Galrahn has been discussing AirSea Battle for quite awhile, specifically focusing on the absence of any Army contribution to the overall public discussion. It is quite sad that the Army has not publicly engaged on the AirSea discussion. Only this month has the AUSA come out with a rebuttal to the Navy and Air Force's public discussions.
One big reason Big Army is not contributing to this AirSea concept is because of internal Army politics. Specifically the decline of Air Defense Artillery. It is quite paradoxical that, while Ballistic Missile Defense has taken on greater strategic significance, Army itself is institutionally moving away from ADA in general.
ADA is composed of two components, HIMAD and SHORAD. For much of the 90s, the active officer corps was split 50/50: 10 Battalion of HIMAD and 10 Battalion of SHORAD. Right after OIF1, though, Big Army saw that there was no low-altitude threat at all, so it moved decisively to eliminate the SHORAD formation. I think right now there's only 10 Stinger/Avenger batteries providing a residual capability, which is a 75% cut.
You'd probably say it's long overdue, but the key is that the loss of 30%+ of total ADA corps means that many fewer O4s and O5s writing papers to Parameters and other professional journals. Sure, we have several ADA generals at the Pentagon, including the current G-8, but where do you think the generals' talking points come from? It's those O4s and O5s.
The BMD mission has slightly increased the HIMAD side of the house, but it did not make a dent against the SHORAD loss. The unit manning the GMD missile field is a Guard unit (Colorado/Alaska Guard), whose officers do not worry about professional journals. Ambitious officers transfer to other hot fields to make their stars.
ADA probably will never attain the reverence of the Soviet PVO branch, but its preoccupation with self-preservation means that Big Army has little brainpower thinking about AirSea. Horror upon horrors, but sometimes I wonder if we should have folded ADA into the USAF like the Europeans have...
Showing posts with label army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label army. Show all posts
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Friday, March 5, 2010
Take Back Your Kilometer!
MAJ Ehrhart's paper, "Taking Back the Last Half Kilometer", has been making the rounds these past few days. It is an interesting paper on the tactical and technical deficiencies of the American and allied infantry in Afghanistan, using a 5.56mm carbine against enemy mortar attacks up to 2km away.
However, this is not a new problem. Mountain warfare experiences from WW2 and Indo-Pakistan wars have shown the necessity to engage enemy infantry beyond 500m. Some writers had warned, for example, that the US Marines reinforcing the Scandinavian flank during a Soviet invasion should bring the 7.62mm M-14 rifles with them to handle the mountainous terrain of Norway. For infantry warfare, there are two extremes: the close range (within 100m) of most infantry combat, and the long range (500m-1000m) requirements of mountain warfare.
To meet this combat requirement, the 6.8mm booster club would like to push the 6.8mm intermediate-intermediate cartridge onto the military. [Intermediate-intermediate because 5.56mm was originally sold as the intermediate cartridge.] They've been looking to get rid of the 5.56mm since its inception, and this is about as good a chance as they're going to get. The 6.5mm club is getting some airtime, too, but they're really too small compared to the 6.8mm club. However, due to the Army's historical foot-dragging on topics like this, this is not likely to happen. [Iraq was too close-quartered for their arguments to be effective, whereas our long war in Afghanistan will bring them many more instances of 5.56mm ineffectivenss.]
On the other hand, there are a couple of fixes we can implement fairly quickly, to meet this combat requirement of engaging enemies 500m to 1000m, with infantry squad weapons. The answers are the 40mm grenade and, surprise, the 5.56mm M-4 carbine.
Currently the 40x46mm unguided, low velocity grenade has a maximum range of 400m with an elevated trajectory. By putting a pair of pop-out fins and a laser seeker on the grenade, we can easily double the range of the grenade out to 800m. It's good timing, too, because the US Army just transitioned from the sliding breech M203 launcher to the swiveling breech M320 launcher. The M320 launcher can accommodate the increased length of the guidance package. Due to the low muzzle velocity of the grenade (76m/s), which is well-below that of common missiles, guidance integration should not be an issue. This development effort would take some time, but will be relatively fast due to the low technical risks involved. A smart grenade would be a "leap-ahead" technology the brass will love, so there will be few bureaucratic obstacles to its adoption. Long-term this grenade is the ideal solution to the mortar ambush scenario. The area effect of the grenade will easily suppress the insurgent mortar crews.
While we are waiting on the smart grenade, the infantry in the field can use their 5.56mm M-4 carbine to suppress the far-away enemy. But wait, you say, isn't the whole problem we're facing that 5.56x45mm cannot reach beyond 500m? Actually, the 5.56mm can go all the way out to 2,000m. The only problem is that you cannot aim it accurately beyond 500m, because the bullet is too light and will drift off course. Back in World War I, the bolt-action rifles all had sights that ranged out to 1,000m, even though few people can aim that far without scopes. [Even today, AK-47 sights can adjust out to 1,000m.] Back then, infantry often had to provide its own fire support, sometimes without help from artillery. The whole regiment would line up, adjust the sights out to 1km, then fire at that target together. The massed rifle fire would blanket that far away target with a rain of lead bullets. The mass fire compensates for the inaccuracy of the individual rifle and man at that distance. Similarly, the machine guns of the era had long range sight markings for indirect-fire, area suppressions. Machine guns were organized in batteries then, and they would mass arcing fire on targets kilometers away.
We can do the same thing today. A squad or two can mass their fire against the suspected insurgent position. A squad of M-4s can generate the fire volume of a WW1 battalion by aiming together. With a bit of range experimentation, you can easily figure out how to shoot out to 1km. I did a bit of calculation and I found that you probably need to elevate your muzzle by 0.28 degrees to shoot 1km. According to online ballistic calculators, you will need about a 1 degree elevation. So work with that and try it out. A bit of Kentucky windage in the field will get you close enough to the target to suppress them. A rain of steel and lead will make the insurgents think twice of mortaring you.
Of course, you still need to close with and assault the enemy. A squad can suppress the position while other squads maneuver to close the distance. You will need at least a squad to generate the fire volume to suppress out to 1km.
Some people will say that the 5.56mm cartridge does not have enough energy to kill a man at 1km. However, try standing out there, without a helmet, while bullets rain down around you. The 5.56mm still has enough energy to lodge inside your braincase at that distance.
So, write your Congresscritters to start this smart grenade program. In the meantime, start experimenting with the sights of your M-4 carbine. Your squad can still suppress that insurgent mortar team, despite what your training told you.
ETA: links and paragraph breaks
However, this is not a new problem. Mountain warfare experiences from WW2 and Indo-Pakistan wars have shown the necessity to engage enemy infantry beyond 500m. Some writers had warned, for example, that the US Marines reinforcing the Scandinavian flank during a Soviet invasion should bring the 7.62mm M-14 rifles with them to handle the mountainous terrain of Norway. For infantry warfare, there are two extremes: the close range (within 100m) of most infantry combat, and the long range (500m-1000m) requirements of mountain warfare.
To meet this combat requirement, the 6.8mm booster club would like to push the 6.8mm intermediate-intermediate cartridge onto the military. [Intermediate-intermediate because 5.56mm was originally sold as the intermediate cartridge.] They've been looking to get rid of the 5.56mm since its inception, and this is about as good a chance as they're going to get. The 6.5mm club is getting some airtime, too, but they're really too small compared to the 6.8mm club. However, due to the Army's historical foot-dragging on topics like this, this is not likely to happen. [Iraq was too close-quartered for their arguments to be effective, whereas our long war in Afghanistan will bring them many more instances of 5.56mm ineffectivenss.]
On the other hand, there are a couple of fixes we can implement fairly quickly, to meet this combat requirement of engaging enemies 500m to 1000m, with infantry squad weapons. The answers are the 40mm grenade and, surprise, the 5.56mm M-4 carbine.
Currently the 40x46mm unguided, low velocity grenade has a maximum range of 400m with an elevated trajectory. By putting a pair of pop-out fins and a laser seeker on the grenade, we can easily double the range of the grenade out to 800m. It's good timing, too, because the US Army just transitioned from the sliding breech M203 launcher to the swiveling breech M320 launcher. The M320 launcher can accommodate the increased length of the guidance package. Due to the low muzzle velocity of the grenade (76m/s), which is well-below that of common missiles, guidance integration should not be an issue. This development effort would take some time, but will be relatively fast due to the low technical risks involved. A smart grenade would be a "leap-ahead" technology the brass will love, so there will be few bureaucratic obstacles to its adoption. Long-term this grenade is the ideal solution to the mortar ambush scenario. The area effect of the grenade will easily suppress the insurgent mortar crews.
While we are waiting on the smart grenade, the infantry in the field can use their 5.56mm M-4 carbine to suppress the far-away enemy. But wait, you say, isn't the whole problem we're facing that 5.56x45mm cannot reach beyond 500m? Actually, the 5.56mm can go all the way out to 2,000m. The only problem is that you cannot aim it accurately beyond 500m, because the bullet is too light and will drift off course. Back in World War I, the bolt-action rifles all had sights that ranged out to 1,000m, even though few people can aim that far without scopes. [Even today, AK-47 sights can adjust out to 1,000m.] Back then, infantry often had to provide its own fire support, sometimes without help from artillery. The whole regiment would line up, adjust the sights out to 1km, then fire at that target together. The massed rifle fire would blanket that far away target with a rain of lead bullets. The mass fire compensates for the inaccuracy of the individual rifle and man at that distance. Similarly, the machine guns of the era had long range sight markings for indirect-fire, area suppressions. Machine guns were organized in batteries then, and they would mass arcing fire on targets kilometers away.
We can do the same thing today. A squad or two can mass their fire against the suspected insurgent position. A squad of M-4s can generate the fire volume of a WW1 battalion by aiming together. With a bit of range experimentation, you can easily figure out how to shoot out to 1km. I did a bit of calculation and I found that you probably need to elevate your muzzle by 0.28 degrees to shoot 1km. According to online ballistic calculators, you will need about a 1 degree elevation. So work with that and try it out. A bit of Kentucky windage in the field will get you close enough to the target to suppress them. A rain of steel and lead will make the insurgents think twice of mortaring you.
Of course, you still need to close with and assault the enemy. A squad can suppress the position while other squads maneuver to close the distance. You will need at least a squad to generate the fire volume to suppress out to 1km.
Some people will say that the 5.56mm cartridge does not have enough energy to kill a man at 1km. However, try standing out there, without a helmet, while bullets rain down around you. The 5.56mm still has enough energy to lodge inside your braincase at that distance.
So, write your Congresscritters to start this smart grenade program. In the meantime, start experimenting with the sights of your M-4 carbine. Your squad can still suppress that insurgent mortar team, despite what your training told you.
ETA: links and paragraph breaks
Thursday, December 24, 2009
USMC TTP AAR
Tom Ricks is running a series on TTP after-action reviews from a Marine CWO2. At the small unit level, tactical competency is vital, no matter COIN or Fulda Gap. I said earlier that you need to treat those "presence patrols" as recon patrols. The CWO2 reinforces that lesson with his litany of patrolling basics here.
CWO2 also reminds us that, if you slow down, you will find that IED before it finds you. It's a lesson we've known for a long time, yet still have trouble applying. It's true that if you slow down, it takes you more time to cover the area of operations. However, most of the time you can afford to slow down. Hey, you've got all year to patrol your area of ops. What's another two hours gonna cost you?
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
On Presence Patrols (& Movements to Contact)
Tonight President Obama will give a policy speech on Afghanistan. Hopefully it will give us some real strategic direction. However, before we get to the strategic level, we need to remember that the US military itself has major tactical deficiencies. One such area is the confusion over presence patrols and movements to contact. Many small unit leaders do not appear to understand how and why they are conducting these missions. Hopefully this article helps our squad and platoon leaders accomplish these missions.
In John T Reed's review of Craig Mullaney's Unforgiving Minute, he pointed out Mullaney's ignorance on presence patrols and movements to contact. This is sad, but unsurprising. I have talked earlier about the Army's tactical deficiencies at the small unit level. The Army officer basic course common core (which all basic courses cover) touches upon tactics, but only as slogans. There is a section on the "Military Decision Making Process", which is a battalion+ level staff planning procedure. The field grade officers have made MDMP the holy grail of tactics in OBC, even though it is just a process and inapplicable at the company level. Mullaney went to Afghanistan in 2003. I hope we're better at it today.
Incidentally, when I looked up Presence Patrol on the Small Wars Journal, I found the discussion "What is Prescence Patrolling?", started five days ago. That is a sad sign for this anti-intellectual Army.
Looking at the Mullaney's description on the Presence Patrol, and on the Small Wars Journal, people seem to think that it is an information operation technique, where you show the flag and remind everybody of your presence. This is an unfortunate legacy from the Cold War, where the US Navy did "Presence Patrols" and coined the phrase. That cultural connotation has carried over into Army operations. However, the Navy Freedom of Navigation and Presence patrols took place in an uncluttered environment, relatively devoid of civilians. The intended target, other navies, were bound by peacetime rules of engagement. The patrols aimed to reinforce existing attitudes, not to change them.
On the other hand, in today's War Amongst the People, ground presence patrols operates on the human terrain. Showing the flag to the population has little effect on hearts and minds. Especially when the Yanks go back to base at the end of the patrol, while the Taliban maintains a permanent presence, as is the current practice in theater. Therefore, these patrols do not accomplish their IO mission, but rather present well-scheduled targets to Taliban IEDs and ambushers.
Therefore, we need to rethink presence patrols and make it militarily useful to the small unit. To the small unit (Company and below), the presence patrol has two purposes: To gather intelligence from the population, and to disrupt enemy Tactical Assembly Area activities.
1. Gather Intelligence
The fact that the Taliban can mount attacks means that we do not know who the enemy is, especially at the small unit level. The presence patrol is the primary intelligence tool available to the small unit leader. You need to keep talking to the locals and finding out what's going on. Just as all operations start with a map reconnaissance, you need to start with a map of the human terrain: Who are the village leaders? Who is related to whom? What blood feuds are in place? Etc.
One of the biggest innovations over the past 8 years, at the small unit level, is the Company Intelligence Cell. As we are doing more distributed operations than ever, and as we fight amongst the people, it is absolutely critical that all "Battlespace-Owning" companies have their own intel cells. These intel cells organize intel and analyzes trends. Regarding War Amongst the People, your intel cell collates the link diagram of your population, telling you who are hostile, who are possible abetters, and whose support you need. If you haven't head of it, read up on it in the Infantry Magazine and the Small War Journal.
To build and maintain your "model"/link diagram of the population, you need to get out there and talk to people, get the latest gossip. If the locals won't talk to you, then you need to build relationships with them. Start with "Hello"s and go on from there. Start a business relationship by hiring a few day laborers to work on your outpost, pick up trash on the surrounding roads, etc. A business relationship is a perfect cover to start talking. Once you know the Who's Whos, then you have a starting point to get to the suspects.
2. Disrupt the Enemy
Of less military utility, but still important, is Disrupting Enemy TAA activities. Just like you, the enemy needs a secure Tactical Assembly Area to plan ops, rehearse actions on the objective, and do pre-combat inspections. If you are patrolling an area, you deny the enemy the availability of that area for TAA activities. He has to go elsewhere, away from the cover of the population.
Therefore, your patrol schedule has to be random, and sometimes you should stay the night.
To sum up, you are not doing presence patrols. You are doing reconnaissance patrols, reconning on the population as opposed to the terrain.
On the subject of "Movements to Contact", you should never just go from one point to another, waiting to get hit. You will always know where the potential ambush sites are, even from a simple map recon. You can then do things like taking detours, clearing enemy Objective Rally Points, etc.
In John T Reed's review of Craig Mullaney's Unforgiving Minute, he pointed out Mullaney's ignorance on presence patrols and movements to contact. This is sad, but unsurprising. I have talked earlier about the Army's tactical deficiencies at the small unit level. The Army officer basic course common core (which all basic courses cover) touches upon tactics, but only as slogans. There is a section on the "Military Decision Making Process", which is a battalion+ level staff planning procedure. The field grade officers have made MDMP the holy grail of tactics in OBC, even though it is just a process and inapplicable at the company level. Mullaney went to Afghanistan in 2003. I hope we're better at it today.
Incidentally, when I looked up Presence Patrol on the Small Wars Journal, I found the discussion "What is Prescence Patrolling?", started five days ago. That is a sad sign for this anti-intellectual Army.
Looking at the Mullaney's description on the Presence Patrol, and on the Small Wars Journal, people seem to think that it is an information operation technique, where you show the flag and remind everybody of your presence. This is an unfortunate legacy from the Cold War, where the US Navy did "Presence Patrols" and coined the phrase. That cultural connotation has carried over into Army operations. However, the Navy Freedom of Navigation and Presence patrols took place in an uncluttered environment, relatively devoid of civilians. The intended target, other navies, were bound by peacetime rules of engagement. The patrols aimed to reinforce existing attitudes, not to change them.
On the other hand, in today's War Amongst the People, ground presence patrols operates on the human terrain. Showing the flag to the population has little effect on hearts and minds. Especially when the Yanks go back to base at the end of the patrol, while the Taliban maintains a permanent presence, as is the current practice in theater. Therefore, these patrols do not accomplish their IO mission, but rather present well-scheduled targets to Taliban IEDs and ambushers.
Therefore, we need to rethink presence patrols and make it militarily useful to the small unit. To the small unit (Company and below), the presence patrol has two purposes: To gather intelligence from the population, and to disrupt enemy Tactical Assembly Area activities.
1. Gather Intelligence
The fact that the Taliban can mount attacks means that we do not know who the enemy is, especially at the small unit level. The presence patrol is the primary intelligence tool available to the small unit leader. You need to keep talking to the locals and finding out what's going on. Just as all operations start with a map reconnaissance, you need to start with a map of the human terrain: Who are the village leaders? Who is related to whom? What blood feuds are in place? Etc.
One of the biggest innovations over the past 8 years, at the small unit level, is the Company Intelligence Cell. As we are doing more distributed operations than ever, and as we fight amongst the people, it is absolutely critical that all "Battlespace-Owning" companies have their own intel cells. These intel cells organize intel and analyzes trends. Regarding War Amongst the People, your intel cell collates the link diagram of your population, telling you who are hostile, who are possible abetters, and whose support you need. If you haven't head of it, read up on it in the Infantry Magazine and the Small War Journal.
To build and maintain your "model"/link diagram of the population, you need to get out there and talk to people, get the latest gossip. If the locals won't talk to you, then you need to build relationships with them. Start with "Hello"s and go on from there. Start a business relationship by hiring a few day laborers to work on your outpost, pick up trash on the surrounding roads, etc. A business relationship is a perfect cover to start talking. Once you know the Who's Whos, then you have a starting point to get to the suspects.
2. Disrupt the Enemy
Of less military utility, but still important, is Disrupting Enemy TAA activities. Just like you, the enemy needs a secure Tactical Assembly Area to plan ops, rehearse actions on the objective, and do pre-combat inspections. If you are patrolling an area, you deny the enemy the availability of that area for TAA activities. He has to go elsewhere, away from the cover of the population.
Therefore, your patrol schedule has to be random, and sometimes you should stay the night.
To sum up, you are not doing presence patrols. You are doing reconnaissance patrols, reconning on the population as opposed to the terrain.
On the subject of "Movements to Contact", you should never just go from one point to another, waiting to get hit. You will always know where the potential ambush sites are, even from a simple map recon. You can then do things like taking detours, clearing enemy Objective Rally Points, etc.
Monday, November 23, 2009
M-4 Carbine Updates
According to Army Times's Matt Cox, the US Army is proposing six changes to the M-4 carbine. The most major among the six are a heavier barrel and a piston gas system. As I discussed in my previous articles, M-4's reliability problems comes from chamber heating, leading to failures to extract. These two changes help to mitigate against that problem.
A heavier barrel will increase the heat capacity of the barrel by adding mass, ie, more heat energy is required to raise the temperature by one degree. Therefore, the new M-4 will fire more shots before the chamber heats up to extraction failures.
A piston gas system gives a sharper tap on the bullet case during extraction, compared to the current gas-impingement design. That higher transient force may be enough to overcome the case "sticking" to the heated chamber, further improving reliability.
So these changes are a good fix to the M-4. However, we still have the problem of excessive heating. The fixes only postpones the inevitable. I wish the Army would go to the root of the problem and either 1) slap a cooling fin/heat sink on the barrel nut, or 2) go to a longer barrel (16 - 20 inch) that the 5.56mm round was designed for.
Hat tip: the Firearm Blog.
PS: Added links and tags.
Friday, November 20, 2009
Fort Hood and the Second Amendment
I've been reflecting upon the Fort Hood massacre and the Second Amendment. As many of you know by now, military bases, like all federal facilities, are gun-free zones. They strictly regulate personal weapons, and concealed carry is prohibited. Doubtlessly, a soldier with a weapon would have disrupted MAJ Hasan's killings. In general, soldiers allowed to carry personal weapons will make terrorist attacks more difficult [against the military].
At the same time, the military regulation of personal weapons came from past experiences. There are many young, immature, and passionate men in the armed forces, who are very likely to shoot each other in a moment of passion, if they have a gun at hand. The challenge here is to reconcile the needs of force protection against good order and discipline.
It is eminently sensible, then, to allow a limited conceal-carry scheme in our military. Specifically, commanders (O-5 and above) can give their officers and non-commissioned officers license to carry their own weapons in garrison, and perhaps on liberty. Officers and NCOs are [hopefully] more mature than the rank and file. Traditionally, officers have sidearms to enforce discipline, so this policy is a natural continuation. Moreover, officers are to look out for the welfare of their subordinates, making concealed carry a logical extension of that duty. Being at the commander's discretion, this licensing scheme allows commanders to apply their judgement. If a licensed individual is at psychological risk, his commander has the right to revoke the license and place him under observation.
In the field and on deployment, soldiers are issued weapons, so they do not need to carry personal weapons. Personal weapons at war may also complicate the Laws of Warfare.
Of course, today's military, as John T Reed reminds us, is a micro-managing institution that fears the concept of accountability. Even if the generals were willing to delegate such a responsibility, their JAG lawyers will probably talk them out of it. I cannot see us implementing this policy any time soon.
Thursday, October 22, 2009
The Art & Science of Defensive Planning
The recent overrun of COP Keating (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/10/the_battle_of_cop_keating_an_earwitness_account) is too close a replay of Wanat for comfort. (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/28/inside_an_afghan_battle_what_happened_at_wanat_last_july_i). In both cases, an American unit is located on tactically unsound terrain, at the tip end of the logistic chain, and were overrun by the enemy assault. Only the belated arrival of air support saved the American bacon.
It appears that the US Army has gotten too relaxed after 20 years of living on Forward Operating Bases (Starting in Somalia). The logistic and security posture/doctrine these days are based on these brigade-sized FOBs. (If the Army still has an institutional security doctrine anymore.) To the extent that the Division staff (and above) think about security, it is from the stand point of Anti-Terrorism/Force-Protection. Maybe the Infantry School (& Ranger School) is still teaching tactical security and patrol base defense, but most Army officers have no training on this subject beyond that FM 7-8 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7-8/index.html) they're supposed to read on their own. If you're one of these unfortunate officers, I urge you to pick up a copy of Millen's "Command Legacy" http://www.amazon.com/Command-Legacy-Tactical-Leaders-Revised/dp/159797207X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1256222637&sr=8-1 . It's a great book filled with concrete TTPs and discussions. You have a defense plan that you can pick up from the book to use, and he explained all of his reasons so you can adapt it on your own. Even infantry officers will get a lot out of this book. Granted, Millen's chapters on defense are based on a Mobile Defense, where you have a Battalion Reserve to come save you. On the other hand, in a patrol base defense like Wanat & Keating, you site your positions around the center, and have a parameter wall. The basic principles are the same.
As we go into the world of Resilient Communities, some of you may find the need to brush up on defensive planning. Millen's book is an excellent starting point. Just remember that you need at least a platoon of people to defend your hamlet.
Friday, October 16, 2009
Sub-Compact AR PDWs Going Forward
Christian of DefenseTech reported that the Army is going ahead with Sub-Compact ARs as a PDW replacement for pistols. http://www.defensetech.org/archives/005066.html That's a good development, as I have advocated here http://americanmohist.blogspot.com/2009/02/us-army-mtoe-rifles-pistols-pdws.html and here http://americanmohist.blogspot.com/2008/09/army-open-to-new-pdw-ideas.html
America and NATO have had a Personal Defense Weapons requirement for close to 3 decades, but previous procurement efforts were derailed by post-Cold War budgetary constraints and by the special ammunition used by some of the PDWs [The militaries didn't want to add a new caliber of ammunition to the supply system.] Hopefully this time around, this PDW program will make it.
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Attack: Helicopter vs OV-10
It's nice to see the return of the OV-10. I know that it's an Army fad to have a fleet of anti-tank helicopters. Hell, we even convinced the Russians and the Chinese to build such a fleet. However, pound for pound, and dollar for dollar, an attack helicopter is much less capable than a light attack aircraft. All armies would be better served to relegate their anti-tank mission to light attack aircrafts.
In terms of the runway requirement, the modern attack helicopter company occupies such a large area that it is simple to plop a runway down the middle. If you think about the payload of an AH-64 (about 2 tons), it is a ridiculously expensive platform for the payload. This article summarizes many of the advantages of a light attack aircraft over an attack helicopter.
The reason the Americans started down the road of an attack helicopter fad, was because the Key West agreement took away the Army's fixed-wing attack aircrafts. So the political agreement steered the Army into the rotary wing CAS alternative. For some reason (maybe Fire Bird?) this political compromise became an international military fad, still going strong. The Israeli have one; the Russians have 3; the Chinese and the Indians are working on it.
This fad proves that groupthink will transcend bureaucratic boundaries. It is so sad it is scary.
In terms of the runway requirement, the modern attack helicopter company occupies such a large area that it is simple to plop a runway down the middle. If you think about the payload of an AH-64 (about 2 tons), it is a ridiculously expensive platform for the payload. This article summarizes many of the advantages of a light attack aircraft over an attack helicopter.
The reason the Americans started down the road of an attack helicopter fad, was because the Key West agreement took away the Army's fixed-wing attack aircrafts. So the political agreement steered the Army into the rotary wing CAS alternative. For some reason (maybe Fire Bird?) this political compromise became an international military fad, still going strong. The Israeli have one; the Russians have 3; the Chinese and the Indians are working on it.
This fad proves that groupthink will transcend bureaucratic boundaries. It is so sad it is scary.
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