Naval Strategy and South China Sea

This article in Asia Times adds to our understanding of nationalist elements in Japan politics.  The writer's pro-China bias is so thick that even I could pick it up, but he makes clear the current [and maybe emergent] Japanese strategy: Aggressively patrols the Senkaku Islands as territorial waters, but not crossing the bright line of settling the islands.  Japan's strategic concern is in not antagonizing Taiwan on the Diaoyutai issue, which can strengthen the pro-unification camp in Taiwan.  [The independence movement in Taiwan is pro-Japan for historical and geo-strategic reasons.]  If Taiwan ever reunifies, Japan will settle the Senkakus in a heartbeat.

More broadly, Japan's overtures to Vietnam, and Phillipine's ASEAN rebuke to Sec. Clinton's South Sea remakrs, underscores an interesting anti-colonial dynamic [for lack of a better word] at play in South East Asia.  [The Hate Triangle that is North East Asia is well-documented.]

In all ASEAN states [except Singapore and maybe Brunei], there are strong sentiments and biases against both China and America. [A bit of Japan, too, but that's faint compared to the other two.]  The Chinese outposts in the South Sea are sore spots to the surrounding countries, but their people don't like the Americans, either.  For example, Vietnam would really prefer Russia over the US in balancing China, but Russia cannot do more than sell weapons at present.  In fact, Russia wants to refurbish Cam Ranh Bay, but we'll see if it actually happens.  Up Country portrays well both the strategic inevitability of a US-Vietnam security alliance, and Vietnamese reluctance to do so.

Phillippines has been pissed off about the American evacuation of Clark Air Base in 1991.  Its intelligentsia are suspicious of America over its support of Marcos regime.  Indonesia has regional aspirations, colonial baggage, past military dictatorships, and an Islamic identity, all of which build the above bias as well.

All this is to say that the US may have no "entry point" into a Battle of the South Sea.  While the US has a freedom of navigation concern, the combatants (China + one more) will not want its help in resolving the battle.  The most likely scenario is where the US Navy escorts neutral convoys together with Singapore and Japan, a la the Tanker War'84-88.  The escort scenario will require several squadrons of FFGs, which the US Navy is retiring soon.


Most of the popular South Sea scenarios envision the US taking a combatant role against China's southern fleet, which in turn feeds into the general support for more destroyers and aircraft carriers.  However, the political emphasis on the higher end of the Navy is unbalancing it for meeting the full spectrum of requirements.  The combatant scenario is but one of the possible futures of the South Sea.  Another equally likely future is the above escort scenario.  Convoy escort is generally the duty of frigates, but we are coming up against a frigate gap.  The current difficulties of the Littoral Combat Ships program means it may be cut short.  It will take time to start up a replacement frigate program.  So there may be a long gap between the retirement of the last Perry and the introduction of the next frigate, in the near future.  If the South Sea Battle falls during this gap, the US Navy will have to commit our Aegis destroyer squadrons [which are national strategic assets for missile defense] for convoy duty, which is a much lower strategic priority.  So the USN is on the trajectory toward a disastrous South Sea.

[The LCS as currently configured is completely incapable of convoy air defense, and only possibly capable of the convoy ASW, pending its ASW module.]

Another question we need to answer is the strategic priority of the South Sea itself.  With the opening of the Northwest Passage, the South Sea is no longer the petrol lifeline of Japan.  Australia, another ally, does not depend on the South Sea for petroleum.  Other than the possibility of oil, and the general global commerce, why should the US care about the South Sea?

The popular South Sea combatant scenarios may be the manifestations of a US Navy in search of a strategic purpose.  The continuing focus on a "near peer competitor", aka China, is unbalancing the US Navy from its other strategic priorities, as I outlined above.  We need some sanity over this piece of ocean, at least in the US.  That the ASEAN states go crazy over the submerged atolls there does not mean it will start World War III.  The most important role for the US is to contain the conflict, and compartmentalize its effects from the rest of the world.  With a robust convoy escort capability, we can minimize the harm of a shooting war on global commerce, and avoid foreign entanglements.  The Senkaku flare up reminds us all that there are no easy territorial disputes left in the world.  All of the remaining territorial disputes have no clear title holders; every claimant has a legitimate claim to the title.  The rest of the world should not suffer from these petty title fights.

Colombia and the South American Arms Race

In a world of non-state conflicts (Iraq, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria), it is refreshing to witness a good old-fashioned state-to-state confrontation. It is much less violent than the up-close-and-personal, messy, insurgency. Today, we see Venezuela kicking it up a notch against its regional rival, Colombia.

Venezuela and Ecuador have funded guerrilla proxies against Colombia. Now that Colombia is emerging from its civil war, it is naturally antagonistic toward its unfriendly neighbors. A FARC-free Colombia will tackle the resource and border disputes it currently ignores. Colombia's battle-hardened army, and its friendly relation with the US, do not comfort Hugo Chavez, either. The strategic rivalry in the area may draw the rest of the continent into the confrontation. An arms race started by Peru and Venezuela will lead to some much needed cash for the American military-industrial complex for the next few years.

Whether this arms race widens will depend on the ABC: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Argentina's Kirchner may well take Chavez's side and use the Venezuelan aid money to "recapitalize the military" [aka graft money to constituents.] Where Brazil and Chile will come down is more difficult to read, due to their complex relationship with the area. Venezuela will interpret the outcome of the Brazilian fighter competition as a signal of where Lula is going.

Iran: Preparing for the Aftermath

New and old media report violent suppressions in Iran at this time. How this will turn out depends on the bureaucratic analysis I presented in the previous article: The Reformers need the Iranian Army on their side. The reformers have already lost this round, but the Army might still come in to minimize the bloodshed. In this article, I will explore what we, the US, can do to minimize the humanitarian disaster likely to follow, because that is all we can do now. I will also explore how the Iranian Army might help the protesters.

About the only action we can take right now, is to set up refugee camps for the current-protester, future fugitives, on the run from the authorities. Obviously we cannot invade Iran to set up these camps, but we can do so in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Afghanistan. As Kurdistan has a history of supporting Iranian dissident movements, they are a natural ally. Afghanistan's western provinces have a large Persian population, so that is an ideal site as well.

As the Revolutionary Guards have started fighting the people, we have moved past the opportunity window for enacting the policies I laid out in my previous post. Now we can go on with our democracy talk. A Persian Voice of America should start broadcasting. We should also convince the EU to join our economic embargo against Iran. We can still set up an embassy in Tehran, but the embassy's mission is not to normalize relation with the regime, but rather to provide books and media to the Iranian people through its on-site library and cultural programs.

Arming the dissidents and training them is not an option, though. As I said before, if the 2nd Iranian Revolution is to succeed, it needs the Iranian Army's backing. Our arming the dissidents would erase the maneuvering space for the Iranian Army. Besides, there are plenty of light weapons available in Iraqi markets if the dissidents are looking for guns.

Possible Outcomes of Current Clashes

It is still possible that the Iranian Army will come to the aide of the people. However, the Army cannot openly side against the Guardian Council. The Army could unilaterally move into the cities to "assist" the Basij's riot control efforts. Infantry units could race ahead of the Basij to take control of the streets. Then, they can turn the Basij away and shelter the dissidents.

Another possibility is to send in the medical units to set up mobile hospitals or to beef up the current hospitals. Obviously, because of the dangerous rioters, the Army doctors need their own Army escorts as well, to secure the hospitals. The militarization of the hospitals would also protect the patients from all intruders.

If the Army had a military exercise right outside Tehran, they could create a sanctuary from the Basij.

So these are some possible, low profile ways for the Army to rein in the excesses of the Revolutionary Guards and minimize the bloodshed. Hopefully the Iranian Army has enough bureaucratic latitude to carry them out.

The Post-Recession Geopolitics, Trade, and Global Guerrillas

Galrahn of Information Dissemination posted a great speech by Stephen Carmel, VP of Maersk. Mr. Carmel talked about how interconnected we have become as a world, and how mundane activities in Bolivia and Africa, for example, have global, economic, and strategic repercussions.

For example, he mentioned that the electric/hybrid car is all the rage in the United States, right now, which is a good thing [Oil and all that.] Electric cars use lots of lithium batteries. 40% of the world's lithium supply comes from Bolivia, and much of the rest in other Latin America countries. Bolivia's president does not like the United States much. He is also facing economic and political unrest in Bolivia. In comes the mining industry. Because the government there is not very effective and plagued by corruption, the mining companies pay bribes and fund private security, company town's utilities, etc. Essentially, the mining companies maintain stability at the mines by exporting instability to the rest of the country, in the form of bribes, prostitution, alcohol problems (of transient miners), resentment of non-accountability, etc.

We then will re-ignite a Maoist movement in the country against foreign domination. We will try to prop up the government there, because lithium is now strategically important to the United States. It will be Banana Republics all over again.

Another big point he made is the bottlenecks in our global supply system. In addition to the physical bottlenecks like the Malacca Strait and Hormuz Strait, there's also the capacity bottlenecks of Ports of Los Angeles and Hong Kong and railroad systems, the information bottlenecks of the undersea fiber optic cables, network-node bottlenecks of our power grids, etc. The Just-In-Time philosophy of capacity over-utilization has taken out the slack in our global economic system. This tautness made our system vulnerable to Global Guerrilla attacks, and magnifies the effect of the attacks on our economies.

The speech is long, and full of interesting reflections. It's a must read for anyone thinking about the future.

"Rise" of Asia

NPR today had a book review on the "Rise" of Asia in a multipolar world. The story has the usual platitudes about how the future will be an economically prosperous Asia. The reviewer even praised the "Invididual entrepreneurship without interference from the state" in India. Hello?! India has a lot of "individual entrepreneurship"? Which land has a more vibrant small business scene, India or China? Which one suffers more from bureaucratic redtape in business formation?

But the point of this post today is not about correcting the details of this NPR story. Rather, I want to raise a point on the American public consciousness about Asia.

It appears that most commentators on the "Rise" of Asia forecast the following: China/India/et al becomes ever richer. One day, their GDP exceeds that of the US. Voila, Asia is now a superpower. Warfare/conflict does not enter the narrative except a worry that the American Gung Ho nutjobs will screw it up by fighting the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait.

These commentators generally downplay the economic risks during the "Rise". China and India both faces significant recession risks in the near term. How they, and we the US, deal with their economic downturn will significantly define their future trajectory and our relationships.

When the economy is booming, as it is right now in Asia, everybody is happy, and they have few disputes with the US. People become angry when their heightened expectations do not pan out, as in a recession, and that is when war starts.

China and India's rising demand for oil is driving up the marginal price for oil now. As oil becomes more expensive, their governments will have to decrease their oil subsidies to the consumers, or increase taxation. An oil-driven inflation will easily cause unrest among the urban poor, leading toward widespread social disruption. Anecdotal evidence suggest that inflation is already higher this year in China than last year, though official inflation figures will not be available before year end. India's new car culture is also vulnerable to the rising oil.

The current energy crisis is also driving up food prices. The agricultural revolution that cured India's famine was fueled by fertilizers. As fertilizer prices have gone up across the world (petroleum is a key input to the aritificial fertilizers), food prices have gone up as well. India and China have stopped exporting rice due to expected shortage.

Beyond the current energy crisis, economic growth has also driven up the real estate in China (not sure about India). The real estate prices in Shanghai and Beijing are reminiscent of pre-recession Japan. In such a speculative environment, there will inevitably be a real estate price crash. We are the living proof of that today.

Even now, manufacturers are moving away from China in search of ever cheaper labor.

All this is to say, we should stop thinking about the "Rise" of Asia, or managing the rise of China and India into the multi-polar world. Instead, we need to start working on plans to manage the coming Chinese and Indian Depressions and/or Stagflations. The coming Asian economic crisis will define the 21st Century, just as the Great Depression defined the 20th Century and the rise of the United States as a Superpower.