CWO2 also reminds us that, if you slow down, you will find that IED before it finds you. It's a lesson we've known for a long time, yet still have trouble applying. It's true that if you slow down, it takes you more time to cover the area of operations. However, most of the time you can afford to slow down. Hey, you've got all year to patrol your area of ops. What's another two hours gonna cost you?
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Thursday, December 24, 2009
USMC TTP AAR
Tom Ricks is running a series on TTP after-action reviews from a Marine CWO2. At the small unit level, tactical competency is vital, no matter COIN or Fulda Gap. I said earlier that you need to treat those "presence patrols" as recon patrols. The CWO2 reinforces that lesson with his litany of patrolling basics here.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Alienation, Culture, and the Welfare State
This is a sad story from Londonstani of the Abu Muqawama blog. Basically, the concentration of immigrants in the low-income housing projects alienated many of them from England as a state and a nation. The norms in the projects appeared to be the most hedonistic of Western cultural stereotypes.
If the immigrants could live in a less hedonistic environment, perhaps they would be less alienated from England, France, and the other European countries. This is the sad consequence of the welfare housing system we have in the West. Fortunately for the US, we have less of it now after the general welfare reform of the '90s, when new urban planning theories dictated the dispersal of low-income housing in the urban area. Not sure the situation in Europe nor their urban planning theories. It is certainly sad because the urban planners in the 50s and 60s pinned such high hopes on these high-rise low-income housing projects, yet they have caught their residents in a feedback loop of poverty and self-destructive behaviors.
That the immigrants had little choice in British housing appear to be the result of their welfare system. Hopefully Londonstani's video will spark a British version of the welfare reform.
One issue I want to touch on is the cultural alienation in the immigrant community. Many people smarter than I have written on the subject of alienation, and perhaps have already said what I'm saying.
As Londonstani hinted in his article, Western Culture(tm) is the combination of two seemingly antagonistic ideas: "People Obey Rules", and "You Can Do Anything". People in the less developed countries have a universal vision of the West, and that is a place where things work. People obey laws. Trains run on time (mostly). Drivers don't run red lights (mostly). Bureaucracies work like they're supposed to. You don't need to pay bribes.
Yet it is also a place you can do anything, as Hollywood relentlessly reinforces with an endless stream of movies and music videos.
It is a jarring combination. Even native Westerners sometime cannot handle this combination. Communism is but one ideology exploiting and trying to solve this alienation problem. You can see it in the proliferation of ethnic and religious groups on college campuses, and in the teenage angst literature. For many, it marks a retreat into more fundamentalist communities, where (at least) you can meet like-minded individuals who are against the mindless hedonism marketed by Hollywood.
This is a problem faced by many parents in the West: How to raise children who can lead a meaningful, productive existence? Children who have a chance to reproduce and enjoy parenthood themselves? [Hedonism is not conducive toward species propagation, mostly.]
In the age of the super-empowered individual, though, this issue is also a national security threat. For all the calls for Islamic enlightenment, the West should own up to its own role in the alienation process, and work on this cultural contradiction. I know that sex sells, but shouldn't horny teenager-hood be a transitional stage, rather than the human aspiration?
[I guess you can trace the age of empowerment to gunpowder and the printing press, but only now is it upon us, the age of free, online Anarchist Cookbooks.]
This is a recent article that also talks about alienation and the gangster culture, in the Latin American context
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
On Presence Patrols (& Movements to Contact)
Tonight President Obama will give a policy speech on Afghanistan. Hopefully it will give us some real strategic direction. However, before we get to the strategic level, we need to remember that the US military itself has major tactical deficiencies. One such area is the confusion over presence patrols and movements to contact. Many small unit leaders do not appear to understand how and why they are conducting these missions. Hopefully this article helps our squad and platoon leaders accomplish these missions.
In John T Reed's review of Craig Mullaney's Unforgiving Minute, he pointed out Mullaney's ignorance on presence patrols and movements to contact. This is sad, but unsurprising. I have talked earlier about the Army's tactical deficiencies at the small unit level. The Army officer basic course common core (which all basic courses cover) touches upon tactics, but only as slogans. There is a section on the "Military Decision Making Process", which is a battalion+ level staff planning procedure. The field grade officers have made MDMP the holy grail of tactics in OBC, even though it is just a process and inapplicable at the company level. Mullaney went to Afghanistan in 2003. I hope we're better at it today.
Incidentally, when I looked up Presence Patrol on the Small Wars Journal, I found the discussion "What is Prescence Patrolling?", started five days ago. That is a sad sign for this anti-intellectual Army.
Looking at the Mullaney's description on the Presence Patrol, and on the Small Wars Journal, people seem to think that it is an information operation technique, where you show the flag and remind everybody of your presence. This is an unfortunate legacy from the Cold War, where the US Navy did "Presence Patrols" and coined the phrase. That cultural connotation has carried over into Army operations. However, the Navy Freedom of Navigation and Presence patrols took place in an uncluttered environment, relatively devoid of civilians. The intended target, other navies, were bound by peacetime rules of engagement. The patrols aimed to reinforce existing attitudes, not to change them.
On the other hand, in today's War Amongst the People, ground presence patrols operates on the human terrain. Showing the flag to the population has little effect on hearts and minds. Especially when the Yanks go back to base at the end of the patrol, while the Taliban maintains a permanent presence, as is the current practice in theater. Therefore, these patrols do not accomplish their IO mission, but rather present well-scheduled targets to Taliban IEDs and ambushers.
Therefore, we need to rethink presence patrols and make it militarily useful to the small unit. To the small unit (Company and below), the presence patrol has two purposes: To gather intelligence from the population, and to disrupt enemy Tactical Assembly Area activities.
1. Gather Intelligence
The fact that the Taliban can mount attacks means that we do not know who the enemy is, especially at the small unit level. The presence patrol is the primary intelligence tool available to the small unit leader. You need to keep talking to the locals and finding out what's going on. Just as all operations start with a map reconnaissance, you need to start with a map of the human terrain: Who are the village leaders? Who is related to whom? What blood feuds are in place? Etc.
One of the biggest innovations over the past 8 years, at the small unit level, is the Company Intelligence Cell. As we are doing more distributed operations than ever, and as we fight amongst the people, it is absolutely critical that all "Battlespace-Owning" companies have their own intel cells. These intel cells organize intel and analyzes trends. Regarding War Amongst the People, your intel cell collates the link diagram of your population, telling you who are hostile, who are possible abetters, and whose support you need. If you haven't head of it, read up on it in the Infantry Magazine and the Small War Journal.
To build and maintain your "model"/link diagram of the population, you need to get out there and talk to people, get the latest gossip. If the locals won't talk to you, then you need to build relationships with them. Start with "Hello"s and go on from there. Start a business relationship by hiring a few day laborers to work on your outpost, pick up trash on the surrounding roads, etc. A business relationship is a perfect cover to start talking. Once you know the Who's Whos, then you have a starting point to get to the suspects.
2. Disrupt the Enemy
Of less military utility, but still important, is Disrupting Enemy TAA activities. Just like you, the enemy needs a secure Tactical Assembly Area to plan ops, rehearse actions on the objective, and do pre-combat inspections. If you are patrolling an area, you deny the enemy the availability of that area for TAA activities. He has to go elsewhere, away from the cover of the population.
Therefore, your patrol schedule has to be random, and sometimes you should stay the night.
To sum up, you are not doing presence patrols. You are doing reconnaissance patrols, reconning on the population as opposed to the terrain.
On the subject of "Movements to Contact", you should never just go from one point to another, waiting to get hit. You will always know where the potential ambush sites are, even from a simple map recon. You can then do things like taking detours, clearing enemy Objective Rally Points, etc.
In John T Reed's review of Craig Mullaney's Unforgiving Minute, he pointed out Mullaney's ignorance on presence patrols and movements to contact. This is sad, but unsurprising. I have talked earlier about the Army's tactical deficiencies at the small unit level. The Army officer basic course common core (which all basic courses cover) touches upon tactics, but only as slogans. There is a section on the "Military Decision Making Process", which is a battalion+ level staff planning procedure. The field grade officers have made MDMP the holy grail of tactics in OBC, even though it is just a process and inapplicable at the company level. Mullaney went to Afghanistan in 2003. I hope we're better at it today.
Incidentally, when I looked up Presence Patrol on the Small Wars Journal, I found the discussion "What is Prescence Patrolling?", started five days ago. That is a sad sign for this anti-intellectual Army.
Looking at the Mullaney's description on the Presence Patrol, and on the Small Wars Journal, people seem to think that it is an information operation technique, where you show the flag and remind everybody of your presence. This is an unfortunate legacy from the Cold War, where the US Navy did "Presence Patrols" and coined the phrase. That cultural connotation has carried over into Army operations. However, the Navy Freedom of Navigation and Presence patrols took place in an uncluttered environment, relatively devoid of civilians. The intended target, other navies, were bound by peacetime rules of engagement. The patrols aimed to reinforce existing attitudes, not to change them.
On the other hand, in today's War Amongst the People, ground presence patrols operates on the human terrain. Showing the flag to the population has little effect on hearts and minds. Especially when the Yanks go back to base at the end of the patrol, while the Taliban maintains a permanent presence, as is the current practice in theater. Therefore, these patrols do not accomplish their IO mission, but rather present well-scheduled targets to Taliban IEDs and ambushers.
Therefore, we need to rethink presence patrols and make it militarily useful to the small unit. To the small unit (Company and below), the presence patrol has two purposes: To gather intelligence from the population, and to disrupt enemy Tactical Assembly Area activities.
1. Gather Intelligence
The fact that the Taliban can mount attacks means that we do not know who the enemy is, especially at the small unit level. The presence patrol is the primary intelligence tool available to the small unit leader. You need to keep talking to the locals and finding out what's going on. Just as all operations start with a map reconnaissance, you need to start with a map of the human terrain: Who are the village leaders? Who is related to whom? What blood feuds are in place? Etc.
One of the biggest innovations over the past 8 years, at the small unit level, is the Company Intelligence Cell. As we are doing more distributed operations than ever, and as we fight amongst the people, it is absolutely critical that all "Battlespace-Owning" companies have their own intel cells. These intel cells organize intel and analyzes trends. Regarding War Amongst the People, your intel cell collates the link diagram of your population, telling you who are hostile, who are possible abetters, and whose support you need. If you haven't head of it, read up on it in the Infantry Magazine and the Small War Journal.
To build and maintain your "model"/link diagram of the population, you need to get out there and talk to people, get the latest gossip. If the locals won't talk to you, then you need to build relationships with them. Start with "Hello"s and go on from there. Start a business relationship by hiring a few day laborers to work on your outpost, pick up trash on the surrounding roads, etc. A business relationship is a perfect cover to start talking. Once you know the Who's Whos, then you have a starting point to get to the suspects.
2. Disrupt the Enemy
Of less military utility, but still important, is Disrupting Enemy TAA activities. Just like you, the enemy needs a secure Tactical Assembly Area to plan ops, rehearse actions on the objective, and do pre-combat inspections. If you are patrolling an area, you deny the enemy the availability of that area for TAA activities. He has to go elsewhere, away from the cover of the population.
Therefore, your patrol schedule has to be random, and sometimes you should stay the night.
To sum up, you are not doing presence patrols. You are doing reconnaissance patrols, reconning on the population as opposed to the terrain.
On the subject of "Movements to Contact", you should never just go from one point to another, waiting to get hit. You will always know where the potential ambush sites are, even from a simple map recon. You can then do things like taking detours, clearing enemy Objective Rally Points, etc.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Afghanistan & the Geopolitical Game
The recent suicide bombing on the Indian Embassy in Kabul and the attacks in Pakistan reminds us, that Afghani violence is not purely a function of American military input, ie, Violence != Function( American Soldiers, Talibans). The violence there is a combination of tribal vendettas, Taliban/Al Qaeda ideology, American/Western presence, and Indian/Pakistani/Iranian competitions. We need to keep this complexity in mind as we debate our strategic aims for Afghanistan.
One thing people may not know much is the presence of Indian and Pakistani contractors and NGOs in Afghanistan. India is spending quite a bit of money on Afghanistan, both in buying influence and assisting its merchants in making American military money. Pakistani vendors and ISI operatives are, of course, already on the ground in Afghanistan. So part of the violence there is this low intensity conflict between Indian and Pakistani factions. The Karzai administration is embroiled in this battle, as well.
Robert Kaplan has a nice opinion piece on China's efforts in Afghanistan as well.
Therefore, many anti-coalition militants may be fighting to kick the Yankees out, but the recipe is there for the fighting to continue, long after we leave.
One thing people may not know much is the presence of Indian and Pakistani contractors and NGOs in Afghanistan. India is spending quite a bit of money on Afghanistan, both in buying influence and assisting its merchants in making American military money. Pakistani vendors and ISI operatives are, of course, already on the ground in Afghanistan. So part of the violence there is this low intensity conflict between Indian and Pakistani factions. The Karzai administration is embroiled in this battle, as well.
Robert Kaplan has a nice opinion piece on China's efforts in Afghanistan as well.
Therefore, many anti-coalition militants may be fighting to kick the Yankees out, but the recipe is there for the fighting to continue, long after we leave.
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Corroborating Evidence of Afghanistan Economy of Force Ops
Gen (ret) Jones stated that we will not be sending more troops to Afghanistan. That is in keeping with Col (ret) Lang's thesis that we are moving the strategic main effort from the conventional forces to the commando forces. Consequently, the conventional forces need to change their mission to meet their objectives as the supporting element. I advocated for a refugee mission to meet the new strategy earlier. The situation remains favorable for this mission.
Thursday, June 4, 2009
A Humane Strategy to Support Our Afghan Policy
In this post I am advocating a strategy to protect the Afghan civilian population from the ongoing violence in Afghanistan, as far as we can. Population protection will no longer be a mission for the Coalition forces. However, we still have the moral imperative to protect Afghan civilians. Therefore, the Coalition forces need to construct, staff, and protect refugee/resettlement camps to shelter the "Internally Displaced Persons" in Afghanistan. We need to give Afghan civilians a place to get away from the fighting.
The American government appears to be changing our policy direction in Afghanistan. Our stated policy has remained the establishment of a civil, democratic society in Afghanistan. The US Army is planning a "surge" of forces into Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban. However, COL(ret) Lang believes that President Obama is revising our policy aim in Afghanistan away from Nation-Building(tm). Obama's ideological faction is generally opposed to a Big Military solution, more congenial to surgical strikes and commando raids. With the appointment of LTG McChrystal as ISAF Commander, we may be giving up on building a Western society in Afghanistan as a policy goal. Instead, our Afghanistan policy is focusing on destroying the Al-Qaeda leadership.
With this change in policy focus, the special operation forces become our strategic main effort in Operation Enduring Freedom. Our conventional forces and the Afghan National Army/Police become the strategic supporting effort. As the supporting effort, their mission is not to establish central government control in the provinces or other population-centric COIN goals. [Although they may conduct population-centric COIN operations to gather intelligence to support the SOF, for example.]
The Afghan people may lose out under our policy change. Under the original policy, securing the Afghan population was a strategic goal, whereas under the new policy, we may cede the Afghan countryside to the Taliban. Some Afghan tribes and families have risked Taliban retaliation to cooperate with the Coalition forces. Under the new policy, we will reduce our operational support, and maybe logistical as well, to our local allies. The reduced support leaves our local allies vulnerable to Taliban attack. As the Taliban has murdered entire families to make an example of "traitors", our strategic retreat from the country side makes us culpable, to a degree, for their deaths as well.
The families of the ANA and ANP are vulnerable to Taliban reprisal as well. If the Afghan soldiers and policemen worry about their far away families, they are less combat effective. We need to secure the families of the ANA and ANP.
In addition, our new policy means that we will start favoring certain warlords over others. Currently, we are officially supporting some warlords who covertly sponsor the Taliban. Instead, we will starting playing one warlord against another to disrupt Taliban safe heavens. In the renewed Afghan Civil War, civilians will get caught in the crossfire.
We need to do something to protect the Afghan civilians from the coming violence; that is the moral thing to do. We will not station basecamps throughout the country to protect the population, because the resulting cost in blood and treasure outweighs our strategic gain. However, we will have enough spare resources to protect refugees and internally displaced persons. We need to include refugee camps in our campaign plan, to minimize our impact on civilians' lives and livelihood. In addition, the unsupervised refugee population is destabilizing the region and further stressing Pakistan.
Therefore, I am proposing that we set up refugee camps near Kabul, for any civilian that needs a place to go. We should organize these camps on the model of John Robb's Resilient Communities, where the residents will work for a living. Idle refugees are susceptible to extremist propaganda of all stripes. Make it a place where the people can stay and make a new life, or catch their breath then go home, whichever they choose. Keep the place safe from insurgent violence so that the people can get on with their lives.
Such a place is a low cost endeavor. It is centrally located with Kabul, so it is close to military bases. The Afghan National Army can train and protect the settlement at the same time. They can practice patrolling and checkpoint operations at the settlement. The Afghan soldiers and policemen can keep their families at the settlements, where they know they'll be kept safe from reprisals. We will involve the refugees in constructing and operating the settlement. These tasks keep them occupied, and give them a stake in the resulting city. By utilizing refugee labor, we reduce the need of expatriate labor, which is expensive and adds to camp life support needs. By having the refugees organize and govern themselves, we give them the opportunity to practice clean government. We will have a centralized place to teach them advanced agricultural techniques, machine repair skills, and other training that can make their lives back home easier, should they ever leave.
The current Afghan refugee population is impeding our policy goals by stressing the social welfare systems of surrounding countries and providing a fertile recruitment ground to Al-Qaeda. We need to at least try to sway them to our side. The ANA and ANP need a sanctuary where their families will be safe from reprisals. We have a moral obligation to give the civilian an alternative from the Taliban-controlled towns and Pakistani slums. These factor argue for Coalition support to refugee camps near Kabul. Moreover, this is an endeavor in which money is more important than American boots on the ground, and for which donor countries are sympathetic.
Edited to add: This post builds on my earlier statement of policy paradigm change. We cannot depend on the host nation bureaucracy to implement our policy for us. Instead, the US military may have to take on the job of city manager/administrator from time to time. Refugee camp is a prime example of the capability the US military needs in the post-Nation-State World we live in.
The American government appears to be changing our policy direction in Afghanistan. Our stated policy has remained the establishment of a civil, democratic society in Afghanistan. The US Army is planning a "surge" of forces into Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban. However, COL(ret) Lang believes that President Obama is revising our policy aim in Afghanistan away from Nation-Building(tm). Obama's ideological faction is generally opposed to a Big Military solution, more congenial to surgical strikes and commando raids. With the appointment of LTG McChrystal as ISAF Commander, we may be giving up on building a Western society in Afghanistan as a policy goal. Instead, our Afghanistan policy is focusing on destroying the Al-Qaeda leadership.
With this change in policy focus, the special operation forces become our strategic main effort in Operation Enduring Freedom. Our conventional forces and the Afghan National Army/Police become the strategic supporting effort. As the supporting effort, their mission is not to establish central government control in the provinces or other population-centric COIN goals. [Although they may conduct population-centric COIN operations to gather intelligence to support the SOF, for example.]
The Afghan people may lose out under our policy change. Under the original policy, securing the Afghan population was a strategic goal, whereas under the new policy, we may cede the Afghan countryside to the Taliban. Some Afghan tribes and families have risked Taliban retaliation to cooperate with the Coalition forces. Under the new policy, we will reduce our operational support, and maybe logistical as well, to our local allies. The reduced support leaves our local allies vulnerable to Taliban attack. As the Taliban has murdered entire families to make an example of "traitors", our strategic retreat from the country side makes us culpable, to a degree, for their deaths as well.
The families of the ANA and ANP are vulnerable to Taliban reprisal as well. If the Afghan soldiers and policemen worry about their far away families, they are less combat effective. We need to secure the families of the ANA and ANP.
In addition, our new policy means that we will start favoring certain warlords over others. Currently, we are officially supporting some warlords who covertly sponsor the Taliban. Instead, we will starting playing one warlord against another to disrupt Taliban safe heavens. In the renewed Afghan Civil War, civilians will get caught in the crossfire.
We need to do something to protect the Afghan civilians from the coming violence; that is the moral thing to do. We will not station basecamps throughout the country to protect the population, because the resulting cost in blood and treasure outweighs our strategic gain. However, we will have enough spare resources to protect refugees and internally displaced persons. We need to include refugee camps in our campaign plan, to minimize our impact on civilians' lives and livelihood. In addition, the unsupervised refugee population is destabilizing the region and further stressing Pakistan.
Therefore, I am proposing that we set up refugee camps near Kabul, for any civilian that needs a place to go. We should organize these camps on the model of John Robb's Resilient Communities, where the residents will work for a living. Idle refugees are susceptible to extremist propaganda of all stripes. Make it a place where the people can stay and make a new life, or catch their breath then go home, whichever they choose. Keep the place safe from insurgent violence so that the people can get on with their lives.
Such a place is a low cost endeavor. It is centrally located with Kabul, so it is close to military bases. The Afghan National Army can train and protect the settlement at the same time. They can practice patrolling and checkpoint operations at the settlement. The Afghan soldiers and policemen can keep their families at the settlements, where they know they'll be kept safe from reprisals. We will involve the refugees in constructing and operating the settlement. These tasks keep them occupied, and give them a stake in the resulting city. By utilizing refugee labor, we reduce the need of expatriate labor, which is expensive and adds to camp life support needs. By having the refugees organize and govern themselves, we give them the opportunity to practice clean government. We will have a centralized place to teach them advanced agricultural techniques, machine repair skills, and other training that can make their lives back home easier, should they ever leave.
The current Afghan refugee population is impeding our policy goals by stressing the social welfare systems of surrounding countries and providing a fertile recruitment ground to Al-Qaeda. We need to at least try to sway them to our side. The ANA and ANP need a sanctuary where their families will be safe from reprisals. We have a moral obligation to give the civilian an alternative from the Taliban-controlled towns and Pakistani slums. These factor argue for Coalition support to refugee camps near Kabul. Moreover, this is an endeavor in which money is more important than American boots on the ground, and for which donor countries are sympathetic.
Edited to add: This post builds on my earlier statement of policy paradigm change. We cannot depend on the host nation bureaucracy to implement our policy for us. Instead, the US military may have to take on the job of city manager/administrator from time to time. Refugee camp is a prime example of the capability the US military needs in the post-Nation-State World we live in.
Monday, February 23, 2009
A Design to Improve Canine Effectiveness in Arid Climates
The military employs military working dogs in bomb detection. Therefore, working dogs can help us avoid mines and improvised explosive devices, and detecting the female suicide bombers currently in vogue in Iraq. However, the dogs are not effective in OIF and OEF because it is too dry over there.
A dog's nose is a mucous membrane with sensors all over. The sensors bind to the scent particles in the air through the mucous membrane. If the nose dries out, the sensors are not as effective in binding to the scent molecules. Because the air is so dry in Iraq and Afghanistan, it dries out dog noses rapidly. The bomb detection dogs were only effective for much less than one hour before needing to take a break and re-wet their noses.
When I was deployed, I wrote up a proposal to build a humidifier for a working dog, to extend his working time. To accomplish this, you can take a spritzer to spray water onto his nose directly, for a low tech method, interim capability.
My design was: Mount the spritzer by the dog's head, and aim it to a point 3 inches in front of his nose. The spritzer would automatically spray water toward this point periodically, to moisturize the air as he breathes in. The exact configuration and timing will require experimentation, for which I did not have the money, personnel, nor assets to do.
Alternatively, we can spray moisturized air, instead of water spray, into the air. This might be more effective, but it would also be more complex.
Anyway, I submitted the proposal to the local counter-IED working group. They forwarded it to some people in the K-9 community. And I never heard back from them again. Story of my life, eh? :)
This proposal will make a great college/backyard engineering project if you want to build it. All you need is a dog, some dry weather, and some time to tinker with. It is not technically sophisticated, but you do need to program that motor controller.
So that is another one of my engineering ideas as I was sitting in the Fallujah contracting office doing paperwork. We need to get more working dogs into the military because they are so useful. In Vietnam, soldiers used to patrol the jungle with working dogs. The dogs could smell and hear the boobytraps, and were great sentries at night. Dogs also are good at reading body language and help us separate good guys from bad guys. In the new population-centric warfare we are fighting, working dogs are a crucial tool that we are not using effectively.
A dog's nose is a mucous membrane with sensors all over. The sensors bind to the scent particles in the air through the mucous membrane. If the nose dries out, the sensors are not as effective in binding to the scent molecules. Because the air is so dry in Iraq and Afghanistan, it dries out dog noses rapidly. The bomb detection dogs were only effective for much less than one hour before needing to take a break and re-wet their noses.
When I was deployed, I wrote up a proposal to build a humidifier for a working dog, to extend his working time. To accomplish this, you can take a spritzer to spray water onto his nose directly, for a low tech method, interim capability.
My design was: Mount the spritzer by the dog's head, and aim it to a point 3 inches in front of his nose. The spritzer would automatically spray water toward this point periodically, to moisturize the air as he breathes in. The exact configuration and timing will require experimentation, for which I did not have the money, personnel, nor assets to do.
Alternatively, we can spray moisturized air, instead of water spray, into the air. This might be more effective, but it would also be more complex.
Anyway, I submitted the proposal to the local counter-IED working group. They forwarded it to some people in the K-9 community. And I never heard back from them again. Story of my life, eh? :)
This proposal will make a great college/backyard engineering project if you want to build it. All you need is a dog, some dry weather, and some time to tinker with. It is not technically sophisticated, but you do need to program that motor controller.
So that is another one of my engineering ideas as I was sitting in the Fallujah contracting office doing paperwork. We need to get more working dogs into the military because they are so useful. In Vietnam, soldiers used to patrol the jungle with working dogs. The dogs could smell and hear the boobytraps, and were great sentries at night. Dogs also are good at reading body language and help us separate good guys from bad guys. In the new population-centric warfare we are fighting, working dogs are a crucial tool that we are not using effectively.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
Paradigm Shift: The US Foreign and Security Policies in Flux
This is something I've been meaning to talk about for awhile now. I will just sketch out my idea for now.
The US foreign and security policies/strategies are at a historical moment right now, the moment of paradigm shift. The paradigm is this: Nation-State Centric versus Nation-Tribe Centric.
Failures of Nation-State Centric Paradigm
US policies used to be, and still nominally is, Nation-State centric. Everything the United States does has to be channeled through states and official governments. For example, we know that terrorists reside in, say, Sudan. However, we can't just go in and grab them. We have to petition the Sudanese government for extradition, even though the Sudanese government does not have that much control over the terrorists. Once the terrorists get the wind of an impending extradition, they can use bribes and their contacts in the government to get out of Sudan. And there's nothing we can do about it [except the CIA].
Or, another example, the Iraqi Oil-For-Food program. Right after Gulf War I, we embargoed Iraq's trade. Officially, Iraq was not getting anything through the UN embargo. Unofficially, smugglers moved oil out of Iraq and food/medicine into Iraq. Saddam Hussein and his people were getting a handsome cut of the smuggling trade. But he chose not to give the food and medicine to his people, because he knew that the suffering of his people made great TV. And it did. The UN started the Oil-For-Food program. Iraq now could export as much oil as necessary to feed its people. However, Iraq never came close to its export quota. Saddam chose to sell less oil than he could so that his people would continue to suffer privation. Critical medicine remained short in Iraqi hospitals. On the black market, however, Saddam continued selling oil to line his coffer and buy some weapons.
Because of our Nation-State centric paradigm, the United States (and the UN) could not go into Iraq and run the Oil-For-Food program directly. We had to wait for Iraq to sell however much oil it wants to. Give Iraq the food and medicine. And watch the Iraqi government divert food/medicine shipments away from its people, and into the black market. We also ccould do little to stop Iraq's black market oil export, because Saddam was exporting his oil to countries like Syria and Turkey, our putative allies. We had to depend on the grace of the Syrian and Turkish governments to police their own black market activities.
Iraq and Afghanistan
Nation-State paradigm is the main reason our strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not working for much of the 21st Century thus far. The paradigm dictates that our policies have to go through the state governments of Iraq and Afghanistan. So for the longest time, we waited for the Iraqi national government to dither about its constitution, then waited some more as they stood up the ministries and carved up patronages. We knew, in the back of our minds, that the Iraqi parties don't have much representation on the ground. That the Iraqi parties were antagonizing the more popularly based insurgencies. However, we could not go against the Iraqi government. If the governing coalition refused to bring more Sunnis into the government, then the most we could do is talk some more.
However, it is also Iraq that has spurred the paradigm shift that we are undergoing. Sometime in early 2006, the US military came to a concensus that we needed to ignore the national parliament and start engaging the local insurgents politically. In the Anbar province, we started negotiating with the sheiks ourselves. We paid the "Sons of Iraq" to provide local security. We paid the sheiks to clean the streets and dig ditches. We dragged the mayors and police chiefs with us to meet the sheiks, sometimes. And everything flowed from that Anbar Awakening.
The difference here is a bottom-up approach versus top-down in imposing security. Before the Awakening, we were recruiting Iraqi soldiers and policemen from a national perspective. We looked at the overall number and depended on the Iraqi ministries to recruit. If the recruiting drive missed, say Fallujah, there was nothing we could do. We gave the ministries Iraqi and US money, and if the ministry bureaucracy does not apportion funds equitably, the most we could do is complain.
In the bottom-up approach, we by-passed the ministries and engage the local level directly. If the recruiting drive missed Fallujah, we could work with the local dignitaries to put security on the street. Americans could hire Fallujan rent-a-cops if there are not enough Fallujan cops.
Because we are in the midst of this paradigm shift, we do not have a clear policy and strategy. The US State Department had always depended on the Host Nation bureaucracy to execute US aid and assistance. Today DoState is trying to stand up Provincial Reconstruction Teams on an ad hoc basis without clear direction. It cannot find enough people to staff these Teams, even though they are a national priority.
Many commentators have commented negatively on the various Awakening movements. They noted the improvements in local security, but always worried that we are undercutting the authority of the Iraqi central government; that we are embracing former Baathists; that we are setting up local warlords. Their concerns generally stem from the Nation-State centric paradigm: if Iraq does not have a strong central government, then the government cannot impose security on its people. Our original policy and strategy was to stand up the central government, able to guarantee internal security, which would allow the US to stand down in Iraq. The Awakenings conflicted with that policy by setting up alternate centers of power. However, the central government had not been able to impose security. The Shiite insurgency and the Sunni insurgency were signs that the Iraqi people did not accept a central government staffed by Iraqi expatriates. We had to grow the local centers of power, co-opting them and steering them in a peaceful direction, thus pressuring the central government to accede to local demands. In embracing the Awakening, the US military adopted a bottom-up tactic when the national policy and strategy remained top-down. The result is strategic confusion, as planners try to reconcile policy with tactic.
The same thing is happening in Afghanistan, tho more slowly. We rushed to set up the central government and the army, without much focus on the local government nor police. The warlords carved up the country and controlled the provinces as they like. Karzai could count on their nominal support, but they always kept high their own interests and those of their constituents. Afghanistan has a more severe problem than Iraq because there are many more factions in Afghanistan, with more regional sponsors. With the "Awakening"-approach, we're again trying to apply bottom-up tactics without seriously reviewing our top-down policy. People like those at Abu Muqawama say that we don't have a clear strategy for Afghanistan. Of course we wouldn't if our tactics and policy conflict with each other.
Paradigm Shift Implications
So it is clear that we are struggling our way through this paradigm shift. Eventually we will have to update our policy to account for bottom-up, non-state approaches. But as the world is full of nationalist feelings and semi-functioning state bureaucracies, we will have a hybrid policy for years to come. We will start with bottom-up, Nation-Tribe approaches toward failed states and semi-failed states (which have nominal state governments).
[In a sense CIA has always practiced a version of this Nation-Tribe approach. However, their shenanigans in the 50s soured the taste of bottom-up paradigm for everyone. A major part of the reluctance to engage in nation-tribe paradigm stems from that historical lesson.]
The Nation-Tribe paradigm is dangerous on the international stage because it directly threatens the governments of the Non-Aligned Movement, namely China, India, and thugs like Mugabe. If the Tibet question comes up for the United States, for example, the nation-state paradigm says, it's an internal problem for China, tho we will protest human rights abuses. The nation-tribe paradigm, on the other hand, can say something like this: We support Tibetan self-determination, and will actively support a process that can lead to Tibetan independence. That is an unlikely outcome of the paradigm, as we need to balance other interests, but that would be foremost on the mind of Chinese leaders as they oppose our paradigm shift. India shares many US strategic goals, but they too have many separatist movements and will oppose a Nation-Tribe paradigm.
A Nation-Tribe paradigm, tho, can lead to a powerful outcome in dealing with humanitarian crisis [edited: crises] like Zimbabwe. For example, we can de-recognize the Mugabe regime as it does not represent all of Zimbabwe. We will carve out a sanctuary on Zimbabwe territory, by force if necessary, internationally preferrably, where the MDC is in charge. We will then provide humanitarian assistance and set out to make the sanctuary self-sufficient in food production. If the MDC decides to raise an army and invade Mugabe territory, we would not intervene. If Mugabe attacks the sanctuary, we will defend. The policy goal is humane governance in Zimbabwe, with the sanctuary as the example and training ground on local governance.
[Yes, this is similar to the Kurdistan model we set up after Gulf War I.]
As we move further into the 21st Century, failed states will proliferate. As John Robb commented, Mexico is sinking inexorably into failed state territory and becoming the US's numero uno security challenge. The nation-tribe paradigm will be essential in dealing with the 21st Century Mexico, as the nation-state pradigm failed in dealing with the 20th Century Mexico. If Iraq is where the US military learned the tactics of bottom-up security, and Afghanistan will be [hopefully] where the US military learns the strategy of bottom-up security/governance, then Mexico will be where the US federal government learns to formulate and execute bottom-up policy in pursuit of US interests. Or we will get to practice COIN tactics on our own soil. Let us hope that we learn fast enough.
Edited to Add: One useful way to think about this shift is on the question of sovereignty: We used to be on the "Theory of Sovereignty", that we assumed every government had full sovereignty, even if reality conflicts with that claim. Now we will operate on "the Test of Sovereignty", where we only acknowledge your sovereignty after you have demonstrated it credibly. To use a dated example, we will acknowledge Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor only if Indonesia can exercise its sovereign powers over East Timor.
Thanks to Joe for the link.
The US foreign and security policies/strategies are at a historical moment right now, the moment of paradigm shift. The paradigm is this: Nation-State Centric versus Nation-Tribe Centric.
Failures of Nation-State Centric Paradigm
US policies used to be, and still nominally is, Nation-State centric. Everything the United States does has to be channeled through states and official governments. For example, we know that terrorists reside in, say, Sudan. However, we can't just go in and grab them. We have to petition the Sudanese government for extradition, even though the Sudanese government does not have that much control over the terrorists. Once the terrorists get the wind of an impending extradition, they can use bribes and their contacts in the government to get out of Sudan. And there's nothing we can do about it [except the CIA].
Or, another example, the Iraqi Oil-For-Food program. Right after Gulf War I, we embargoed Iraq's trade. Officially, Iraq was not getting anything through the UN embargo. Unofficially, smugglers moved oil out of Iraq and food/medicine into Iraq. Saddam Hussein and his people were getting a handsome cut of the smuggling trade. But he chose not to give the food and medicine to his people, because he knew that the suffering of his people made great TV. And it did. The UN started the Oil-For-Food program. Iraq now could export as much oil as necessary to feed its people. However, Iraq never came close to its export quota. Saddam chose to sell less oil than he could so that his people would continue to suffer privation. Critical medicine remained short in Iraqi hospitals. On the black market, however, Saddam continued selling oil to line his coffer and buy some weapons.
Because of our Nation-State centric paradigm, the United States (and the UN) could not go into Iraq and run the Oil-For-Food program directly. We had to wait for Iraq to sell however much oil it wants to. Give Iraq the food and medicine. And watch the Iraqi government divert food/medicine shipments away from its people, and into the black market. We also ccould do little to stop Iraq's black market oil export, because Saddam was exporting his oil to countries like Syria and Turkey, our putative allies. We had to depend on the grace of the Syrian and Turkish governments to police their own black market activities.
Iraq and Afghanistan
Nation-State paradigm is the main reason our strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not working for much of the 21st Century thus far. The paradigm dictates that our policies have to go through the state governments of Iraq and Afghanistan. So for the longest time, we waited for the Iraqi national government to dither about its constitution, then waited some more as they stood up the ministries and carved up patronages. We knew, in the back of our minds, that the Iraqi parties don't have much representation on the ground. That the Iraqi parties were antagonizing the more popularly based insurgencies. However, we could not go against the Iraqi government. If the governing coalition refused to bring more Sunnis into the government, then the most we could do is talk some more.
However, it is also Iraq that has spurred the paradigm shift that we are undergoing. Sometime in early 2006, the US military came to a concensus that we needed to ignore the national parliament and start engaging the local insurgents politically. In the Anbar province, we started negotiating with the sheiks ourselves. We paid the "Sons of Iraq" to provide local security. We paid the sheiks to clean the streets and dig ditches. We dragged the mayors and police chiefs with us to meet the sheiks, sometimes. And everything flowed from that Anbar Awakening.
The difference here is a bottom-up approach versus top-down in imposing security. Before the Awakening, we were recruiting Iraqi soldiers and policemen from a national perspective. We looked at the overall number and depended on the Iraqi ministries to recruit. If the recruiting drive missed, say Fallujah, there was nothing we could do. We gave the ministries Iraqi and US money, and if the ministry bureaucracy does not apportion funds equitably, the most we could do is complain.
In the bottom-up approach, we by-passed the ministries and engage the local level directly. If the recruiting drive missed Fallujah, we could work with the local dignitaries to put security on the street. Americans could hire Fallujan rent-a-cops if there are not enough Fallujan cops.
Because we are in the midst of this paradigm shift, we do not have a clear policy and strategy. The US State Department had always depended on the Host Nation bureaucracy to execute US aid and assistance. Today DoState is trying to stand up Provincial Reconstruction Teams on an ad hoc basis without clear direction. It cannot find enough people to staff these Teams, even though they are a national priority.
Many commentators have commented negatively on the various Awakening movements. They noted the improvements in local security, but always worried that we are undercutting the authority of the Iraqi central government; that we are embracing former Baathists; that we are setting up local warlords. Their concerns generally stem from the Nation-State centric paradigm: if Iraq does not have a strong central government, then the government cannot impose security on its people. Our original policy and strategy was to stand up the central government, able to guarantee internal security, which would allow the US to stand down in Iraq. The Awakenings conflicted with that policy by setting up alternate centers of power. However, the central government had not been able to impose security. The Shiite insurgency and the Sunni insurgency were signs that the Iraqi people did not accept a central government staffed by Iraqi expatriates. We had to grow the local centers of power, co-opting them and steering them in a peaceful direction, thus pressuring the central government to accede to local demands. In embracing the Awakening, the US military adopted a bottom-up tactic when the national policy and strategy remained top-down. The result is strategic confusion, as planners try to reconcile policy with tactic.
The same thing is happening in Afghanistan, tho more slowly. We rushed to set up the central government and the army, without much focus on the local government nor police. The warlords carved up the country and controlled the provinces as they like. Karzai could count on their nominal support, but they always kept high their own interests and those of their constituents. Afghanistan has a more severe problem than Iraq because there are many more factions in Afghanistan, with more regional sponsors. With the "Awakening"-approach, we're again trying to apply bottom-up tactics without seriously reviewing our top-down policy. People like those at Abu Muqawama say that we don't have a clear strategy for Afghanistan. Of course we wouldn't if our tactics and policy conflict with each other.
Paradigm Shift Implications
So it is clear that we are struggling our way through this paradigm shift. Eventually we will have to update our policy to account for bottom-up, non-state approaches. But as the world is full of nationalist feelings and semi-functioning state bureaucracies, we will have a hybrid policy for years to come. We will start with bottom-up, Nation-Tribe approaches toward failed states and semi-failed states (which have nominal state governments).
[In a sense CIA has always practiced a version of this Nation-Tribe approach. However, their shenanigans in the 50s soured the taste of bottom-up paradigm for everyone. A major part of the reluctance to engage in nation-tribe paradigm stems from that historical lesson.]
The Nation-Tribe paradigm is dangerous on the international stage because it directly threatens the governments of the Non-Aligned Movement, namely China, India, and thugs like Mugabe. If the Tibet question comes up for the United States, for example, the nation-state paradigm says, it's an internal problem for China, tho we will protest human rights abuses. The nation-tribe paradigm, on the other hand, can say something like this: We support Tibetan self-determination, and will actively support a process that can lead to Tibetan independence. That is an unlikely outcome of the paradigm, as we need to balance other interests, but that would be foremost on the mind of Chinese leaders as they oppose our paradigm shift. India shares many US strategic goals, but they too have many separatist movements and will oppose a Nation-Tribe paradigm.
A Nation-Tribe paradigm, tho, can lead to a powerful outcome in dealing with humanitarian crisis [edited: crises] like Zimbabwe. For example, we can de-recognize the Mugabe regime as it does not represent all of Zimbabwe. We will carve out a sanctuary on Zimbabwe territory, by force if necessary, internationally preferrably, where the MDC is in charge. We will then provide humanitarian assistance and set out to make the sanctuary self-sufficient in food production. If the MDC decides to raise an army and invade Mugabe territory, we would not intervene. If Mugabe attacks the sanctuary, we will defend. The policy goal is humane governance in Zimbabwe, with the sanctuary as the example and training ground on local governance.
[Yes, this is similar to the Kurdistan model we set up after Gulf War I.]
As we move further into the 21st Century, failed states will proliferate. As John Robb commented, Mexico is sinking inexorably into failed state territory and becoming the US's numero uno security challenge. The nation-tribe paradigm will be essential in dealing with the 21st Century Mexico, as the nation-state pradigm failed in dealing with the 20th Century Mexico. If Iraq is where the US military learned the tactics of bottom-up security, and Afghanistan will be [hopefully] where the US military learns the strategy of bottom-up security/governance, then Mexico will be where the US federal government learns to formulate and execute bottom-up policy in pursuit of US interests. Or we will get to practice COIN tactics on our own soil. Let us hope that we learn fast enough.
Edited to Add: One useful way to think about this shift is on the question of sovereignty: We used to be on the "Theory of Sovereignty", that we assumed every government had full sovereignty, even if reality conflicts with that claim. Now we will operate on "the Test of Sovereignty", where we only acknowledge your sovereignty after you have demonstrated it credibly. To use a dated example, we will acknowledge Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor only if Indonesia can exercise its sovereign powers over East Timor.
Thanks to Joe for the link.
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