Michael Pettis's brief review of American Development economic history and lessons for China's current developments. Lots of discomforting thoughts. Of course, also too general and not quantified enough for effective implementation, but then, so's much of political economics, I guess :D
Victor Davis Hanson's essay on the culminating changes of the past few years in America. More discomforting thoughts.
The pending European currency crisis will probably be the trigger of worldwide economic tumult, but whether China or the US goes second is the key question for the rest of us. Arguably the market is already pricing in the European currency collapse, but the order of the subsequent crises will drive how you should prepare. If America goes second, then we simply need to preposition our savings and wait out the American inflation. If China goes second, however, there will be geopolitical disruptions in addition to an American recession, which argues for a different savings allocation.
Showing posts with label Asia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asia. Show all posts
Sunday, February 24, 2013
Monday, October 11, 2010
Naval Strategy and South China Sea
This article in Asia Times adds to our understanding of nationalist elements in Japan politics. The writer's pro-China bias is so thick that even I could pick it up, but he makes clear the current [and maybe emergent] Japanese strategy: Aggressively patrols the Senkaku Islands as territorial waters, but not crossing the bright line of settling the islands. Japan's strategic concern is in not antagonizing Taiwan on the Diaoyutai issue, which can strengthen the pro-unification camp in Taiwan. [The independence movement in Taiwan is pro-Japan for historical and geo-strategic reasons.] If Taiwan ever reunifies, Japan will settle the Senkakus in a heartbeat.
More broadly, Japan's overtures to Vietnam, and Phillipine's ASEAN rebuke to Sec. Clinton's South Sea remakrs, underscores an interesting anti-colonial dynamic [for lack of a better word] at play in South East Asia. [The Hate Triangle that is North East Asia is well-documented.]
In all ASEAN states [except Singapore and maybe Brunei], there are strong sentiments and biases against both China and America. [A bit of Japan, too, but that's faint compared to the other two.] The Chinese outposts in the South Sea are sore spots to the surrounding countries, but their people don't like the Americans, either. For example, Vietnam would really prefer Russia over the US in balancing China, but Russia cannot do more than sell weapons at present. In fact, Russia wants to refurbish Cam Ranh Bay, but we'll see if it actually happens. Up Country portrays well both the strategic inevitability of a US-Vietnam security alliance, and Vietnamese reluctance to do so.
Phillippines has been pissed off about the American evacuation of Clark Air Base in 1991. Its intelligentsia are suspicious of America over its support of Marcos regime. Indonesia has regional aspirations, colonial baggage, past military dictatorships, and an Islamic identity, all of which build the above bias as well.
All this is to say that the US may have no "entry point" into a Battle of the South Sea. While the US has a freedom of navigation concern, the combatants (China + one more) will not want its help in resolving the battle. The most likely scenario is where the US Navy escorts neutral convoys together with Singapore and Japan, a la the Tanker War'84-88. The escort scenario will require several squadrons of FFGs, which the US Navy is retiring soon.
Most of the popular South Sea scenarios envision the US taking a combatant role against China's southern fleet, which in turn feeds into the general support for more destroyers and aircraft carriers. However, the political emphasis on the higher end of the Navy is unbalancing it for meeting the full spectrum of requirements. The combatant scenario is but one of the possible futures of the South Sea. Another equally likely future is the above escort scenario. Convoy escort is generally the duty of frigates, but we are coming up against a frigate gap. The current difficulties of the Littoral Combat Ships program means it may be cut short. It will take time to start up a replacement frigate program. So there may be a long gap between the retirement of the last Perry and the introduction of the next frigate, in the near future. If the South Sea Battle falls during this gap, the US Navy will have to commit our Aegis destroyer squadrons [which are national strategic assets for missile defense] for convoy duty, which is a much lower strategic priority. So the USN is on the trajectory toward a disastrous South Sea.
[The LCS as currently configured is completely incapable of convoy air defense, and only possibly capable of the convoy ASW, pending its ASW module.]
Another question we need to answer is the strategic priority of the South Sea itself. With the opening of the Northwest Passage, the South Sea is no longer the petrol lifeline of Japan. Australia, another ally, does not depend on the South Sea for petroleum. Other than the possibility of oil, and the general global commerce, why should the US care about the South Sea?
The popular South Sea combatant scenarios may be the manifestations of a US Navy in search of a strategic purpose. The continuing focus on a "near peer competitor", aka China, is unbalancing the US Navy from its other strategic priorities, as I outlined above. We need some sanity over this piece of ocean, at least in the US. That the ASEAN states go crazy over the submerged atolls there does not mean it will start World War III. The most important role for the US is to contain the conflict, and compartmentalize its effects from the rest of the world. With a robust convoy escort capability, we can minimize the harm of a shooting war on global commerce, and avoid foreign entanglements. The Senkaku flare up reminds us all that there are no easy territorial disputes left in the world. All of the remaining territorial disputes have no clear title holders; every claimant has a legitimate claim to the title. The rest of the world should not suffer from these petty title fights.
More broadly, Japan's overtures to Vietnam, and Phillipine's ASEAN rebuke to Sec. Clinton's South Sea remakrs, underscores an interesting anti-colonial dynamic [for lack of a better word] at play in South East Asia. [The Hate Triangle that is North East Asia is well-documented.]
In all ASEAN states [except Singapore and maybe Brunei], there are strong sentiments and biases against both China and America. [A bit of Japan, too, but that's faint compared to the other two.] The Chinese outposts in the South Sea are sore spots to the surrounding countries, but their people don't like the Americans, either. For example, Vietnam would really prefer Russia over the US in balancing China, but Russia cannot do more than sell weapons at present. In fact, Russia wants to refurbish Cam Ranh Bay, but we'll see if it actually happens. Up Country portrays well both the strategic inevitability of a US-Vietnam security alliance, and Vietnamese reluctance to do so.
Phillippines has been pissed off about the American evacuation of Clark Air Base in 1991. Its intelligentsia are suspicious of America over its support of Marcos regime. Indonesia has regional aspirations, colonial baggage, past military dictatorships, and an Islamic identity, all of which build the above bias as well.
All this is to say that the US may have no "entry point" into a Battle of the South Sea. While the US has a freedom of navigation concern, the combatants (China + one more) will not want its help in resolving the battle. The most likely scenario is where the US Navy escorts neutral convoys together with Singapore and Japan, a la the Tanker War'84-88. The escort scenario will require several squadrons of FFGs, which the US Navy is retiring soon.
Most of the popular South Sea scenarios envision the US taking a combatant role against China's southern fleet, which in turn feeds into the general support for more destroyers and aircraft carriers. However, the political emphasis on the higher end of the Navy is unbalancing it for meeting the full spectrum of requirements. The combatant scenario is but one of the possible futures of the South Sea. Another equally likely future is the above escort scenario. Convoy escort is generally the duty of frigates, but we are coming up against a frigate gap. The current difficulties of the Littoral Combat Ships program means it may be cut short. It will take time to start up a replacement frigate program. So there may be a long gap between the retirement of the last Perry and the introduction of the next frigate, in the near future. If the South Sea Battle falls during this gap, the US Navy will have to commit our Aegis destroyer squadrons [which are national strategic assets for missile defense] for convoy duty, which is a much lower strategic priority. So the USN is on the trajectory toward a disastrous South Sea.
[The LCS as currently configured is completely incapable of convoy air defense, and only possibly capable of the convoy ASW, pending its ASW module.]
Another question we need to answer is the strategic priority of the South Sea itself. With the opening of the Northwest Passage, the South Sea is no longer the petrol lifeline of Japan. Australia, another ally, does not depend on the South Sea for petroleum. Other than the possibility of oil, and the general global commerce, why should the US care about the South Sea?
The popular South Sea combatant scenarios may be the manifestations of a US Navy in search of a strategic purpose. The continuing focus on a "near peer competitor", aka China, is unbalancing the US Navy from its other strategic priorities, as I outlined above. We need some sanity over this piece of ocean, at least in the US. That the ASEAN states go crazy over the submerged atolls there does not mean it will start World War III. The most important role for the US is to contain the conflict, and compartmentalize its effects from the rest of the world. With a robust convoy escort capability, we can minimize the harm of a shooting war on global commerce, and avoid foreign entanglements. The Senkaku flare up reminds us all that there are no easy territorial disputes left in the world. All of the remaining territorial disputes have no clear title holders; every claimant has a legitimate claim to the title. The rest of the world should not suffer from these petty title fights.
Friday, October 1, 2010
Senkaku/Diaoyutai, and Reflections on Maritime Low-Intensity Warfare
Watching the Senkaku dispute, one is reminded of the passion people feel toward land, especially a piece of land that most people have never seen and almost uninhabitable. That people can feel so passionate of land speaks ill toward conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian struggle.
What is the next step? In the Hobbesian world of international relations, possession is 90% of the game. Japan had erected markers and a lighthouse on Diaoyutai, but has no permanent presence on the islands. Therefore, the first actor to "settle" the islands will resolve the dispute in his favor.
Indeed, as NightWatch reports, Japan is considering stationing troops.
I thought China might deploy the PLA to garrison the islands much like it did in the south china sea, but this article suggests that China may not have the will to escalate.
A unilateral occupation of any island [of the 4 "habitable" ones] will trigger a military race to settle the other 3 islands. The second mover will also embargo the opposing garrisons to "freeze" the situation, pending diplomatic resolution. Both sides will try to re-supply their marines on shore. A naval confrontation is inevitable in this scenario. Due to the distance, neither side is capable of enforcing an aerial embargo for long, so aerial resupply will keep the garrisons at survival level.
[If Japan moves first, Taiwan will face political pressure to deploy as well. Such a three-way race risks driving Taiwan away from Japan, which may be one of the few current constraints holding Japan back.]
In this scenario of unilateral settlements, a military confrontation at sea will quickly reach a new local equilibrium, absent political wills for war. If domestic pressures increase, the political leadership may seek points through this escalation.
One further point on this military confrontation: To enforce the naval embargo against resupply, ramming will be the predominant tactic. As I mentioned previously, ocean-going tugboats are incredibly relevant on the maritime low-intensity battlefield. If a combatant is too fragile for ramming, its only resort will be warning shots, which is a very risky escalation on the force continuum, depending on gunnery skills and sea state. Whereas the physical force of a tugship enables safe resolution against non-cooperative vessels. While Galrahn has expounded on the necessity of including and elevating VBSS teams and naval infantry in the planning/doctrine & force structure of naval strategy, tugs and ramming represent the other leg of the low-intensity naval dyad. Indeed, a ramming touched off the current crisis, and the Japan Coast Guard cutters frequently resorted to ramming to enforce its claims over the Senkaku Islands. Both tugs & VBSS teams will depend on a mothership that is sorely lacking in the US Navy.
Given the prominence of nationalist groups in both Japan and China, a non-government actor may try to settle the islands. Japanese and Taiwanese civilian groups had attempted to resolve the sovereignty dispute through settlement. Japan Coast Guard were able to arrest and deport Taiwanese settlers in the past. Japanese settlers did not have the logistic support to stay long term. There is no fresh water on the islands nor much wildlife, making the logistic requirements unaffordable to most NGOs. The current diplomatic crisis may raise sufficient funds for such an expedition, though.
If a Taiwanese group undertakes a deployment, its primary obstacle will be Japanese eviction. The settlers will have to employ non-lethal measures to successfully resist eviction. For example, net launchers can trap RHIBs and swimmers in the surf zone, preventing Coast Guard officers from landing. Once on land, sticky foam and nets can immobilize the officers. Thus secured, the settlers can send the officers back out to sea on their RHIBs, for an intercept and recovery by their own cutters. The settlers may deploy an ADS-like device without contending with human-safety concerns, but fuel for power generation will be the primary constraint on its operation. Same goes for other direct energy systems.
[We focus on a Taiwanese group because of logistics, and because Chinese billionaires are unlikely to fund this endeavor without government clearance.]
A Japanese civilian group faces eviction risks from the Coast Guard as well. In the current environment, PRC will respond to a civilian escalation with a proxy civilian deployment [ie, a state-sponsored NGO.] To maintain the status quo, where Japn enjoys de facto sovereignty over Diaoyu with its cutter patrols, the Japanese government has an incentive to head off a low-intensity escalation by evicting Japanese settlers. In addition, a Japanese civilian escalation risks a Taiwanese response as well, which is against Japanese interests as stated above. Therefore, a Japanese NGO needs to invest in non-lethal measures to oppose landings.
An NGO can survive on the islands with reverse osmosis water purifiers and mussel/shellfish harvests. It is not impossible, but requires significant preparation and training.
At the moment, neither Japan nor PRC wishes to escalate the dispute. However, ignored domestic pressures can become rogue NGO actions. A successful NGO operation/settlement can force the governments into escalation, reaching the new local equilibrium of a naval embargo. A Solomonic resolution could divide each island into two, half to Japan and the other half China, with a Green Line going down the middle of each island. However, a settlement operation can preclude that division. We could end up with an Ying-Yang-esque division, with a Japanese Diaoyu Dao and a Chinese Taisho Jima. That would be an amusing ending to this 130 year old dispute.
PS (3OCT10): Edited title and added links and tags.
What is the next step? In the Hobbesian world of international relations, possession is 90% of the game. Japan had erected markers and a lighthouse on Diaoyutai, but has no permanent presence on the islands. Therefore, the first actor to "settle" the islands will resolve the dispute in his favor.
Indeed, as NightWatch reports, Japan is considering stationing troops.
I thought China might deploy the PLA to garrison the islands much like it did in the south china sea, but this article suggests that China may not have the will to escalate.
A unilateral occupation of any island [of the 4 "habitable" ones] will trigger a military race to settle the other 3 islands. The second mover will also embargo the opposing garrisons to "freeze" the situation, pending diplomatic resolution. Both sides will try to re-supply their marines on shore. A naval confrontation is inevitable in this scenario. Due to the distance, neither side is capable of enforcing an aerial embargo for long, so aerial resupply will keep the garrisons at survival level.
[If Japan moves first, Taiwan will face political pressure to deploy as well. Such a three-way race risks driving Taiwan away from Japan, which may be one of the few current constraints holding Japan back.]
In this scenario of unilateral settlements, a military confrontation at sea will quickly reach a new local equilibrium, absent political wills for war. If domestic pressures increase, the political leadership may seek points through this escalation.
One further point on this military confrontation: To enforce the naval embargo against resupply, ramming will be the predominant tactic. As I mentioned previously, ocean-going tugboats are incredibly relevant on the maritime low-intensity battlefield. If a combatant is too fragile for ramming, its only resort will be warning shots, which is a very risky escalation on the force continuum, depending on gunnery skills and sea state. Whereas the physical force of a tugship enables safe resolution against non-cooperative vessels. While Galrahn has expounded on the necessity of including and elevating VBSS teams and naval infantry in the planning/doctrine & force structure of naval strategy, tugs and ramming represent the other leg of the low-intensity naval dyad. Indeed, a ramming touched off the current crisis, and the Japan Coast Guard cutters frequently resorted to ramming to enforce its claims over the Senkaku Islands. Both tugs & VBSS teams will depend on a mothership that is sorely lacking in the US Navy.
Given the prominence of nationalist groups in both Japan and China, a non-government actor may try to settle the islands. Japanese and Taiwanese civilian groups had attempted to resolve the sovereignty dispute through settlement. Japan Coast Guard were able to arrest and deport Taiwanese settlers in the past. Japanese settlers did not have the logistic support to stay long term. There is no fresh water on the islands nor much wildlife, making the logistic requirements unaffordable to most NGOs. The current diplomatic crisis may raise sufficient funds for such an expedition, though.
If a Taiwanese group undertakes a deployment, its primary obstacle will be Japanese eviction. The settlers will have to employ non-lethal measures to successfully resist eviction. For example, net launchers can trap RHIBs and swimmers in the surf zone, preventing Coast Guard officers from landing. Once on land, sticky foam and nets can immobilize the officers. Thus secured, the settlers can send the officers back out to sea on their RHIBs, for an intercept and recovery by their own cutters. The settlers may deploy an ADS-like device without contending with human-safety concerns, but fuel for power generation will be the primary constraint on its operation. Same goes for other direct energy systems.
[We focus on a Taiwanese group because of logistics, and because Chinese billionaires are unlikely to fund this endeavor without government clearance.]
A Japanese civilian group faces eviction risks from the Coast Guard as well. In the current environment, PRC will respond to a civilian escalation with a proxy civilian deployment [ie, a state-sponsored NGO.] To maintain the status quo, where Japn enjoys de facto sovereignty over Diaoyu with its cutter patrols, the Japanese government has an incentive to head off a low-intensity escalation by evicting Japanese settlers. In addition, a Japanese civilian escalation risks a Taiwanese response as well, which is against Japanese interests as stated above. Therefore, a Japanese NGO needs to invest in non-lethal measures to oppose landings.
An NGO can survive on the islands with reverse osmosis water purifiers and mussel/shellfish harvests. It is not impossible, but requires significant preparation and training.
At the moment, neither Japan nor PRC wishes to escalate the dispute. However, ignored domestic pressures can become rogue NGO actions. A successful NGO operation/settlement can force the governments into escalation, reaching the new local equilibrium of a naval embargo. A Solomonic resolution could divide each island into two, half to Japan and the other half China, with a Green Line going down the middle of each island. However, a settlement operation can preclude that division. We could end up with an Ying-Yang-esque division, with a Japanese Diaoyu Dao and a Chinese Taisho Jima. That would be an amusing ending to this 130 year old dispute.
PS (3OCT10): Edited title and added links and tags.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Annual China-Taiwan-US Rituals
Sorry for the few updates recently. Have been busy at work with assignment changes.
I saw this protest from China over the proposed Taiwan foreign military sales currently pending in Congress. This happens everytime that it is practically a ritual of form.
Perhaps, to keep face, China needs to make some noise. And perhaps it is a slow news day for the news media, who have to report this kind of stuff. However, it struck me that China should be happy about all sales to Taiwan. In fact, it is in China's strategic interest to encourage Taiwan to buy as much stuff from the US as possible.
To understand this logic, you need to accept the premise that re-unification is the inevitable conclusion. 70 years is a blink in the eye of the Chinese culture. The people across the strait shares too much to keep up the separation. The independence movement has support from some parts of Taiwan, but Taiwan is too enmeshed in the Chinese economic system to make that a political reality. It may be in the strategic interests of some countries to keep Taiwan separate, but do not confuse strategic interest with reality.
Anyway, if Taiwan will eventually re-unify with China, [and a peaceful reunification looks more hopeful everyday], then any Taiwanese technology will eventually become Chinese technology. If Taiwan buys or builds submarines, they will become Chinese subs down the road. If Taiwan gets some F-16 technology from the US, that will end up in Chinese hands anyway. So whatever Taiwan can get from the US, is a net-plus to China.
The US needs to consider this possibility in its FMS process. But it does not materially change the FMS calculus. The US is officially for a peaceful reunification, and the FMS package supports that end. The US and China are not adversaries yet, just competitors and symbiots. Some parts of the US national security apparatus are arguing for an adversarial interpretation of the Sino-American relationship, but that remains a non-official view. Above all, the US strives for stability in the global economic system to foster economic growth. An ascendant China, in itself, is agnostic to that strategic goal.
So here is another way to interpret the on-going China-Taiwan-US soap opera.
I saw this protest from China over the proposed Taiwan foreign military sales currently pending in Congress. This happens everytime that it is practically a ritual of form.
Perhaps, to keep face, China needs to make some noise. And perhaps it is a slow news day for the news media, who have to report this kind of stuff. However, it struck me that China should be happy about all sales to Taiwan. In fact, it is in China's strategic interest to encourage Taiwan to buy as much stuff from the US as possible.
To understand this logic, you need to accept the premise that re-unification is the inevitable conclusion. 70 years is a blink in the eye of the Chinese culture. The people across the strait shares too much to keep up the separation. The independence movement has support from some parts of Taiwan, but Taiwan is too enmeshed in the Chinese economic system to make that a political reality. It may be in the strategic interests of some countries to keep Taiwan separate, but do not confuse strategic interest with reality.
Anyway, if Taiwan will eventually re-unify with China, [and a peaceful reunification looks more hopeful everyday], then any Taiwanese technology will eventually become Chinese technology. If Taiwan buys or builds submarines, they will become Chinese subs down the road. If Taiwan gets some F-16 technology from the US, that will end up in Chinese hands anyway. So whatever Taiwan can get from the US, is a net-plus to China.
The US needs to consider this possibility in its FMS process. But it does not materially change the FMS calculus. The US is officially for a peaceful reunification, and the FMS package supports that end. The US and China are not adversaries yet, just competitors and symbiots. Some parts of the US national security apparatus are arguing for an adversarial interpretation of the Sino-American relationship, but that remains a non-official view. Above all, the US strives for stability in the global economic system to foster economic growth. An ascendant China, in itself, is agnostic to that strategic goal.
So here is another way to interpret the on-going China-Taiwan-US soap opera.
Thursday, December 24, 2009
Russia: Climbing the Export Tree?
Galrahn at Information Dissemination analyzes more news on the Russian Mistral LHD purchase and talk about the Russian shipbuilding industry and why it is importing French shipbuilding technology. He also talks about the US Senate reaction to this pending purchase.
I have earlier talked about the Mistral purchase as reviving the historic Franco-Russian relationship. Galrahn's discussions reminds me that France may be actively pursuing this geo-political realignment as well. France is betting on Russia becoming the next China.
For all the abuses of the Soviet era, it has left Russia with a relatively well-educated work force familiar with modern manufacturing technology. Although Russian quality control was deplorable, its heavy industries sustained the mighty Red Army for decades. Even today Russian metallurgy is still state of the art. Compared to India and Brazil, Russia is probably best prepared to take on China in mass manufacturing. Moreover, China itself is trying to climb the export tree and leaving the export manufacturing business behind. If France injects capital and technology into Russia, it stands to profit from Russia's re-industrialization and China's de-exportation.
At the same time, France is trying to balance a multipolar world. From France's perspective, an economically ascendant Russia is a nice counter against China. Russia is a potential ally who shares France's distrust of both the US and China. With the communist party still popular in both countries, they share a social affinity as well.
Therefore France hopes to re-industrialize Russia, starting with its ship-building sector. They may be working on a Korean model, where the heavy industries spin off into the light manufacturing industries. There are certainly many challenges, not the least of which is Russia's demographic collapse. But the time is right for a geo-economic/political partnership between France and Russia.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Alienation, Culture, and the Welfare State
This is a sad story from Londonstani of the Abu Muqawama blog. Basically, the concentration of immigrants in the low-income housing projects alienated many of them from England as a state and a nation. The norms in the projects appeared to be the most hedonistic of Western cultural stereotypes.
If the immigrants could live in a less hedonistic environment, perhaps they would be less alienated from England, France, and the other European countries. This is the sad consequence of the welfare housing system we have in the West. Fortunately for the US, we have less of it now after the general welfare reform of the '90s, when new urban planning theories dictated the dispersal of low-income housing in the urban area. Not sure the situation in Europe nor their urban planning theories. It is certainly sad because the urban planners in the 50s and 60s pinned such high hopes on these high-rise low-income housing projects, yet they have caught their residents in a feedback loop of poverty and self-destructive behaviors.
That the immigrants had little choice in British housing appear to be the result of their welfare system. Hopefully Londonstani's video will spark a British version of the welfare reform.
One issue I want to touch on is the cultural alienation in the immigrant community. Many people smarter than I have written on the subject of alienation, and perhaps have already said what I'm saying.
As Londonstani hinted in his article, Western Culture(tm) is the combination of two seemingly antagonistic ideas: "People Obey Rules", and "You Can Do Anything". People in the less developed countries have a universal vision of the West, and that is a place where things work. People obey laws. Trains run on time (mostly). Drivers don't run red lights (mostly). Bureaucracies work like they're supposed to. You don't need to pay bribes.
Yet it is also a place you can do anything, as Hollywood relentlessly reinforces with an endless stream of movies and music videos.
It is a jarring combination. Even native Westerners sometime cannot handle this combination. Communism is but one ideology exploiting and trying to solve this alienation problem. You can see it in the proliferation of ethnic and religious groups on college campuses, and in the teenage angst literature. For many, it marks a retreat into more fundamentalist communities, where (at least) you can meet like-minded individuals who are against the mindless hedonism marketed by Hollywood.
This is a problem faced by many parents in the West: How to raise children who can lead a meaningful, productive existence? Children who have a chance to reproduce and enjoy parenthood themselves? [Hedonism is not conducive toward species propagation, mostly.]
In the age of the super-empowered individual, though, this issue is also a national security threat. For all the calls for Islamic enlightenment, the West should own up to its own role in the alienation process, and work on this cultural contradiction. I know that sex sells, but shouldn't horny teenager-hood be a transitional stage, rather than the human aspiration?
[I guess you can trace the age of empowerment to gunpowder and the printing press, but only now is it upon us, the age of free, online Anarchist Cookbooks.]
This is a recent article that also talks about alienation and the gangster culture, in the Latin American context
Thursday, December 17, 2009
The Chinese Not-Recession-To-Be
I want to clarify my earlier article by saying that, if you were a pessimistic investor like me, you will need to start hedging against the possibilities that the economy will really take off soon, given that employment may pick up soon. For example, you should start getting back into the stock market, if you recently moved your 401k and IRA into money market in anticipation of that W-shaped stock market.
One issue from the employment article is on world trade. Specifically, the deficit spending in China and India to stimulate domestic spending, and to make up for the deglobalization. I can't speak for India, since its economy is not much in the American news. However, China is continuing its real estate boom. So I want to visualize its end state, to help with policy responses.
The Chinese real estate boom will end in a couple of years. The mega-cities of Shanghai and Beijing cannot expand forever. The primary input into the Chinese economy, export, is declining. So they're becoming a closed economic system, and real estate value cannot rise forever in that. They can grow the money supply by issuing more currency or increase monetary velocity. Due to the excess production capacity, inflation is not a big issue. However, real estate is a sinkhole and will limit the velocity growth. So the point is that the real estate will either flatline or dip a bit. Until the world re-globalize and China export again.
Many China watchers and Chinese economists downplay the effects of a real-estate recession in China, because, they say, that Chinese banks do not give out home mortgages, that most Chinese pay cash for the condos, and that they hold the condos to rent out, instead of speculating on a rising value.
The above assertions are true, and these characteristics have constrained the velocity of the real-estate market. However, real estate investment is still tying up a big chunk of the Chinese savings. House purchase is a clan affair in China. The banks may not be lending money, but a shadow-financing system is operating in China to make up for it. A clan (or extended family) will pool its savings to buy a house. People can borrow money from relatives and good friends to put up the cash for the houses. They use the rent payments to pay back the informal mortgages they've incurred.
If the Chinese housing market deflates, all that savings is tied up in these informal mortgages. There may not be a precipitous crash, but there will be a sudden slow-down of the monetary velocity. Economic activity will slow down. And China will have few tools to start it up again, short of an economic-stimulating event (Like World War II) or increased global trade.
Because the lending is informal, the central bank cannot just lower the interest rate to stimulate lending (or mortgage re-financing). Because the saving is not liquid, China will have to borrow money from abroad if it wants to deficit spend its way out. Which does not seem favorable, and which may prompt China to start unloading its T-bills.
I supposed that the banks can start doing home equity loans to increase the liquidity of the real estate market, but that would require a culture change, and start China down a difficult path we've just tread.
Therefore, China may soon hit that real estate asymptote. And it will have to start aggressively export or face economic ennui.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Afghanistan & the Geopolitical Game
The recent suicide bombing on the Indian Embassy in Kabul and the attacks in Pakistan reminds us, that Afghani violence is not purely a function of American military input, ie, Violence != Function( American Soldiers, Talibans). The violence there is a combination of tribal vendettas, Taliban/Al Qaeda ideology, American/Western presence, and Indian/Pakistani/Iranian competitions. We need to keep this complexity in mind as we debate our strategic aims for Afghanistan.
One thing people may not know much is the presence of Indian and Pakistani contractors and NGOs in Afghanistan. India is spending quite a bit of money on Afghanistan, both in buying influence and assisting its merchants in making American military money. Pakistani vendors and ISI operatives are, of course, already on the ground in Afghanistan. So part of the violence there is this low intensity conflict between Indian and Pakistani factions. The Karzai administration is embroiled in this battle, as well.
Robert Kaplan has a nice opinion piece on China's efforts in Afghanistan as well.
Therefore, many anti-coalition militants may be fighting to kick the Yankees out, but the recipe is there for the fighting to continue, long after we leave.
One thing people may not know much is the presence of Indian and Pakistani contractors and NGOs in Afghanistan. India is spending quite a bit of money on Afghanistan, both in buying influence and assisting its merchants in making American military money. Pakistani vendors and ISI operatives are, of course, already on the ground in Afghanistan. So part of the violence there is this low intensity conflict between Indian and Pakistani factions. The Karzai administration is embroiled in this battle, as well.
Robert Kaplan has a nice opinion piece on China's efforts in Afghanistan as well.
Therefore, many anti-coalition militants may be fighting to kick the Yankees out, but the recipe is there for the fighting to continue, long after we leave.
Monday, September 28, 2009
Thoughts & Re-Thoughts on the Afghanistan Campaign
Since Afghanistan is in the news lately, with the McChrystal report to the President, everybody is talking about Afghanistan, again. I guess I need to join the fray, too. I do not have much new to contribute to the current strategic debate, other than my earlier proposal to focus on refugee camps as an alternative, economy-of-force, population-centric tactic. We do not have the resources to save every Afghan, not to the standards we want. We need to focus on the ones we can help, and build a refuge that people can turn to. A refugee camp, which is self-sustaining (a place that gives inhabitants the means to make money and feed themselves, and allows them to organize themselves to administer shared resources), will give the displaced Afghans a place to live, and oppressed Afghans a place to go to.
In addition, such a refugee camp will provide a wealth of human intelligence for the Coalition.
In 2007, I asked the commanding general of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan about their plans for civilian "internally displaced people"; he said there was none. It was a Department of State mission, and the US military is authorized only to assist when State asks. At the time, State didn't ask, so the military didn't prepare. Luckily for the Iraqi people, Iraq kind of sorted itself out. However, Afghanistan is still a wreck. If the military really wants to "win" Afghanistan, then they need to break down the bureaucratic walls and seize this mission for themselves. We can't wait for State to get its acts together.
[Perhaps, with Hilary Clinton in charge, the State Department will do something about this. However, they do not have the money in FY2010 to do this mission. The latest they can is FY2011, and we do not have a year to wait.]
The current Afghanistan strategic debate has two levels: Build the Country vs Disrupt the Insurgents, and Top-down vs Bottom-up. Obviously, we need to go with the Bottom-up strategy, which unfortunately has not been in vogue with the Nation-State-Centric Paradigm crowd. I personally would prefer that we build the Afghanistan state; but that's not realistic, so I'm settling w/ the Disrupt the Insurgent camp.
In terms of strategic location, Afghanistan is in an interesting location. It borders Iran, Pakistan, and China, and close to India, all four states of interest to the US. A US presence in Afghanistan can thus influence nearby events. The only problem is that it is expensive to sustain our presence there.
In terms of strategic location, Afghanistan is in an interesting location. It borders Iran, Pakistan, and China, and close to India, all four states of interest to the US. A US presence in Afghanistan can thus influence nearby events. The only problem is that it is expensive to sustain our presence there.
Saturday, August 29, 2009
Clarifications on Russia and Western Europe
An anonymous commenter responded to my thoughts on the Mistral order. He objected to my analysis because
I think Russia's present security preoccupations are NATO expansion towards
Russia's Near Abroad. Islam is a very minor threat to Russia, and entire
point of the SCO is to manage Sino-Russian interests without butting heads.
I responded:
Yes, Russians are pre-occupied with NATO expansion. However, as Defense
Secretary Gates has said, there's the war you're preparing for, and there's the
war that you're actually fighting.Yes, NATO is expanding. However, that does not
pose a security threat, per se, to Russia. Rather, it is more over spheres of
influence, prestige, and control.In addition, NATO expansion is driven, in large part, by former Warsaw
countries such as Poland and Czech. If you think about intentions, these Central
European countries are more hostile toward Russia than, say, England and France
are. England and France may object to Russian internal politics on humanitarian
grounds, but that could change if Russia becomes more Westernized. Poles and
Czechs, on the other hand, will forever hold Russians in suspicion.So geostrategically, England and France may be rekindling their strategic
relationship with Russia. Here I am thinking on historical timescales of
decades. Historians in the 22nd Century may well mark this Mistral order as the
start of the trend.Ref SCO and China: For all the pomp and circumstance surrounding the SCO,
Russia is deeply worried about China due to the demographics. With the sporadic
anti-Chinese riots and actions in Moscow, and the de-facto Chinese colonization
of Russian Far East, China is Russia's biggest security risk at this moment.As Russia is fighting its Muslim minorities right now, Islamic insurgency is
Russia's biggest security task. The war you're fighting today, like I said.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Chinese PLA Officer Corps Promotion Cycle, and Some Notes on India
Here is an observation thread about China today. Most of the observations are valid, coming from different perspectives. The observation about their selective enforcement of laws can be jarring to a Westerner, but not news to anyone else. The Rule of Law is definitely one of the larger issues the international aid community is struggling with now.
One commenter there noted the rapid promotion cycle of PLA officers, compared to the US Army. American officers generally have made Lieutenant Colonels (O5) by their 20th year in commissioned service. [We're not talking about the guys who are retiring.] However, the People's Liberation Army expects its officers to make "Division-Commander-Equivalent" (O8-equivalent) by their 20th year. That is fast indeed.
The speed of promotion in PLA has several effects. One is that the pressure for promotion is correspondingly high. You are not only preparing for the promotion coming up, you're also preparing for every subsequent promotions. With the intense competition, every little mistake or blemish has huge consequences (Think Zero-Defect Mentality in the post-Cold War US Military.) So the officers are always afraid of stepping away from the group norm.
Another effect is that the sycophancy gets magnified. China has a gift-giving culture that Americans might call bribery, but similar to every other non-Western nation. In the PLA the officers obviously cannot afford much given their salary, but they're still expected to give something. Coupled that with the sycophancy natural in a political organization, even someone who wants to stay clean cannot do so.
On the other hand, their generals do become very good at reading people. To survive the promotion system, they have to be good at reading body language and socializing. That may give them an edge in certain military and political situations.
With so short a promotion cycle, the officers hardly spend any time at any position. In the US Army, battalion command is supposed to be a three year job, giving the lieutenant colonels some time to make their mark on the team. The staff also have time to learn and anticipate the commander's intent. In the PLA, commanders hardly spend any time on their post (probably a year at most). Just when the commander and his staff have gelled as a team, it's time for the commander to move on to his next position. He also does not have much time for schooling, definitely not the year-long CGSC and War Colleges American officers are accustomed to. He has to depend a lot on On the Job Training.
Another effect of the fast promotion system is that the PLA has to kick out a lot of young officers along the way. If you do not make that first promotion list, you probably will not be on the next one, either. With many government-owned companies in the defense sector and elsewhere, this provides a steady stream of employees.
Another effect is that the PLA has a small staff system. The US military let many not-likely-to-promote officers stick around to make their 20 years and qualify for retirement, in part to fill the many staff jobs. The PLA does not have that pool of bodies to draw on.
However, sycophancy does not imply mindless sucking up. The PLA does think about the future and values scholarly activity (a carryover from Confuscianism), as opposed to the anti-intellectual US Army. Combine that with the obedient officer corps. If the political leadership or the PLA brass needs to change their doctrine or organizational direction (eg, from centralized corps formations to decentralized battlegroups), the officer corps will quickly adapt and adopt their orders. That organizational flexibility cannot be discounted.
Some people in that observation thread mentions nepotism. It does exist, but its effect on the PLA is limited these days. With the economic growth of the past thirty years, there is a lot of money in the non-military sector. Generals are more likely to place their children in the government enterprise or private companies, to make money, than to groom them to follow the family tradition.
Compare and contrast the PLA system with that of India. Bharat-Rakshak recently had an interesting thread that touches on Indian Army's promotion system. [Another one talks about officer commissioning sources and touches on promotion, too.] The Indian promotion cycle is definitely slower than the PLA's, maybe slightly longer than America's. So the battalion commanders have more time to gell with their staffs.
Two features of the Indian system are worth noting though: Its top-heavy chain of command, and its emphasis on a full career.
The Indian Army is remarkably brass heavy, when compared to NATO formations. On the line units, they have majors (O4) commanding companies, colonels (O6) battalions, and brigadiers (O7) brigades. Coupled with the 5 to 6 years you typically spend in each rank, that makes for a long time between command billets. While the line commanders definitely get more maturity and "wisdom" for being so senior in their military career, they may also be more set in their ways.
Another part of the Indian system is their emphasis on career. Most of the Short Service Commission officers get out of the Indian Army at the five year mark. However, the permanent commissioned officers (like the Regular Army officers of yore) usually stay on until retirement. So the Indian Army has a big population of the field grade, permanent commissioned, officers on the payroll. This is as opposed to the American system where most officers separate from service between the fifth year mark and the twelfth year mark, with the rest holding out for the 20th year retirement. The "iron rice bowl" mentality associated with government career service makes the Indian Army more rigid, less mentally flexible, than the US military. Indian Army's military operations around the country keep its line units on their toes, but the institutional and support side of the army are slow and inflexible. The slower tail of the Indian Army may hold the line units back in an extended campaign.
Edited to add labels and remove signature.
One commenter there noted the rapid promotion cycle of PLA officers, compared to the US Army. American officers generally have made Lieutenant Colonels (O5) by their 20th year in commissioned service. [We're not talking about the guys who are retiring.] However, the People's Liberation Army expects its officers to make "Division-Commander-Equivalent" (O8-equivalent) by their 20th year. That is fast indeed.
The speed of promotion in PLA has several effects. One is that the pressure for promotion is correspondingly high. You are not only preparing for the promotion coming up, you're also preparing for every subsequent promotions. With the intense competition, every little mistake or blemish has huge consequences (Think Zero-Defect Mentality in the post-Cold War US Military.) So the officers are always afraid of stepping away from the group norm.
Another effect is that the sycophancy gets magnified. China has a gift-giving culture that Americans might call bribery, but similar to every other non-Western nation. In the PLA the officers obviously cannot afford much given their salary, but they're still expected to give something. Coupled that with the sycophancy natural in a political organization, even someone who wants to stay clean cannot do so.
On the other hand, their generals do become very good at reading people. To survive the promotion system, they have to be good at reading body language and socializing. That may give them an edge in certain military and political situations.
With so short a promotion cycle, the officers hardly spend any time at any position. In the US Army, battalion command is supposed to be a three year job, giving the lieutenant colonels some time to make their mark on the team. The staff also have time to learn and anticipate the commander's intent. In the PLA, commanders hardly spend any time on their post (probably a year at most). Just when the commander and his staff have gelled as a team, it's time for the commander to move on to his next position. He also does not have much time for schooling, definitely not the year-long CGSC and War Colleges American officers are accustomed to. He has to depend a lot on On the Job Training.
Another effect of the fast promotion system is that the PLA has to kick out a lot of young officers along the way. If you do not make that first promotion list, you probably will not be on the next one, either. With many government-owned companies in the defense sector and elsewhere, this provides a steady stream of employees.
Another effect is that the PLA has a small staff system. The US military let many not-likely-to-promote officers stick around to make their 20 years and qualify for retirement, in part to fill the many staff jobs. The PLA does not have that pool of bodies to draw on.
However, sycophancy does not imply mindless sucking up. The PLA does think about the future and values scholarly activity (a carryover from Confuscianism), as opposed to the anti-intellectual US Army. Combine that with the obedient officer corps. If the political leadership or the PLA brass needs to change their doctrine or organizational direction (eg, from centralized corps formations to decentralized battlegroups), the officer corps will quickly adapt and adopt their orders. That organizational flexibility cannot be discounted.
Some people in that observation thread mentions nepotism. It does exist, but its effect on the PLA is limited these days. With the economic growth of the past thirty years, there is a lot of money in the non-military sector. Generals are more likely to place their children in the government enterprise or private companies, to make money, than to groom them to follow the family tradition.
Compare and contrast the PLA system with that of India. Bharat-Rakshak recently had an interesting thread that touches on Indian Army's promotion system. [Another one talks about officer commissioning sources and touches on promotion, too.] The Indian promotion cycle is definitely slower than the PLA's, maybe slightly longer than America's. So the battalion commanders have more time to gell with their staffs.
Two features of the Indian system are worth noting though: Its top-heavy chain of command, and its emphasis on a full career.
The Indian Army is remarkably brass heavy, when compared to NATO formations. On the line units, they have majors (O4) commanding companies, colonels (O6) battalions, and brigadiers (O7) brigades. Coupled with the 5 to 6 years you typically spend in each rank, that makes for a long time between command billets. While the line commanders definitely get more maturity and "wisdom" for being so senior in their military career, they may also be more set in their ways.
Another part of the Indian system is their emphasis on career. Most of the Short Service Commission officers get out of the Indian Army at the five year mark. However, the permanent commissioned officers (like the Regular Army officers of yore) usually stay on until retirement. So the Indian Army has a big population of the field grade, permanent commissioned, officers on the payroll. This is as opposed to the American system where most officers separate from service between the fifth year mark and the twelfth year mark, with the rest holding out for the 20th year retirement. The "iron rice bowl" mentality associated with government career service makes the Indian Army more rigid, less mentally flexible, than the US military. Indian Army's military operations around the country keep its line units on their toes, but the institutional and support side of the army are slow and inflexible. The slower tail of the Indian Army may hold the line units back in an extended campaign.
Edited to add labels and remove signature.
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Corroborating Evidence of Afghanistan Economy of Force Ops
Gen (ret) Jones stated that we will not be sending more troops to Afghanistan. That is in keeping with Col (ret) Lang's thesis that we are moving the strategic main effort from the conventional forces to the commando forces. Consequently, the conventional forces need to change their mission to meet their objectives as the supporting element. I advocated for a refugee mission to meet the new strategy earlier. The situation remains favorable for this mission.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Iran: Preparing for the Aftermath
New and old media report violent suppressions in Iran at this time. How this will turn out depends on the bureaucratic analysis I presented in the previous article: The Reformers need the Iranian Army on their side. The reformers have already lost this round, but the Army might still come in to minimize the bloodshed. In this article, I will explore what we, the US, can do to minimize the humanitarian disaster likely to follow, because that is all we can do now. I will also explore how the Iranian Army might help the protesters.
About the only action we can take right now, is to set up refugee camps for the current-protester, future fugitives, on the run from the authorities. Obviously we cannot invade Iran to set up these camps, but we can do so in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Afghanistan. As Kurdistan has a history of supporting Iranian dissident movements, they are a natural ally. Afghanistan's western provinces have a large Persian population, so that is an ideal site as well.
As the Revolutionary Guards have started fighting the people, we have moved past the opportunity window for enacting the policies I laid out in my previous post. Now we can go on with our democracy talk. A Persian Voice of America should start broadcasting. We should also convince the EU to join our economic embargo against Iran. We can still set up an embassy in Tehran, but the embassy's mission is not to normalize relation with the regime, but rather to provide books and media to the Iranian people through its on-site library and cultural programs.
Arming the dissidents and training them is not an option, though. As I said before, if the 2nd Iranian Revolution is to succeed, it needs the Iranian Army's backing. Our arming the dissidents would erase the maneuvering space for the Iranian Army. Besides, there are plenty of light weapons available in Iraqi markets if the dissidents are looking for guns.
Possible Outcomes of Current Clashes
It is still possible that the Iranian Army will come to the aide of the people. However, the Army cannot openly side against the Guardian Council. The Army could unilaterally move into the cities to "assist" the Basij's riot control efforts. Infantry units could race ahead of the Basij to take control of the streets. Then, they can turn the Basij away and shelter the dissidents.
Another possibility is to send in the medical units to set up mobile hospitals or to beef up the current hospitals. Obviously, because of the dangerous rioters, the Army doctors need their own Army escorts as well, to secure the hospitals. The militarization of the hospitals would also protect the patients from all intruders.
If the Army had a military exercise right outside Tehran, they could create a sanctuary from the Basij.
So these are some possible, low profile ways for the Army to rein in the excesses of the Revolutionary Guards and minimize the bloodshed. Hopefully the Iranian Army has enough bureaucratic latitude to carry them out.
About the only action we can take right now, is to set up refugee camps for the current-protester, future fugitives, on the run from the authorities. Obviously we cannot invade Iran to set up these camps, but we can do so in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Afghanistan. As Kurdistan has a history of supporting Iranian dissident movements, they are a natural ally. Afghanistan's western provinces have a large Persian population, so that is an ideal site as well.
As the Revolutionary Guards have started fighting the people, we have moved past the opportunity window for enacting the policies I laid out in my previous post. Now we can go on with our democracy talk. A Persian Voice of America should start broadcasting. We should also convince the EU to join our economic embargo against Iran. We can still set up an embassy in Tehran, but the embassy's mission is not to normalize relation with the regime, but rather to provide books and media to the Iranian people through its on-site library and cultural programs.
Arming the dissidents and training them is not an option, though. As I said before, if the 2nd Iranian Revolution is to succeed, it needs the Iranian Army's backing. Our arming the dissidents would erase the maneuvering space for the Iranian Army. Besides, there are plenty of light weapons available in Iraqi markets if the dissidents are looking for guns.
Possible Outcomes of Current Clashes
It is still possible that the Iranian Army will come to the aide of the people. However, the Army cannot openly side against the Guardian Council. The Army could unilaterally move into the cities to "assist" the Basij's riot control efforts. Infantry units could race ahead of the Basij to take control of the streets. Then, they can turn the Basij away and shelter the dissidents.
Another possibility is to send in the medical units to set up mobile hospitals or to beef up the current hospitals. Obviously, because of the dangerous rioters, the Army doctors need their own Army escorts as well, to secure the hospitals. The militarization of the hospitals would also protect the patients from all intruders.
If the Army had a military exercise right outside Tehran, they could create a sanctuary from the Basij.
So these are some possible, low profile ways for the Army to rein in the excesses of the Revolutionary Guards and minimize the bloodshed. Hopefully the Iranian Army has enough bureaucratic latitude to carry them out.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Iran: Time for an Embassy
We need to can all this talk about Supporting the People's Will in Iran. Paradoxically, our outpouring of support for the protesting students and people in Iran is making things worse. We are cutting them off from the military support they need. Instead, we need to initiate a military and diplomatic rapprochement with Iran, to allow the Iranian military to support the people.
The Iranian people are protesting and counter-protesting over their presidential election results. The unrest is similar to the protests of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, the Tiananmen Square event, and the Berlin Wall. (Or the Israeli and Indian independence movements.) What happens next will depend very much on the bureaucratic actors in Iran. The American response therefore needs to shape and influence these bureaucratic actors.
As Mao Zedung famously observed, "Political power comes from the barrel of a gun." Political transition cannot occur without military power. It is all fine and good that people are marching in the streets, but they cannot change the government if the military balance is against them. For example, in Ukraine and in East Germany, the military sat out on the protests, neither embracing nor opposing the marchers. The people could march in peace and effect change. In Israel and India, the independence movements attacked the British colonial administration with sabotage and assassinations. The British government decided to stop fighting and withdrew. In Western democracies, the military protects the political transitions of elections. Without a military component, protests will cry unheard.
Therefore we need to look at the military dimension in Iran right now. The military opposition in Iran is very small. For example, Michael Totten visited some Iranian Communist Party militia in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2006 [Correction: 2007], and they numbered in hundreds at most. We hear about ethnic separatist violence in Iran from time to time (Iran is an empire), but they were few in number and limited in effect. The student protesters do not seem to have a military wing, judging by my perception that there have been few assassinations of the secret police officials in Tehran. For the Iranian protest to become an Iranian revolution, we will have to look toward the government bodies.
Iran has several militaries. There are the usual Iranian Army, Navy, and Air Force. There is also the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which has ships and planes of its own. There is the Iranian National Police, which shares the paramilitary and law enforcement portfolio with the Revolutionary Guards. How will they respond to the protest and possible constitutional crisis?
Ahmadinejad came from the Revolutionary Guards, so the Guards will probably side with Ahmadinejad. More importantly, however, the Guards exists to support the Iranian Guardian Council, so they will do what Khamenei says. The Iranian military, on the other hands, competes with the Revolutionary Guards on military matters, so may be inclined to support the students. On the other hand, the Iranian military probably views the current unrest as an American/Israeli conspiracy. Therefore, we need to give the Iranian military the breathing space to make up its mind.
We need to signal the Iranian military that we are not going to take advantage of their current political weakness. We can employ confidence building measures such as officer exchange programs and military visits. These things take time to set up, but by starting the planning process for them, we demonstrate our intentions to the Iranian military. Further, we should decrease the military tension when possible. Our forces in the Persian Gulf can stand down their tempo of operations, such as decreased patrols and training flights. The US Army can minimize its patrols near the Iraqi-Iranian border.
Furthermore, we need to tell the Iranians what we are doing. President Obama can put his mega-watt smile on TV and tell the Iranians that we are standing down militarily to show them we harbor no ill will toward them. He can make a historic announcement to normalize our diplomatic ties with Iran, such as setting up an embassy in Tehran. He should tell them that, regardless of who ends up being president of Iran, the United States will continue the rapprochement. We need to show respect for Iran's constitutional process so that the Iranian military can stop focusing on us and start focusing on their constitutional crisis.
Many commentators in America are saying that we need to "Show our solidarity with the Iranian people and support their democratic dreams." That, in my opinion, is precisely the wrong thing to do. Our support will only feed the Iranian conspiracy theory that the protest is an American/Israeli plot. Instead, we need to back off on the aggressive democratic talk, and demonstrate our respect for Iran's institutions. We need to do what we can to let the Iranian Army support the students.
Edited: The Stimulist looks at the next step here. Anne Applebaum wants to up the democratic rhetoric. Patrick Lang looks beyond the current protest stage, toward the possibly next stage of armed revolution. Adam Silverman analyzes revolutions in general.
Edited for format and inserted links.
Friday, June 5, 2009
China, India, Brides, and War
Kenneth Anderson wrote an interesting post on Volokh Conspiracy about Surplus Males in China and Libertarian thoughts. The comments were very interesting as well and covered most of the common angles.
One of the commenters brought up the burgeoning mail-order bride industry in China, specifically touring Cambodia and other Southeast Asia countries. His remarks got me thinking about the geopolitical implications of this development.
As many of you know, Southeast Asia has a complex attitude toward China. Vietnam, for example, drove out many ethnic Chinese as “boat people” in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. Indonesia and Malaysia periodically have anti-Chinese riots. Vietnam and the Phillipines have claims against China on the Spratly Islands. Yet Indonesia is cooperating with China in the defense industry, and Burma is using China to balance against Thailand and India.
As China and India both have a surplus male population (explored in Bare Branches), both are experiencing social stress as men compete for mates. Entrepreneurs are pushing the mail-order bride industry in both countries, with a large target demographic.
I believe that bride importing countries generally provoke resentment among the bride exporting populations, due to increased competition for mates in the exporting populations. I don’t have evidence to back up this claim.
However, this sentiment can easily become coupled to local nativist sentiments in the Southeast Asian states. Thailand and Myanmar have cross-border insurgencies and drug trade problems. Vietnam has disputed territories with Laos and Cambodia. Indonesia has ethnic separatist movements. The region has suffered economically over the past 20 years, from competition with the Chinese and Indian export economies and from the currency crises. These are all factors that can lead to war.
China and India both possess nuclear weapons and thus are unlikely to directly confront each other. However, the Southeast Asian states have many flash points and have been balancing against each other. If a crisis were to erupt, demagogues will drag anti-Chinese and anti-Indian sentiments to the surface. India and China will get dragged into such a crisis because of the complex bilateral defense relationships in the region, and because of domestic responses to the nativist sentiment in the crisis countries. The conflict can quickly widen across the penninsulas. Such a conflict will be difficult to resolve, because the belligerents can easily claim seemingly legitimate causii belli in this environment.
Therefore, the bare branches in China and India may indirectly destabilize Southeast Asia. We need to recognize this and increase our crisis response capability in the region.
One of the commenters brought up the burgeoning mail-order bride industry in China, specifically touring Cambodia and other Southeast Asia countries. His remarks got me thinking about the geopolitical implications of this development.
As many of you know, Southeast Asia has a complex attitude toward China. Vietnam, for example, drove out many ethnic Chinese as “boat people” in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. Indonesia and Malaysia periodically have anti-Chinese riots. Vietnam and the Phillipines have claims against China on the Spratly Islands. Yet Indonesia is cooperating with China in the defense industry, and Burma is using China to balance against Thailand and India.
As China and India both have a surplus male population (explored in Bare Branches), both are experiencing social stress as men compete for mates. Entrepreneurs are pushing the mail-order bride industry in both countries, with a large target demographic.
I believe that bride importing countries generally provoke resentment among the bride exporting populations, due to increased competition for mates in the exporting populations. I don’t have evidence to back up this claim.
However, this sentiment can easily become coupled to local nativist sentiments in the Southeast Asian states. Thailand and Myanmar have cross-border insurgencies and drug trade problems. Vietnam has disputed territories with Laos and Cambodia. Indonesia has ethnic separatist movements. The region has suffered economically over the past 20 years, from competition with the Chinese and Indian export economies and from the currency crises. These are all factors that can lead to war.
China and India both possess nuclear weapons and thus are unlikely to directly confront each other. However, the Southeast Asian states have many flash points and have been balancing against each other. If a crisis were to erupt, demagogues will drag anti-Chinese and anti-Indian sentiments to the surface. India and China will get dragged into such a crisis because of the complex bilateral defense relationships in the region, and because of domestic responses to the nativist sentiment in the crisis countries. The conflict can quickly widen across the penninsulas. Such a conflict will be difficult to resolve, because the belligerents can easily claim seemingly legitimate causii belli in this environment.
Therefore, the bare branches in China and India may indirectly destabilize Southeast Asia. We need to recognize this and increase our crisis response capability in the region.
Thursday, June 4, 2009
A Humane Strategy to Support Our Afghan Policy
In this post I am advocating a strategy to protect the Afghan civilian population from the ongoing violence in Afghanistan, as far as we can. Population protection will no longer be a mission for the Coalition forces. However, we still have the moral imperative to protect Afghan civilians. Therefore, the Coalition forces need to construct, staff, and protect refugee/resettlement camps to shelter the "Internally Displaced Persons" in Afghanistan. We need to give Afghan civilians a place to get away from the fighting.
The American government appears to be changing our policy direction in Afghanistan. Our stated policy has remained the establishment of a civil, democratic society in Afghanistan. The US Army is planning a "surge" of forces into Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban. However, COL(ret) Lang believes that President Obama is revising our policy aim in Afghanistan away from Nation-Building(tm). Obama's ideological faction is generally opposed to a Big Military solution, more congenial to surgical strikes and commando raids. With the appointment of LTG McChrystal as ISAF Commander, we may be giving up on building a Western society in Afghanistan as a policy goal. Instead, our Afghanistan policy is focusing on destroying the Al-Qaeda leadership.
With this change in policy focus, the special operation forces become our strategic main effort in Operation Enduring Freedom. Our conventional forces and the Afghan National Army/Police become the strategic supporting effort. As the supporting effort, their mission is not to establish central government control in the provinces or other population-centric COIN goals. [Although they may conduct population-centric COIN operations to gather intelligence to support the SOF, for example.]
The Afghan people may lose out under our policy change. Under the original policy, securing the Afghan population was a strategic goal, whereas under the new policy, we may cede the Afghan countryside to the Taliban. Some Afghan tribes and families have risked Taliban retaliation to cooperate with the Coalition forces. Under the new policy, we will reduce our operational support, and maybe logistical as well, to our local allies. The reduced support leaves our local allies vulnerable to Taliban attack. As the Taliban has murdered entire families to make an example of "traitors", our strategic retreat from the country side makes us culpable, to a degree, for their deaths as well.
The families of the ANA and ANP are vulnerable to Taliban reprisal as well. If the Afghan soldiers and policemen worry about their far away families, they are less combat effective. We need to secure the families of the ANA and ANP.
In addition, our new policy means that we will start favoring certain warlords over others. Currently, we are officially supporting some warlords who covertly sponsor the Taliban. Instead, we will starting playing one warlord against another to disrupt Taliban safe heavens. In the renewed Afghan Civil War, civilians will get caught in the crossfire.
We need to do something to protect the Afghan civilians from the coming violence; that is the moral thing to do. We will not station basecamps throughout the country to protect the population, because the resulting cost in blood and treasure outweighs our strategic gain. However, we will have enough spare resources to protect refugees and internally displaced persons. We need to include refugee camps in our campaign plan, to minimize our impact on civilians' lives and livelihood. In addition, the unsupervised refugee population is destabilizing the region and further stressing Pakistan.
Therefore, I am proposing that we set up refugee camps near Kabul, for any civilian that needs a place to go. We should organize these camps on the model of John Robb's Resilient Communities, where the residents will work for a living. Idle refugees are susceptible to extremist propaganda of all stripes. Make it a place where the people can stay and make a new life, or catch their breath then go home, whichever they choose. Keep the place safe from insurgent violence so that the people can get on with their lives.
Such a place is a low cost endeavor. It is centrally located with Kabul, so it is close to military bases. The Afghan National Army can train and protect the settlement at the same time. They can practice patrolling and checkpoint operations at the settlement. The Afghan soldiers and policemen can keep their families at the settlements, where they know they'll be kept safe from reprisals. We will involve the refugees in constructing and operating the settlement. These tasks keep them occupied, and give them a stake in the resulting city. By utilizing refugee labor, we reduce the need of expatriate labor, which is expensive and adds to camp life support needs. By having the refugees organize and govern themselves, we give them the opportunity to practice clean government. We will have a centralized place to teach them advanced agricultural techniques, machine repair skills, and other training that can make their lives back home easier, should they ever leave.
The current Afghan refugee population is impeding our policy goals by stressing the social welfare systems of surrounding countries and providing a fertile recruitment ground to Al-Qaeda. We need to at least try to sway them to our side. The ANA and ANP need a sanctuary where their families will be safe from reprisals. We have a moral obligation to give the civilian an alternative from the Taliban-controlled towns and Pakistani slums. These factor argue for Coalition support to refugee camps near Kabul. Moreover, this is an endeavor in which money is more important than American boots on the ground, and for which donor countries are sympathetic.
Edited to add: This post builds on my earlier statement of policy paradigm change. We cannot depend on the host nation bureaucracy to implement our policy for us. Instead, the US military may have to take on the job of city manager/administrator from time to time. Refugee camp is a prime example of the capability the US military needs in the post-Nation-State World we live in.
The American government appears to be changing our policy direction in Afghanistan. Our stated policy has remained the establishment of a civil, democratic society in Afghanistan. The US Army is planning a "surge" of forces into Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban. However, COL(ret) Lang believes that President Obama is revising our policy aim in Afghanistan away from Nation-Building(tm). Obama's ideological faction is generally opposed to a Big Military solution, more congenial to surgical strikes and commando raids. With the appointment of LTG McChrystal as ISAF Commander, we may be giving up on building a Western society in Afghanistan as a policy goal. Instead, our Afghanistan policy is focusing on destroying the Al-Qaeda leadership.
With this change in policy focus, the special operation forces become our strategic main effort in Operation Enduring Freedom. Our conventional forces and the Afghan National Army/Police become the strategic supporting effort. As the supporting effort, their mission is not to establish central government control in the provinces or other population-centric COIN goals. [Although they may conduct population-centric COIN operations to gather intelligence to support the SOF, for example.]
The Afghan people may lose out under our policy change. Under the original policy, securing the Afghan population was a strategic goal, whereas under the new policy, we may cede the Afghan countryside to the Taliban. Some Afghan tribes and families have risked Taliban retaliation to cooperate with the Coalition forces. Under the new policy, we will reduce our operational support, and maybe logistical as well, to our local allies. The reduced support leaves our local allies vulnerable to Taliban attack. As the Taliban has murdered entire families to make an example of "traitors", our strategic retreat from the country side makes us culpable, to a degree, for their deaths as well.
The families of the ANA and ANP are vulnerable to Taliban reprisal as well. If the Afghan soldiers and policemen worry about their far away families, they are less combat effective. We need to secure the families of the ANA and ANP.
In addition, our new policy means that we will start favoring certain warlords over others. Currently, we are officially supporting some warlords who covertly sponsor the Taliban. Instead, we will starting playing one warlord against another to disrupt Taliban safe heavens. In the renewed Afghan Civil War, civilians will get caught in the crossfire.
We need to do something to protect the Afghan civilians from the coming violence; that is the moral thing to do. We will not station basecamps throughout the country to protect the population, because the resulting cost in blood and treasure outweighs our strategic gain. However, we will have enough spare resources to protect refugees and internally displaced persons. We need to include refugee camps in our campaign plan, to minimize our impact on civilians' lives and livelihood. In addition, the unsupervised refugee population is destabilizing the region and further stressing Pakistan.
Therefore, I am proposing that we set up refugee camps near Kabul, for any civilian that needs a place to go. We should organize these camps on the model of John Robb's Resilient Communities, where the residents will work for a living. Idle refugees are susceptible to extremist propaganda of all stripes. Make it a place where the people can stay and make a new life, or catch their breath then go home, whichever they choose. Keep the place safe from insurgent violence so that the people can get on with their lives.
Such a place is a low cost endeavor. It is centrally located with Kabul, so it is close to military bases. The Afghan National Army can train and protect the settlement at the same time. They can practice patrolling and checkpoint operations at the settlement. The Afghan soldiers and policemen can keep their families at the settlements, where they know they'll be kept safe from reprisals. We will involve the refugees in constructing and operating the settlement. These tasks keep them occupied, and give them a stake in the resulting city. By utilizing refugee labor, we reduce the need of expatriate labor, which is expensive and adds to camp life support needs. By having the refugees organize and govern themselves, we give them the opportunity to practice clean government. We will have a centralized place to teach them advanced agricultural techniques, machine repair skills, and other training that can make their lives back home easier, should they ever leave.
The current Afghan refugee population is impeding our policy goals by stressing the social welfare systems of surrounding countries and providing a fertile recruitment ground to Al-Qaeda. We need to at least try to sway them to our side. The ANA and ANP need a sanctuary where their families will be safe from reprisals. We have a moral obligation to give the civilian an alternative from the Taliban-controlled towns and Pakistani slums. These factor argue for Coalition support to refugee camps near Kabul. Moreover, this is an endeavor in which money is more important than American boots on the ground, and for which donor countries are sympathetic.
Edited to add: This post builds on my earlier statement of policy paradigm change. We cannot depend on the host nation bureaucracy to implement our policy for us. Instead, the US military may have to take on the job of city manager/administrator from time to time. Refugee camp is a prime example of the capability the US military needs in the post-Nation-State World we live in.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
The Recession and Neo-Fascism/Et-al-isms
David Brooks at New York Times had an interesting article up today on the "Formerly Middle Class". His main thesis is that, as these formerly middle class people lose their jobs and their middle class symbols, they will become angry, pessimistic, and vulnerable to extremist messages.
This column reminded me of Today's ISMS: Socialism, Capitalism, Fascism, Communism, and Libertarianism by Ebenstein. In it, Ebenstein said of Fascism that its footsoldiers are of the Lower Middle Class, because they have worked the hardest to move themselves out of the lower class. So they embrace the social conventions and traditions. At the same time, because they are lower on the economic scale, they are more vulnerable to losing their status. Therefore they are more militant against economic redistribution schemes. Fascism exploits their vulnerabilities against Communism, even though both are more similar than different in practice.
With this in mind, we can look at a post-Great-Recession World 10 years from now: In China, India, Brazil, and Russia, (and East Europe), we can expect to see a rise in Nationalistic Fascist groups in their respective countries. They will militate against their traditional enemies: Japan/Korea, Pakistan, Germany/Europe, Paraguay(?), et al. And the United States will be the Public Enemy # Uno in many of those places as well.
As the "Emerging Markets" slide back into 3rd World-ness, we can also expect a re-surgence in Communist philosophies. Both Communism and Fascism are products of the turbulent economic times of the last turn of the century. It seems that the more things change, the more they stay the same.
I may have to order that nuclear fall-out shelter I've been thinking about. With a possibly Islamic-ruled Pakistan and Nationalistic Fascist India facing each other, the Doomsday Clock is edging toward armageddon.
This column reminded me of Today's ISMS: Socialism, Capitalism, Fascism, Communism, and Libertarianism by Ebenstein. In it, Ebenstein said of Fascism that its footsoldiers are of the Lower Middle Class, because they have worked the hardest to move themselves out of the lower class. So they embrace the social conventions and traditions. At the same time, because they are lower on the economic scale, they are more vulnerable to losing their status. Therefore they are more militant against economic redistribution schemes. Fascism exploits their vulnerabilities against Communism, even though both are more similar than different in practice.
With this in mind, we can look at a post-Great-Recession World 10 years from now: In China, India, Brazil, and Russia, (and East Europe), we can expect to see a rise in Nationalistic Fascist groups in their respective countries. They will militate against their traditional enemies: Japan/Korea, Pakistan, Germany/Europe, Paraguay(?), et al. And the United States will be the Public Enemy # Uno in many of those places as well.
As the "Emerging Markets" slide back into 3rd World-ness, we can also expect a re-surgence in Communist philosophies. Both Communism and Fascism are products of the turbulent economic times of the last turn of the century. It seems that the more things change, the more they stay the same.
I may have to order that nuclear fall-out shelter I've been thinking about. With a possibly Islamic-ruled Pakistan and Nationalistic Fascist India facing each other, the Doomsday Clock is edging toward armageddon.
Sunday, June 22, 2008
Manifestation of Asian Growth Risks
The LA Times today brings confirmation of the precarious economic situations of China and India. This confirms my article last week about the popular misperception of Asian economic prowess. The Asian Depression is coming soon. How everyone deal with it will define the Twenty-First Century, just as the Great Depression defined the Twentieth Century.
PS: The Chinese official CPI for May'08 is rumored to be 7%. Looking for confirmation report.
PS: The Chinese official CPI for May'08 is rumored to be 7%. Looking for confirmation report.
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
"Rise" of Asia
NPR today had a book review on the "Rise" of Asia in a multipolar world. The story has the usual platitudes about how the future will be an economically prosperous Asia. The reviewer even praised the "Invididual entrepreneurship without interference from the state" in India. Hello?! India has a lot of "individual entrepreneurship"? Which land has a more vibrant small business scene, India or China? Which one suffers more from bureaucratic redtape in business formation?
But the point of this post today is not about correcting the details of this NPR story. Rather, I want to raise a point on the American public consciousness about Asia.
It appears that most commentators on the "Rise" of Asia forecast the following: China/India/et al becomes ever richer. One day, their GDP exceeds that of the US. Voila, Asia is now a superpower. Warfare/conflict does not enter the narrative except a worry that the American Gung Ho nutjobs will screw it up by fighting the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait.
These commentators generally downplay the economic risks during the "Rise". China and India both faces significant recession risks in the near term. How they, and we the US, deal with their economic downturn will significantly define their future trajectory and our relationships.
When the economy is booming, as it is right now in Asia, everybody is happy, and they have few disputes with the US. People become angry when their heightened expectations do not pan out, as in a recession, and that is when war starts.
China and India's rising demand for oil is driving up the marginal price for oil now. As oil becomes more expensive, their governments will have to decrease their oil subsidies to the consumers, or increase taxation. An oil-driven inflation will easily cause unrest among the urban poor, leading toward widespread social disruption. Anecdotal evidence suggest that inflation is already higher this year in China than last year, though official inflation figures will not be available before year end. India's new car culture is also vulnerable to the rising oil.
The current energy crisis is also driving up food prices. The agricultural revolution that cured India's famine was fueled by fertilizers. As fertilizer prices have gone up across the world (petroleum is a key input to the aritificial fertilizers), food prices have gone up as well. India and China have stopped exporting rice due to expected shortage.
Beyond the current energy crisis, economic growth has also driven up the real estate in China (not sure about India). The real estate prices in Shanghai and Beijing are reminiscent of pre-recession Japan. In such a speculative environment, there will inevitably be a real estate price crash. We are the living proof of that today.
Even now, manufacturers are moving away from China in search of ever cheaper labor.
All this is to say, we should stop thinking about the "Rise" of Asia, or managing the rise of China and India into the multi-polar world. Instead, we need to start working on plans to manage the coming Chinese and Indian Depressions and/or Stagflations. The coming Asian economic crisis will define the 21st Century, just as the Great Depression defined the 20th Century and the rise of the United States as a Superpower.
But the point of this post today is not about correcting the details of this NPR story. Rather, I want to raise a point on the American public consciousness about Asia.
It appears that most commentators on the "Rise" of Asia forecast the following: China/India/et al becomes ever richer. One day, their GDP exceeds that of the US. Voila, Asia is now a superpower. Warfare/conflict does not enter the narrative except a worry that the American Gung Ho nutjobs will screw it up by fighting the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait.
These commentators generally downplay the economic risks during the "Rise". China and India both faces significant recession risks in the near term. How they, and we the US, deal with their economic downturn will significantly define their future trajectory and our relationships.
When the economy is booming, as it is right now in Asia, everybody is happy, and they have few disputes with the US. People become angry when their heightened expectations do not pan out, as in a recession, and that is when war starts.
China and India's rising demand for oil is driving up the marginal price for oil now. As oil becomes more expensive, their governments will have to decrease their oil subsidies to the consumers, or increase taxation. An oil-driven inflation will easily cause unrest among the urban poor, leading toward widespread social disruption. Anecdotal evidence suggest that inflation is already higher this year in China than last year, though official inflation figures will not be available before year end. India's new car culture is also vulnerable to the rising oil.
The current energy crisis is also driving up food prices. The agricultural revolution that cured India's famine was fueled by fertilizers. As fertilizer prices have gone up across the world (petroleum is a key input to the aritificial fertilizers), food prices have gone up as well. India and China have stopped exporting rice due to expected shortage.
Beyond the current energy crisis, economic growth has also driven up the real estate in China (not sure about India). The real estate prices in Shanghai and Beijing are reminiscent of pre-recession Japan. In such a speculative environment, there will inevitably be a real estate price crash. We are the living proof of that today.
Even now, manufacturers are moving away from China in search of ever cheaper labor.
All this is to say, we should stop thinking about the "Rise" of Asia, or managing the rise of China and India into the multi-polar world. Instead, we need to start working on plans to manage the coming Chinese and Indian Depressions and/or Stagflations. The coming Asian economic crisis will define the 21st Century, just as the Great Depression defined the 20th Century and the rise of the United States as a Superpower.
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