit a Warship Gap by the year of 2025 if the US Navy does not come up with a plan to fix shipbuilding.
There are several options for our Shipbuilding Plan B. One possibility is build our 21st Century Spruance Class Destroyer. The Spruance Class was a highly successful ship type because the Navy built it in enough numbers to meet its presence needs. It also had plenty of room inside for future upgrades and technology experiments. By sticking with a minimal weapon system suite, the Navy kept the price tag affordable. Later on, the Navy used the Spruance hull to build the world-famous AEGIS Cruisers.
It turns out that we have a reverse-Spruance class in service right now: the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (DDG-51). At $1.5 billion per ship, the Burke is one of the most expensive warship in the world. Maybe we should start planning for a reverse-Spruance. More than 40% of the Burke price tag comes from the electronics and weapons. If we strip off the radars and don't install the Mk 41, we can buy a DD-51 for about $700 million.
Such a Spruanced-Burke will keep the shipyards in business. Its manufacturing cost and process is well known, so we minimize budget and production surprises. After we take out the weapons, we regain all that upgrade room we've lost over the past 20 years. We will have room to park those LCS modules and launch/recover UxVs. Or more helicopters.
We can also update the hull with new technology. For example, we can incorporate LCS's crew automation technology to drive down DD-51's crew requirement. We can incorporate some electric drive systems to increase the power reserve available for later upgrades. (Without the SPY-1, there will be plenty of power). If in the future, we face a higher end threat, we can always upgrade our DD-51 with more missiles and combat systems.
The specific configuration of DD-51 (hangar, sonar tail, boat ramp, etc) will depend on a more detailed requirement analysis and cost-tradeoff. We can even have multiple variants of DD-51. But this will work well as a Plan B. In effect, an Frigate in a Destroyer's body.
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Budget Cut: Military Healthcare Costs
The Defense Department has to cut some money in its FY10 budget. It's not much of a cut, though. DoD will make most of the cut by not keeping up with inflation. Regardless, this is the start of the budget reckoning I have talked of before. If you are interested in the Defense budget, you should check out Holding the Line, edited by Dr. Cindy Williams. The book is a product of the 1990-era strategic confusion, so there's a lot of maintaining status quo, aka "Holding the Line". However, the authors made a nice case of where we can cut and hedge our strategic bets.
Over at Abu Muqawama, I made a comment on the military healthcare costs. The military healthcare is the fastest rising sector of defense spending, just like the rest of the US economy. In FY09, the DoD requested $42.8 billions for the Defense Health Program. If you add in the Veterans' Administration, it will be even bigger. The brass are having to decide between guns (weapon acquisition) and butter (personnel cost) directly now. [As opposed to just DoD vs everybody else.]
This may be unfortunate for those of us in the military-industrial complex, and for the generals and admirals. However, this healthcare problem is largely the result of the military culture. The brass has known about the problem for years, but ignored it because it's not sexy.
For example, back in the '80s and '90s, the most common cause of injury (or conditions preventing duty performance) for male soldiers is intramural sports. During physical training or unit-wide sports competition, they played too hard and hurt their knees or break bones. [Don't have the data but the sports injuries should be true for the Regular Army pre-AVF as well.] This directly drives up our healthcare cost because:
1: Soldiers are getting medical treatment for something that's prefectly preventable.
2: They will develop chronic conditions later on, requiring knee surgeries and other expensive treatments.
3: Due to reduced mobility from the chronic injuries, they will get fat and develop type 2 diabetes.
So, all because the leaders are having too much fun on the sports field, we now do not have enough money to buy the F-22, FCS, etc.
Or, to take another example: Hearing loss. We do a lot of loud stuff, firing weapons, drive tanks, blow stuff up. However, the leadership does not do a good job with hearing protection. These days, they at least hand out foam earplugs and make an effort to raise hearing awareness, but back in the day, they did not even do that much. For years, the Army has said that electronic hearing protection is too expensive, even though they would be more effective than foam earplugs. Yet when OIF started, Army suddenly had enough money to buy the electronic ear muffs for the line units. Years later, the now veterans file for disability because of military duty-related hearing loss, and the brass has to pay for it.
So, to the American people: Please demand better accountability from your generals and admirals when they come to you asking for more money. Make them find money from smarter healthcare decisions. It is their own stupidity that their healthcare cost is eating up their budget pie.
Edited to Add: Here are a couple of articles that add to this: Andrew Exum's article on soldier's load, and 3 years later, his predictions coming true.
Over at Abu Muqawama, I made a comment on the military healthcare costs. The military healthcare is the fastest rising sector of defense spending, just like the rest of the US economy. In FY09, the DoD requested $42.8 billions for the Defense Health Program. If you add in the Veterans' Administration, it will be even bigger. The brass are having to decide between guns (weapon acquisition) and butter (personnel cost) directly now. [As opposed to just DoD vs everybody else.]
This may be unfortunate for those of us in the military-industrial complex, and for the generals and admirals. However, this healthcare problem is largely the result of the military culture. The brass has known about the problem for years, but ignored it because it's not sexy.
For example, back in the '80s and '90s, the most common cause of injury (or conditions preventing duty performance) for male soldiers is intramural sports. During physical training or unit-wide sports competition, they played too hard and hurt their knees or break bones. [Don't have the data but the sports injuries should be true for the Regular Army pre-AVF as well.] This directly drives up our healthcare cost because:
1: Soldiers are getting medical treatment for something that's prefectly preventable.
2: They will develop chronic conditions later on, requiring knee surgeries and other expensive treatments.
3: Due to reduced mobility from the chronic injuries, they will get fat and develop type 2 diabetes.
So, all because the leaders are having too much fun on the sports field, we now do not have enough money to buy the F-22, FCS, etc.
Or, to take another example: Hearing loss. We do a lot of loud stuff, firing weapons, drive tanks, blow stuff up. However, the leadership does not do a good job with hearing protection. These days, they at least hand out foam earplugs and make an effort to raise hearing awareness, but back in the day, they did not even do that much. For years, the Army has said that electronic hearing protection is too expensive, even though they would be more effective than foam earplugs. Yet when OIF started, Army suddenly had enough money to buy the electronic ear muffs for the line units. Years later, the now veterans file for disability because of military duty-related hearing loss, and the brass has to pay for it.
So, to the American people: Please demand better accountability from your generals and admirals when they come to you asking for more money. Make them find money from smarter healthcare decisions. It is their own stupidity that their healthcare cost is eating up their budget pie.
Edited to Add: Here are a couple of articles that add to this: Andrew Exum's article on soldier's load, and 3 years later, his predictions coming true.
Thursday, November 6, 2008
The USAF's Acquisition Crisis and AAMs
Whew! The election is finally over with. Let's hope Obama is more of a Clinton-style triangulator instead of a Carter-ish indecisive vision guy as Todd Zywicki said here.
Regardless, Stephen Trimble yesterday highlighted some great comments from a fighter jock here, that generated a lot of comments. One of the interesting points is the low probability of kill ratio of the AIM-120 against a jamming target. If the USAF is going up against any semi-near-peer competitor, it will not have superiority. Sure, the F-22 is great. But the key to making the F-22, and its Beyond-Visual-Range tactic, work, is the AIM-120. If the F-22 supercruises into the fight, fires the AMRAAMs, and get out of Dodge, he survives. But his target will survive, too, if the missiles fail to lock onto the target due to jamming. And what's that called, if neither side gets a kill? Parity, not Superiority.
This, coupled with the USAF fiscal death spiral that ELP and others have been documenting, means that the USAF needs to change its acquisition strategy right now. If it keeps going down the current path, it will run out of money, people, and fighters. The USAF will get a smaller and smaller slice of the budget pie, along with the rest of the DoD, because that is the American budgetary future. The USAF cannot out-compete the AARP. The USAF is also getting less retention. And it is prematurely retiring its F-teens to bank on the unproven F-35. The USAF will become operationally irrelevant if it keeps going as it is.
The USAF keeps saying that the F-22s (with AMRAAM) will secure the skies and allow the F-35s to do their job, but it doesn't have enough F-22s, and will never get more. The F-35s (and some legacy F-teens) will have to take on air-to-air missions. We know that AMRAAM, as is, doesn't work in a jamming environment. The USAF has to immediately embark on an AMRAAM replacement program right now. Being that even missile programs take more than 4 years to go from the lab to the flightline, the more the USAF wastes its time, the more time it gives semi-near-peers to become peers. The new Advanced AAM Program [doesn't that sound familiar? :] has a simple goal, Give the F-35 a decisive advantage over the current 4.5th Gen fighters (Eurofighter, Su-35+, et al). The corollary effect will give the F-teens and F-22 superiority over everybody else.
In the mean time, the USAF can get some cheap fixes: Put a Sidewinder seeker and an RF homing seeker on the AMRAAM for seeker diveristy in the inventory. Integrate and buy the Meteor to improve the kill ratio and foster cross-Atlantic solidarity. Try the datalink to improve jamming resistance. Or have the AMRAAM talk to other AMRAAMs in its volley to sift through the noise.
Unfortunately, the USAF has been peddling the F-35 as its savior for too long now. Politically, it cannot admit otherwise and change course, without killing many officer careers. The Obama administration seems unlikely to rock the USAF boat, because its focus, and its expertise, is on COIN and the ground fight. The Obama administration may not have the intellectual and political capital to fight the USAF.
If Dr. Gates stays on as DefSec, he might be able to turn the USAF around, due to his USAF background as a missileer and his distance from the F-35 game. However, he is planning on leaving, and there are other people that want the job. All in all, the future looks bleak for the
USAF.
On the other hand, the USN faces a similar issue with its underpowered F-18. The USN Tomcat association has long lobbied for an AIM-54 Phoenix replacement. The USN aviation budget is in much less trouble due to its volume buy of the F-18E/F, and is in a better position to advocate a new AAAM program. If the USN succeeds in deploying the AAAM, you can be sure that the USAF will jump on board.
It is a sad day when the USAF has to depend on the USN to rescue it from air-to-air irrelevance. However, this analysis is yet another piece of vindication for Inter-Service Rivalry and support for duplication in Roles and Missions.
Sorry for the html. Has to use email submission.
Edit: fixed the html.
Edit 2: I saw the Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile. I hope that the Air to Air requirements are sufficiently robust, and that the ARM/AGM requirements take a back seat, as they should be. However, with an in-service date beyond 2020, it is clear that the USN and USAF needs an interim solution, as I've outlined above.
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