USAF Politics and Lt Gen(P) Wolfenbarger

I saw this interesting story on Yahoo today, Obama Air Force Nomination Reeks of Politics, by Teri Heisler.  It talked about the careers of 3 different female USAF flag officers: Lt Gen(P) Wolfenbarger, Maj Gen Masiello, and Lt Gen(ret) Gabreski.  Wolfenbarger made the news because she will become USAF's first female 4-star.  Heisler decried the selection because she thinks that the other two officers were more qualified, worthy, of being the first USAF female general.

The 3 generals had very distinct career paths:  Wolfenbarger, an Academy grad, is a developmental engineer.  Masiello is a contracting officer.  And Gabreski is a maintenance officer with significant command and operational experience.  Masiello deployed to Iraq once, while Gabreski served a tour in Korea.  Wolfenbarger stayed CONUS the whole time, but she did have a GWOT Svc Medal. [Couldn't find where she got it from.]  Heisler thought that Masiello and Gabreski are better role models because of their deployments and operational experience for an Air Force at war.

However, I think USAF went with the right choice with Wolfenbarger, both as a female role model and as AFMC Commander.  Wolfenbarger is an engineer, which is exactly the raison d'etre of AFMC: to engineer weapons for the USAF.  If Gabreski was in the Army, then she would have made 4-star because the Army likes operational experience.  But the USAF needs an engineer to manage its technical programs, so Wolfenbarger got the nod.

Moreover, as a female engineer, Wolfenbarger is the right STEM role model.  It's somewhat ironic that Heisler, who just wrote about "Women in STEM Careers", turns right back around and decries a female engineer making ranks.

[On the other hand, the current AFMC Commander, Gen Hoffman, a male, was a fighter pilot and an engineer.  So when USAF female pilots come of age, we can expect AFMC commanders to stay pilot/engineers.  Gabreski was operational, just not the right kind of operational.]

Army, ADA, and AirSea Battle

Galrahn has been discussing AirSea Battle for quite awhile, specifically focusing on the absence of any Army contribution to the overall public discussion.  It is quite sad that the Army has not publicly engaged on the AirSea discussion.  Only this month has the AUSA come out with a rebuttal to the Navy and Air Force's public discussions.

One big reason Big Army is not contributing to this AirSea concept is because of internal Army politics. Specifically the decline of Air Defense Artillery. It is quite paradoxical that, while Ballistic Missile Defense has taken on greater strategic significance, Army itself is institutionally moving away from ADA in general.

ADA is composed of two components, HIMAD and SHORAD. For much of the 90s, the active officer corps was split 50/50: 10 Battalion of HIMAD and 10 Battalion of SHORAD. Right after OIF1, though, Big Army saw that there was no low-altitude threat at all, so it moved decisively to eliminate the SHORAD formation. I think right now there's only 10 Stinger/Avenger batteries providing a residual capability, which is a 75% cut.

You'd probably say it's long overdue, but the key is that the loss of 30%+ of total ADA corps means that many fewer O4s and O5s writing papers to Parameters and other professional journals. Sure, we have several ADA generals at the Pentagon, including the current G-8, but where do you think the generals' talking points come from? It's those O4s and O5s.

The BMD mission has slightly increased the HIMAD side of the house, but it did not make a dent against the SHORAD loss. The unit manning the GMD missile field is a Guard unit (Colorado/Alaska Guard), whose officers do not worry about professional journals. Ambitious officers transfer to other hot fields to make their stars.

ADA probably will never attain the reverence of the Soviet PVO branch, but its preoccupation with self-preservation means that Big Army has little brainpower thinking about AirSea. Horror upon horrors, but sometimes I wonder if we should have folded ADA into the USAF like the Europeans have...

The Tanker Drama Back To Square One

Northrop has decided not to bid for the tanker RFP, and EADS will not go it alone. So Boeing is now the de facto winner of the KC-X competition, as was the case nearly 10 years ago. France and Germany are crying foul and may punish the US for a narrow RFP, we'll see how that turns out. Some of the observers seem to have forgotten that this is merely the first stage of the USAF tanker replacement program. There are the KC-Y and KC-Z to come.

So France and Germany need to pace themselves on that protesting part. The KC-330 has never been a good replacement for the KC-135s; its performance more approximates the KC-10(KC-Y/Z?). The USAF is clearly interested in a wide-body tanker, they just screwed up their own acquisition program in pursuing the KC-330.

Still, I'm glad that we will start saving on the O&M money of maintaining the outdated KC-135s.

ETA: Formatting and links

USAF's Near Ridiculous Push for Unmanned Cargo Aircraft

USAF just put out an RFI for an unmanned cargo aircraft. The specifications are: 500-3,000 lbs, 500 nautical miles, 250 knots, V/STOL up to 300 feet runway, etc, etc.

As I see it, that's a pretty ridiculous set of specifications for an unmanned aircraft. If you're going to have a payload of up to 3,000 lbs, you have room for a pilot. The USAF could use a commercial off-the-shelf prop-driven aircraft that would meet all of the specs (other than the unmanned part). They could spend the money saved on a strapped-down auto-pilot unit, later, that could fly the plane. Voila, immediate capability in the field! This is the USAF re-inventing the wheel the USAF-way.

Speaking of re-inventing the wheel, here is a blast from the past: The Soviet Antonov-2 biplane cargo aircraft. 3,000 lb, check [4,700lb "useful load"]. 500 nautical miles, check [456 nm, almost there]. V/STOL, check [30 miles per hour stall speed.] 250 knots, no [139 kn max].

Wiki quotes a serviceable An-2 at $30,000. That is probably cheaper than the salary we paid the USAF people during their RFI preparation.

NCADE = A-AAM?

USAF's Chief of Staff, Gen Schwartz, has signalled his support for the air-launched missile defense concepts. This is good for missile defense. Additionally, the USAF will have an option to improve its air-to-air capability.

As I have talked about before, the USAF needs new air-to-air missiles to make up for F-35's inferior capabilities. Raytheon's NCADE and Lockheed's ALHTK will nicely address the shortfalls.

NCADE will give the AIM-120 an infrared seeker option. This will address the seeker diversity problem USAF and USN faces. NCADE's booster stage will also extend the range or improve AIM-120's kinematics. Even if NCADE does not pan out, Raytheon can quickly leverage its results into AIM-120 improvements.

ALHTK will introduce new missiles into USAF inventory, if NCADE doesn't pan out. PAC-3's radar seeker operates on a different band from AIM-120, so that will complicate threat jamming efforts. THAAD's IR seeker will address seeker diversity.

If air-launched missile defense progresses beyond the study stage, hopefully BAE will bring on its Meteor in the competition.

May the best missile win!

New MRAP-like Capability Gaps

Paul McLeary of Aviation Week asked a question: What is our next MRAP-like capability gap? In other words, a capability gap that the US military has been underfunding, but which would be catastrophic in our next war?

I came up with 3 gaps, one for each of the departments, 'cuz I'm joint in my heart :)

1.) AAM seeker diversity: AIM-120 desperately needs an infrared seeker alternative. Or a hyperspectral sensor.
2.) Corvettes/Frigates/PCs for Navy: they need more smaller ships. that one will come up when we intervene in a coastal situation again. Galrahn is talking about this one right now.
2.) An airborne-capable tank would be nice.

One of the commenters said cyber, but that's kind of getting enough attention as it is. An MRAP like capability gap is usually very conventional and un-sexy. That's why we get "surprised" when it happens.

Anyone else have any thoughts?

Edited for tags and removal of signature

CoI Disclosure: Boeing Employee

Dear Readers,

Because my last post involves my employer, I will disclose my employer's name. I work for Boeing IDS, which is involved in the current tanker dispute against Northrop/EADS/Airbus. I have never been directly or indirectly involved in any aspect of the Boeing KC-767 tanker proposal. I hold few shares in Boeing stock. In case you find the information relevant, now you know.

PS: edited for format.

Tanker Split Buy Can Be Cheap, Too!

After Sec. Dr. Gates' recent remarks against KC-X split buy, Rep. Norm Dicks of Washington has re-affirmed his opposition as well. Both oppose split buy because they believe operating two aircraft types will be expensive to the USAF.

Dr. Loren Thompson made a case that splitting KC-X may be fiscally advantageous to the USAF, based on some budgeting considerations. However, he failed to consider the engineering angle of lowering operating expenses. Which makes sense, since he is not an engineer. I am, though, so I will make the case that split buy can work, in terms of maintenance expenses.

One important point you need to remember about Boeing KC-767 and Airbus KC-45 is that they both can use the GE CF6-80 series turbofan engine. The two platforms use different variants of the CF6-80, due to different thrust requirements. All CF6-80 variants share common turbine stages, however. Therefore, in terms of engine spare parts, KC-767 and KC-45 share many common parts. Engine maintenance/rebuild accounts for the majority of aircraft maintenance expenses. On the engine side, a split purchase does not much increase the maintenance budget due to the volume scale.

Another point that critics of split buy bring up is the requirement for separate training pipelines. To non-pilots and non-engineers, that excuse sounds valid. That is not the case. We can build the two platforms to maximize training commonality. For example, a big part of learning to fly is the "knob-ology", learning to interpret the displays and gauges, and to operate the knobs and switches. The reason there are different training pipelines is because different planes have their gauges at different places. Whereas you do not need "training pipelines" for GM vs Toyota cars because they all have their tachometers (engine RPM) right next to the speedometer. Cars can share the same "training pipeline" because they share the same "knob-ology" with minor differences. 767 and Airbus A330 currently have different flight decks, necessitating the different training programs. If the USAF were to mandate a common cockpit for the two platforms, this will obviate much of the need for training pipelines. The A330 uses fly-by-wire, so we can further restrict its flight envelope to mimic 767's flight characteristics, if necessary.

As you can see, smart engineering can minimize the expenses of a split buy over winner-take-all. If the USAF spends a little effort in its system engineering and acquisition, by mandating the above two, common engine and common cockpit, it can make split buy work. Of course, this route requires either commitment from senior USAF leadership or a Congressional mandate. Congress will probably need to cram this down USAF's throat.

[If you're going to say something about the unfairness of GE monopoly, well, we can have a "split-buy" there, too. Just like what we're doing with F-135 and F-136. A common engine-aircraft interface is all we need to get that done.]

Update 2MAY2009: Dr. Rebecca Grant of Mitchell Institute/Lexington Institute has released a paper, The Tanker Imperative, which echoes the arguments made by Dr. Thompson above. Still no mention of the engineering argument I made, tho. Hat tip: The DEW Line.

Obama, New York, and Air Force One

This past Monday, a VC-25 flew over New York City. A lot of people got nervous and upset. A scandal ensued. The White House Military Office chief, Louis Caldera, took responsibility. President Obama condemned the photo op along with everybody else.

It is sad that Obama missed an opportunity to appear presidential. In hind sight, the photo op was insensitive. Obama getting "furious", however, is unnecessary. If Obama had taken responsibility publicly, then leaked out Caldera's role, then he would have looked magnanimous for shielding his subordinate. He would also have stopped the public witch hunt, because all of the hunters wanted to link Obama with this "mistake" anyway. Him taking responsibility would pre-empt their objective, removing their incentives to keep this scandal on the air. His critics would have little else to talk about. The talking heads would talk up the leaked Caldera story and absolve Obama of all blames. Obama would emerge looking better, this story would quickly burn out, and he would have earned the loyalty of Caldera.

So Obama missed a big leadership opportunity this week. Casting stone after Caldera along with everyone else is uncalled for. His "damage control" efforts make him appear weak and a bad judge of character. He has only cemented his reputation for "throwing people under the bus". His excessive focus on his own image is detrimental to his leadership of the country.

Budget Cut: Military Healthcare Costs

The Defense Department has to cut some money in its FY10 budget. It's not much of a cut, though. DoD will make most of the cut by not keeping up with inflation. Regardless, this is the start of the budget reckoning I have talked of before. If you are interested in the Defense budget, you should check out Holding the Line, edited by Dr. Cindy Williams. The book is a product of the 1990-era strategic confusion, so there's a lot of maintaining status quo, aka "Holding the Line". However, the authors made a nice case of where we can cut and hedge our strategic bets.

Over at Abu Muqawama, I made a comment on the military healthcare costs. The military healthcare is the fastest rising sector of defense spending, just like the rest of the US economy. In FY09, the DoD requested $42.8 billions for the Defense Health Program. If you add in the Veterans' Administration, it will be even bigger. The brass are having to decide between guns (weapon acquisition) and butter (personnel cost) directly now. [As opposed to just DoD vs everybody else.]

This may be unfortunate for those of us in the military-industrial complex, and for the generals and admirals. However, this healthcare problem is largely the result of the military culture. The brass has known about the problem for years, but ignored it because it's not sexy.

For example, back in the '80s and '90s, the most common cause of injury (or conditions preventing duty performance) for male soldiers is intramural sports. During physical training or unit-wide sports competition, they played too hard and hurt their knees or break bones. [Don't have the data but the sports injuries should be true for the Regular Army pre-AVF as well.] This directly drives up our healthcare cost because:
1: Soldiers are getting medical treatment for something that's prefectly preventable.
2: They will develop chronic conditions later on, requiring knee surgeries and other expensive treatments.
3: Due to reduced mobility from the chronic injuries, they will get fat and develop type 2 diabetes.

So, all because the leaders are having too much fun on the sports field, we now do not have enough money to buy the F-22, FCS, etc.

Or, to take another example: Hearing loss. We do a lot of loud stuff, firing weapons, drive tanks, blow stuff up. However, the leadership does not do a good job with hearing protection. These days, they at least hand out foam earplugs and make an effort to raise hearing awareness, but back in the day, they did not even do that much. For years, the Army has said that electronic hearing protection is too expensive, even though they would be more effective than foam earplugs. Yet when OIF started, Army suddenly had enough money to buy the electronic ear muffs for the line units. Years later, the now veterans file for disability because of military duty-related hearing loss, and the brass has to pay for it.

So, to the American people: Please demand better accountability from your generals and admirals when they come to you asking for more money. Make them find money from smarter healthcare decisions. It is their own stupidity that their healthcare cost is eating up their budget pie.

Edited to Add: Here are a couple of articles that add to this: Andrew Exum's article on soldier's load, and 3 years later, his predictions coming true.

The USAF's Acquisition Crisis and AAMs

Whew! The election is finally over with. Let's hope Obama is more of a Clinton-style triangulator instead of a Carter-ish indecisive vision guy as Todd Zywicki said here.

Regardless, Stephen Trimble yesterday highlighted some great comments from a fighter jock here, that generated a lot of comments. One of the interesting points is the low probability of kill ratio of the AIM-120 against a jamming target. If the USAF is going up against any semi-near-peer competitor, it will not have superiority. Sure, the F-22 is great. But the key to making the F-22, and its Beyond-Visual-Range tactic, work, is the AIM-120. If the F-22 supercruises into the fight, fires the AMRAAMs, and get out of Dodge, he survives. But his target will survive, too, if the missiles fail to lock onto the target due to jamming. And what's that called, if neither side gets a kill? Parity, not Superiority.

This, coupled with the USAF fiscal death spiral that ELP and others have been documenting, means that the USAF needs to change its acquisition strategy right now. If it keeps going down the current path, it will run out of money, people, and fighters. The USAF will get a smaller and smaller slice of the budget pie, along with the rest of the DoD, because that is the American budgetary future. The USAF cannot out-compete the AARP. The USAF is also getting less retention. And it is prematurely retiring its F-teens to bank on the unproven F-35. The USAF will become operationally irrelevant if it keeps going as it is.

The USAF keeps saying that the F-22s (with AMRAAM) will secure the skies and allow the F-35s to do their job, but it doesn't have enough F-22s, and will never get more. The F-35s (and some legacy F-teens) will have to take on air-to-air missions. We know that AMRAAM, as is, doesn't work in a jamming environment. The USAF has to immediately embark on an AMRAAM replacement program right now. Being that even missile programs take more than 4 years to go from the lab to the flightline, the more the USAF wastes its time, the more time it gives semi-near-peers to become peers. The new Advanced AAM Program [doesn't that sound familiar? :] has a simple goal, Give the F-35 a decisive advantage over the current 4.5th Gen fighters (Eurofighter, Su-35+, et al). The corollary effect will give the F-teens and F-22 superiority over everybody else.

In the mean time, the USAF can get some cheap fixes: Put a Sidewinder seeker and an RF homing seeker on the AMRAAM for seeker diveristy in the inventory. Integrate and buy the Meteor to improve the kill ratio and foster cross-Atlantic solidarity. Try the datalink to improve jamming resistance. Or have the AMRAAM talk to other AMRAAMs in its volley to sift through the noise.

Unfortunately, the USAF has been peddling the F-35 as its savior for too long now. Politically, it cannot admit otherwise and change course, without killing many officer careers. The Obama administration seems unlikely to rock the USAF boat, because its focus, and its expertise, is on COIN and the ground fight. The Obama administration may not have the intellectual and political capital to fight the USAF.

If Dr. Gates stays on as DefSec, he might be able to turn the USAF around, due to his USAF background as a missileer and his distance from the F-35 game. However, he is planning on leaving, and there are other people that want the job. All in all, the future looks bleak for the
USAF.

On the other hand, the USN faces a similar issue with its underpowered F-18. The USN Tomcat association has long lobbied for an AIM-54 Phoenix replacement. The USN aviation budget is in much less trouble due to its volume buy of the F-18E/F, and is in a better position to advocate a new AAAM program. If the USN succeeds in deploying the AAAM, you can be sure that the USAF will jump on board.

It is a sad day when the USAF has to depend on the USN to rescue it from air-to-air irrelevance. However, this analysis is yet another piece of vindication for Inter-Service Rivalry and support for duplication in Roles and Missions.

Sorry for the html. Has to use email submission.

Edit: fixed the html.

Edit 2: I saw the Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile. I hope that the Air to Air requirements are sufficiently robust, and that the ARM/AGM requirements take a back seat, as they should be. However, with an in-service date beyond 2020, it is clear that the USN and USAF needs an interim solution, as I've outlined above.